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PREFACE
The original purpose of this thesis was to trace the
development of Argentine Churoh-State relations from their In-
ception down to the Peron era In order to see what Implications
history had In the Peron period.
The lnoreased complexity encountered In the Church as
well as the State, rather than diminishing the areas of conflict
between the two, has led to an Increase of areas where conflict
might arise slnoe each touches upon the other to a greater de-
gree than formerly. The ollmax of the Church-State struggle
was reached during the Perfin regime when friction between the
State and Church reached a maximum and resulted In the final
coup d' gtat against Per6n.
During the course of this research, It was discovered
that both the Church and the State were Involved In a continual
prooess of change, each aotlng upon the other with varying de-
grees. The Church, for Its part, had shifted Its emphasis from
a paramount concern with the political aspects of society In the
nineteenth century to the social aspects of society as It related
to the Individual In the twentieth century.
An attempt has been made to prove the hypothesis that the
Church changed Its direction as did the State, which was witnessed
by the proliferation of the centers of power of which the State
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Is composed. The changing Church and the changing State Inter-
acted one upon the other, leading to an Intensification of
friction between the two traditional power centers. This struggle
was climaxed during the Per6n era, when the Church became one of
the primary factors motivating the ouster of Per6n.
It was necessary to draw upon the past, upon men, upon
ideas, upon events, and upon a chronological recitation of recent
events that led up to the present mid-twentieth century Argen-
tina. All of these factors contributed toward gaining some
insight into the whole of Argentine Churoh-State relations as
manifested in the Peron administration. In addition, it was
necessary to investigate the preoepts, both religious and non-
religious, held by many Argentine theorists in order to arrive
at some comprehension of the complexity of the Church-State pro-
blem during the Peron tyranny. The strengths and weaknesses of
the Argentine Church, the position it held regarding marriage
and education and how national patronage had been used by the
State to further Its own nationalistic goals, were included In
this thesis. Additionally, the organization of the Church was
examined, as well as the new centers of power which had arisen
within the State—such as the political parties, the university
students, and labor—to bring order out of chaos and to arrive
at some concept of the interrelation between Churoh and State
In present day Argentina.
The necessity of obtaining a maximum of source material
in Spanish editions—most of which were not available In English
—has not severely handicapped the composition of this thesis,
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although It did Involve much extra time and work In reading.
Additionally, oontemporary Argentine periodicals were not readily-
available, which, had they been, would have aided the writer In
obtaining a clearer understanding of Church-State relations
during the Peronlst dictatorship. The author had to rely largely
upon periodicals and pamphlets for source material dealing with
the Per6n era and felt that a ohronologloal handling of that
period would best Illustrate the magnitude and complexity of the
problem as it developed.
Prom this thesis, the writer has obtained a clearer and
more oomprehen3lve idea of the weaknesses inherent in Argentine
democracy, aside from the main thesis that the Church has changed,
and why these weaknesses have come to exist. If time had per-
mitted and the source material could have been obtained from an
on-the-spot survey, this wrltor would have undertaken a study
of the religious practices and habits of the significant Argen-
tine centers of power, particularly the Argentine military class
and the oligarchy, and attempted to relate them more completely
to the Church and to the state. Unfortunately, this survey
could not be made at this tine. Therefore, the significance of
thl3 thesis depends upon showing how the Church-State problems
of the Per6n period developed against the intellectual baokdrop.
IKTEODUOTIOH
Nature of the Church
It Is highly essential for the reader of this paper to
have a basic comprehension of the terminology Involved, parti-
cularly with regard to the Churoh and Patronato . In as muoh as
the vocable "Church" Is used repeatedly throughout the text, the
reader should understand that this terra refers to a specific
oreed—that of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.
During the greater part of the 19th century, there was
such a unanimity of Argentine religious belief that the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Churoh or more simply, the Catholic Church,
was referred to as "the Church." For the purposes of this
paper, then, when reference Is made to "the Churoh," It will
be construed to mean the Roman Cathollo Apostolic Churoh.
However, as religious diversity In Argentina Increased toward
the last deoades of the 19th oentury, a change In terminology
was necessitated In order to arrive at a more preolse definition
due to ohanglng circumstances. Therefore, for the purpose of
making oredal distinctions and since the former unanimity of
religious belief was no longer In evidence, valid referenoe will
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be made to the Soman Catholio Churoh or Catholic Ohurch, rather
than simply to "the Churoh" as formerly.
Having at the outset, established the particular Christian
oreed to which this paper refers, It will be useful to define
what the prerequisites and qualifications were for membership
in the Roman Catholic Church and what the visible signs of the
Church in society were.
The Roman Oatholle Church held that any person who had
been baptized by a Roman Catholio ecclesiastic automatically
beoame a member In the nyetlcal body of Christ—the Roman Catholio
Churoh—being the visible sign of His existence In this world.
Unlike most other Christian creeds, where actual confirmation
was required before an Individual could be considered as a church
nenber, baptism alone was sufficient for membership In the Roman
Catholic Ohurch. The Individual thus beoame a member of this
particular creed, as a general rule, while atlll In Infancy before
the reasoning abilities of the mind had become developed. The
practical result of this led to the growth of a diversity of
opinion among other oreeds as to just what did oonstltute member-
ship In the Roman Catholic Ohurch. In order to equate churoh
membership between the other Christian seots and the Roman Catholic
Churoh, many considered Catholics only those who were "practicing"
—that Is those who affirmed their continued adhesion to the
church by manifesting the outward signs of membership, which
consisted of receiving the Saorament of Communion at least onoe
a year.
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Theoretloally, all those individuals who had been bap-
tized were onoe considered members of the Koman Catholic reli-
gion in Argentina as elsewhere. In recent tines, the Xoman
Catholic Church Itself has begun making a distinction between
the active members and the nominal members of the Church,
nowever in Latin America and in Argentina in particular, the
classification of members of the Catholic Church has been
broadened to lnolude not only aotive and nominal members, but
also the expressions of Catholicism, which make up a part of the
whole. Accordingly, a brief outline of the various types of
Catholics and Cathollolsia is given as follows:
1. formal Catholicism : Those individuals who have pro-
fessed Catholicism by means of the Sacrament of Confirmation
and those who practice and accept the dootrines and discipline
of the Church, as imparted to them by the olergy, are olaeslfled
as "formal" Catholics, In certain other parts of the world
these Individuals would be oategorlzed as "aotive" or "practicing"
Catholics.
2. fioalnflA Catholicism: An individual who had acknow-
ledged membership in and who makes some minor manifestation of
allegiance to the Church, but makes little effort to follow th<-
rites and prescriptions of the aotive Catholio, is classified in
this category. This group cannot be oomparod to the "fallen-
away" Catholic since many nominal Cathollos, and, more speoifloally,
those in Argentina oonslder themselves to bo "very Catholio,"
even though they are not aotive or practicing Catholics.
3. Cultural Catholicism : ThlB category can be defined
ae a form of social Catholicism or as a way of life. If the
entire environment of an area is permeated with Catholic thought
in most fields of human endeavor—such as the political,
phllosophloal, religious, economic nnd Institutional spheres-
then a Cathollo oulture can be said to obtain.
4. fo],lc Cathollolgn : This type of Cathollolsm Is expressed
through "Indigenous praotloes and oustoms," whloh while not In
conflict with the teachings of the Church, are only distantly
related to the formal and Intellectual aspeot of the Church. 1
Now that we have enumerated the various types of Cathollos
and the forms of Cathollolsm, how can the Argentine nation be
classified? The Argentine people, or the majority of thes, have
Inherited a traditional or cultural Catholicism from the past,
which was limited to certain nominal sentiments and pious prac-
tices, but one In whloh little Influence has been exerted upon
the Individual, the family, or the professional life of the
nation. 2 As a consequence, a religious heterogeneity had developed
—a religious characteristic not extraordinary to the Latin
world, but one quite alien to the tenets of Anglo-Saxon Cathollolsm.
In Argentina, there existed a deep devotion and piety to the
William J. Coleman, "Latln-Anerloan Cathollolsm," World
Horizon Reports
. XXIII (1958), 3-4.
MBtM
2isreera secana Interanerlcana de acci^n qatfilloa . Doou-
«w (Llaa-Ohlmbote: 1953), p. 60. Cited hereafter as Tercera
fifjnana. Unless otherwise Indicated It may be assumed by the
roader that all quoted exoerpts from Spanish language works used
In this paper have been translated by this writer, James K. Aye.
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Vlrgln and a aonamanlaoal oonoern for the naoranent of 3apti«j
however, paradoxically, the Sacrament of Harriage was oynloally
regarded. If at all, and attendance at ;;ass or the praotlce of
the other sacraments has teen viewed as only an annoyance. Since
the prlnolpal of the aaorament was supreme In the Internal struc-
ture of the Church as to Its frequency and devotion, the
heterogeneity of Argentine Catholicism Is readily apparent.?
Seminal Catholicism in Argentina may be attributed to
two primary causes—that of absolute lgnoranoe and that of rela-
tive ignorance. In the former, the individual never reoelved
any dear religious education or Instruction, and he based his
religious practices upon a great deal of superstition and fanatical
sentiments. In the latter, the individual received only a supsr-
flolal form of religious instruction at home or in the oolleges,
with the result that his oonoern for religious matters has been
sublimated to the desire for improving his material and professional
position in life.*
Argentine Catholicism was thua a cultural Catholicism or
a way of life that started at birth and continued throughout the
life of the individual. 5 Most Argentines were Influenced by the
ethics of the Church in varying degrees—either consciously or
unconsciously. Visible reminders of the Church's presence were
encountered everywhere—from the black-robed priests to the small
statues of the Virgin in corner niches. 5?he exterior signs of
'Coleman, p. 5.
4Teroera semana . pp. 60-61.
the Church may hare been quite deceiving, since a rather deep
schism has always existed between the rural dvellers and the
city Inhabitants—an age-old division that has bean found among
all 8eetor3 of society, a division that may be traced back to
the foundation of the nation. 6 This division, this ohasm, has
resulted In a continuing straggle between the foroo3 of is
baxbarle
.
as represented In the rule of caudlllos and despots,
and those of la clvlll5aol6n . aa masterfully portrayed In ths
olasslc ^r-ontlne novol, Tacundo .
In the hinterlands Argentine Catholicism was mora rigid,
nore devout, mora pious. It wa3 a cultural and traditional
Cathollolsn baaed upon superficial beliefs, and It derived Its
otrenrjth from the past and from tradition.7 ,/hioh of the two,
the rural traditional or the nodorn urban and lntollectual
Catholicism, be3t repreaentod the Argentina faith? The answer
to this would bo that both forma of Catholloljm wore representa-
tive of Argentina. However, In reoent years that of the rational,
the aduorvtod, the urban Catholicism would seem to have been In
the ascendency.
^
Ihld .. P* 17A. Bruce seems more concerned with Judging
the strength of Catholicism by Its outward manifestations than
a states that "outside of
Is over stronger ..." The
by aotual beliefs and praotloes. Ha
Buenos Aires the Church's influence
reason he gives for this value Judgment Is that "In every blook
of staunchly conservative Cfirdoba, a priest may be found." His
observation apparently was based upon an urban area, Cdrdoba,
whloh lc comparable to tuenos Aires and therefore not relevant
to the rural-urban problen.
"
ibid ., p. 177.
°Ceorge I. Blaaksten, ?er6n'B Argentina (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 230.
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A transoendental question that has confronted all chroni-
clers of Church-State relations and one that still has defied a
definitive solution, has bean: who represents the Church and
what are Its spokenmen? Officially, the hierarchy acting oolleo-
tlvely enunciates the official position of the Church through
the Issuance of Joint pastoral letters. In other words, the
lesser clergy and, particularly, the parish priest can not
authoritatively speak for the collective body of the Churoh.
Their Ideas may coincide with that of the official position of
the Churoh, In which instance they could be considered as repre-
sentative of offlolal churoh policy. On other occasions the
homilies of the lower olergy may differ considerably from those
opinions held by their immediate superiors—In whioh instance
they do not represent the Churoh and have been frequently dis-
avowed. Unofficially, a number of eminent Catholic laymen, fro»
time to time, have spoken in the name of the Church and have
defended oertaln Church interests. They may be regarded only
as unofficial spokesmen of the Church, although their persuasions
might be Identical with that of the Churoh. Public disavowed
has been the prlnoipal method by which the Churoh has disasso-
ciated Itself from various heterodox doctrines of its unofficial
spokesmen. Later oonfusion will be avoided, especially durine
the Perdn tyranny, if the aforesaid oonoepts are born in mind.
Churoh-State Spheres o£ Influence
Many Argentine lntolleotualo traditionally believed
that there existed two primary opheren of influence in sooiety
—the temporal and the spiritual. Caslello has suocinotiy
defined the npirltual realm of society as that in whioh
the Churoh, Independently of all huaan power,
has the facility to act In order to fulfill
Its ends and to employ the oholoe of p.deouate
measures to advanoe Itself.
9
This Interpretation generally coincided with that expressed by
the Roman Catholic Church, but it may necessarily differ from
that upheld by some other Christian creeds. In the temporal
sphere of aoolety the State was looked upon as "a perfect olvll
aoolety of the natural order with its sphere of aotion In its
sovereign structure." 10 Catholics, being the subjeots of one
society, were at the same time the subjects of the other, and
since both temporal and spiritual powers were exercised over one
person, harmonious collaboration between the two wae needed. 11
If harmonious collaboration was not effeotuated between the tem-
poral and the spiritual powers, the results were schizophrenic,
since the Individual In the final analysis might at some time be
foroed to make a ohoioe between one or the other. Theoretically,
the temporal and the spiritual orders of society eaoh had Its
own sphere of activity, but in praotloe there were certain areas
10ibid., p. m.
"•Ibid., p. 19.
Aire
of eoeiety where coterminous Jurisdictions between the two
existed. It ie in these areas that the Church and ?tate visually
worfced together in an effort to harmonize the nnture of things.
Forever at tires, as in the Perfe era, harmony did not prevail.
In reality an absolute wall of separation between the
temporal and the spiritual powers could not be erected, since
In certain r.rear of inbrlcated Jurisdiction the exact Units of
each were not delineated. In these areas of inbrlcated Juris-
diction, conflicts have arisen in the same social organism; for
there existed where both powers held r coincidental competence,
permanent llnklnc of the Juridloal with the noral order. When
conflicts rroan, sons Argentines believed the Htato should "not
subordinate Itself to the Church nor the Church to the State. Ml2
Throughout Argentine history however, the Church has affirmed
Its right of spiritual sovereignty which it claimed was over and
above that of the State. Tet, re noted inter, -r.tror.r.to has
United this Implication of sovereignty.
The freedom and independence of the Church and the stability
of the State could best be obtained, according to Jose Manuel
rintredn, "Ouando se da a Dlos lo Que es de Bios f al Cer.ar lo que
ec del C^sar."1' The difficulty with this lay in defining whloh
orders pertained exclusively to the spiritual and which belonged
exclusively to the temporal order of things. The coincidental
'frrandeB esorltores Argentlnos . Vol. XXVII, Jose Manuel
istrada, La lglfisla y el eetado" (Eueaoe Aires: El Ateneo Press)
1929, p. 20. Cited hereafter as Estrada.
13Caslello, p. 20.
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areas of power—areas of overlapping Jurisdiction where conflict?
have arisen—were usually settled through a mutual cooperation
of the two powers when a bona fide desire to adjudicate disputes
was present. Otherwise, areas of frlotlon between the two—the
Church and the State—might continue over a long period of time,
resulting In tense and unsettled conditions.
In theory, the Churoh occupied a position high above the
passions of oonfllet, the struggles of politics and the machina-
tions of man, but at times, It has felt compelled to enter Into
the polltloal fray. On occasion, It has subjected Itself to
saorlleglous outrages and vilifications from the temporal order.
Prom time to time, areas of conflict have arisen In natters per-
taining to patronage, eduoatlon, and marriage as these are
spheres of oolnoldental Jurisdiction, and the Churoh and State
have not always worked together in a spirit of harmonious co-
operation. In the eduoatlonal field, the foremost Argentine
religious thinker of the last century, Jos« Hanuel Estrada, be-
lieved that the State should not educate, but that if it did,
It must inouloate certain religious principles Into its subjects?
otherwise education without religion was sterile and contained
the fecundity of atheism. 1* The Church admitted that the State
had the right to eduoate, but only if religious principles were
taught along with and included In the regular currioulum. Where
the 3tate has not obliged itself to impart religious eduoatlon
in the public schools, the Church has protested unceasingly and
14Estrada, p. 63.
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countered by providing the facilities for a separate, but equal,
education based upon religious principles. As this problem is
treated at length in Chapter IV, It will suffice to make only
brief mention of it now.
Contrary to a majority of Argentine opinion, Estrada
held that the separation of Church and State in Argentina would
be highly deelreable, since it would benefit the Church and free
it from political interference by the oivil authority. He
opined that in the long run, the Church would be stronger and
more able to concentrate on carrying out its mission of education,
and thus would be better adopted to the developing of a high
moral tone among the people. ^5 other leading Argentines have
advocated a separation of the Church from the State, but to date,
all such attempts have proved fruitless. It is ooncelvable that
a future generation of Argentines will witness this separation,
hut until such a time, any prediction along this line would he
pure conjecture.
Mature of Pt
i
1:
'rnimtt
A clear understanding of Church-State relations in Argen-
tina is possible only through some knowledge of oatronato and,
later during the national period, of patronato naclonal . Patro-
nato or patronage may be defined "as the power to nominate or
present a cleric for installation in a vacant benefice."1 *) Some
15Ihld .. p. 61.
16J. Lloyd !!eoham, Church & State in Latin America (Chapel
IIllli University of North Carolina Press, 1934), p. 2.
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Argentlnes regarded It as the Intervention of the civil power
Into ecclo3lastloal matters. This right of Intervention by the
temporal power Into the realm of the spiritual gradually evolved
In Spain prior to the Kiddle Ages, but reached Its zenith only
after the Heoonqulata
.
when the 3panlsh Grown was granted or
conceded the right to present prelates to all vaoant sees newly
recovered from the Moors by the Holy See.
During the medieval period two sohoolB of thought vera
formed as to the exaot nature and origin of patronage. One
school of thought, the regallst, held that royal patronage was
laical In origin and, consequently. Inherent In temporal sovereign-
ty. The regallsts claimed that since patronage derived Its
source from Its possessor, that, If the possessor was laloal,
then It pertained to the temporal sphere and not the spiritual.
The other school of thought, called canonist or ultramontanlst,
on the othor hand, maintained that patronage pertained to spiri-
tual matters and derived lt3 origins from the early pontifical
concessions to the Spanish Crown. The latter believed that
patronage, which had originated with the Fapaoy and was likewise
reBdndable by the Holy See, was non-transferrable. 1?
Universal patronage by the 15th century had so evolved
that the Papaoy held exclusive claim to It and the right to con-
cede It to whomever It willed. s such, through a series of
papal bulls, specific patronal rights were granted to the Spanish
Crown, represented at the time by los reyes oat6llcos. First,
17Ibld>. p. 2.
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the Pontiff ceded to the Spanish Crown the right of nomination
of eccleslastlos In the kingdom of Granada and the privilege of
collecting perpetual dlezmos . or tithes, from the newly oonverted
Moors. After the dlEoovery of the Indies, the Spanish Crown
petitioned the Holy Gee to grant Spain possession of the reoently
discovered lands and In turn, they would extend the dominion of
the Roman Cathollo faith."!8 Accordingly, the Holy See Issued
the now famous hull of Inter Caetra , In which title to all lands
west of a line drawn from pole to pole, a distance of one hundred
leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands was granted on
condition that the Spanish Crown would prosecute missionary
work In the new lands.^ As the Papaoy, due to lack of communi-
cations, was unable to Christianise the new lands, the Spanish
Crown, whloh alone was capable of establishing a transatlantic
Churoh, was given the power to oarry out the mission.
Papal recognition of the heavy expenses born by the Spanish
Crown In the carrying out of its spiritual mission In the new
territories was acknowledged In 1501, when Pope Alexander VI
Issued another bull, granting the Spanish Crown "the right to
levy tithes upon all the Inhabitants of the Indies and the explicit
right of building churches and erecting dlooeses." 2^ Finally, In
1508, Pope Julius II Issued the bull entitled Universalis
r:ccleslae , whloh granted the Spanish Crown the legal right to
exercise olvll Jurisdiction over the Churoh In the Hew World.
13Ibld .. p. 12
19
Iblfl ., p. 14.
^Ibld. . p. 16.
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'ilil last bull, explicitly and lnoontrovertlbly, e weeded the
right of patronage to the Spanish Crown through the cotu proorlo
or the suprene Pontiff, The Church cluirsed that the civil
authority could not Intervene In natters of a spiritual nature,
as those natters were Its exclusive concern unless It expressly
ooncented to thl2 Intervention." The Corpus Juris Canonlol .
1448, of the Roman Catholic Church was quite speolflc on the
patronal conoept '.rhen It stated that
patronage Is the relating of privileges vrlth
certain offices that, by the concession of the
Church, compete for the Catholic establishing
of a church, ohapel, benefloe or as signs. 22
The act of founding a ohurch, aooordlng to the canonists, did
not oarry with It the right of patronage, for the origin of
patronage was the Holy 3ee, as previously mentioned, which had
suprene Jurisdiction over the Universal Churoh, The regallet
claln of patronage, whloh later became predominant In Argentina,
was based upon the Inherent rights of sovereignty and Its nature
derived from the possessor, not from the Papaoy. The Argentine
nation, thus, as the temporal power possessed the right of
patronage as Inherited from the Spanish Crown, and as such It
belonged to the temporal sphere, ^coordlngly, the State had the
right of presentation to vacant sees and could restrict or expand
the dloceslan boundaries of the Church.
Within the short span of one hundred years, partially due
to the Papal concessions of patronage and partially due to the
21
"Caslollo, p. 45.
Law 1448 . olted by Caslello, p. 45.
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energy of the Spanish aonarohs, tho Spanish Crown bad bo
thoroughly and completely established civil control over the
Ohuroh In the .lew i.'orld that tho Suprene Pontiff , made virtually
inpotent in dealing wlih the ecclesiastical affairs of the Churoh,
had even bcon limited in his right to promulgate duIIb and other
pronounoeEonts. The Papaoy could not even construct religious
edifices without tho prior approval of the Spanish Grown nor
exercise full discipline or control over the clergy in the New
World. The union of throne and altar in Spain and in the Indies
was bo complete that the temporal could barely be distinguished
from the spiritual. However, reciprocal understanding was not
always maintained between the Holy See and the Spanish Crown,
and frequent disputes over the rights of patronage occurred. 2^
Jor over three hundred years most confliota were Eettled aimloatly.
The regaliste 1 concept of patronage did not assume any measure
of great importance until after the Independence Movement.
national pTltr?n,iffit
The advent of Argentine independence ruptured all reli-
gious and polltloal connections with the Spanish Crown. The new
leaders of tho nascent republlo immediately came to grips with
the problem of patronato noclonal . I'arlano Koreno, the first
secretary of the govornlnc Junta of 1010, asserted the Argentine
regalist olaisi that tho rights of national patronage were inherent
23caeiello, p. 54.
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ln sovereignty. He based this olalm on the fact that the
Junta was merely a substitution of the vloeroy and, as a con-
sequenoa, assumed the same powers and Jurisdiction over the new
nation that the viceroy had retained, Including the vloe-patronage.^
Persently the local caudlllos and .lefes . contained within the
Incumbent government, made use of national patronage as an In-
strument of governmental policy and as a means to further their
own particular ends. 2^
Upon Bernardino Rlvadavla's acoesslon to power In the
decade of the 1820* s, the regallstlo ooncept of national patronage
began to flourish. Rlvadavla found It easy to assert the dominance
of the State and to relegate the Church to a subservient position,
for the Church was Incommunicado with the Holy See, and the last
of the Spanish ecclesiastics had died. He pursued his religious
reforms so that the Churoh—stripped of most of Its property,
legislated against by the regallsts and weakened by the loss of
leadership—practically reverted Into a national ohuroh. 26 The
Church neither received Its Independence nor Its freedom, but
Instead was subjected to the regallstlo ooncept of patronage—
a
national patronage far more dlreot than the former royal patronage
had ever been.
2*Faustlno J. Legon, Bootrlna j ejerctolo del patron*to
naolonal (Buenos Aires: Imprenta naolonal de Lajouane y Cla.
,
1920), p. 229.
25Coleman, pp. 14-15.
"John Joseph Kennedy, Cathollolsn . nationalism and
geaqraoy In Argentina (Notre Dame: University of :'otre Dame
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The Holy See rejected the Argentine pretensions to na-
tional patronage and reasserted Its claim to oonoede patronage
to whoa It willed. The canonist viewpoint held by the Papaoy
was completely Ignored by the Argentine governmental leaders,
for non-oomaunloatlon with Rone was to remain a fait accompli
for twenty-five years. The Papaoy'e basic objections to a
unilateral assertion of the rights of presentation were disre-
garded. 27
After the Rosas tyranny, when the furor caused by national
patronage had subsided, the regallsto secured the government's
right to oontlnue the exercise of the national patronage through
Its Incorporation Into the Constitution of 1853. Article 83,
Sections 8 and 9, specified that the Argentine president exer-
cised the right of national patronage through the presentation
of bishops for the oathedral ohurohes as proposed by the Senate
from a list of three names. 28 The Church, for Its part, was
awarded a permanent representation In the Senate In the person
of a bishop and three minor olergy. In addition, the eplsoopacle3
were placed on an equal footing with the highest civil function-
aries and, like them, subject to accusation for crimes against
the nation. They were required to take an oath to uphold and
observe the Constitution. 2^
Catholic opinion, led by Jos6 "anuel Estrada, was unal-
terably opposed to the regallst position and believed that the
^Estrada, pp. 27-28.
28Argentine Constitution fif. 1853. 3eo. 8 & 9.
29M«oham, p. 275.
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clvil authority hnd seriously transgressed Into the religious
sphere. Estrada was especially critical of the decree of 1815,
denying admittance to monastio communities of all persons unless
they had attained their thirtieth birthday. He held thla regu-
lation violated the Individual's freedom of oholce and selection;
therefore, It was unconstitutional. 5° Not only was the Indivi-
dual's freedom negated In the exerolse of national patronage,
but "the patronized creed Is subject to a tutelage which violates
equity and denlos religious freedom. "31 Estrada oontlnued his
struggle against national patronage until near the end of the
oentury. ?or hla the "sovereign power did not have a religious
oapaclty"32 and the Argentine Constitution of 1853 denied the
eooleslastioal fueros or privileges.
Although the struggle against the regallst oonoept of na-
tional patronage met with failure, a modus vlvendl was agreed
upon. The Holy See acquiesced to the right of presentation as
exerolsed by successive Argentine presidents. If somewhat reluc-
tantly, but it steadfastly refused to recognize the Inherence of
patronage In sovereignty. 33 The result of this modus vlvendl has
been beneficial to both the Church and the State, since rarely
have conflicts arisen between the two opposing parties, never-
theless, on rare occasions when conflicts have ooourred, such
3°Estrada, pp. 27-28.
31Ibld .. p. 34.
32
Ifeii». P« 34.
33xennedy, pp. 15-17.
-19-
ns during the Alvear and ?er6n administrations, the need for
a concordat has boen evidenced. Thin exigency lias been recog-
nized by different political leaders at variouo tines, although
all attempts to ooncludo a concordat between Argentina and the
Holy See have time far ended in failure.
OHAPIS I
BACKGROUND OP CHURCH-STATE RELATI0N3: 1810-1892
The Independence Period
The Church, from the very outset, was lntrloated In the
struggle for Independence from Spain. Fully ten per cent or
twenty-six clerics participated In the first open meeting or
cablldo ablerto of May 22, 1810—a meeting destined to set the
Vlceroyalty of La Plata onto the road of Independence. Manuel
Lu6 y ftlega, the senior bishop of La Plata, was lnoluded among
that fateful gathering. An ardent royalist, as were the majority
of Argentine olergy at the start of the Independence movements,
he had opposed the overthrow of the last Spanish viceroy, Llnlers,
by voting again t his subsequent deposition. Pi hop Lue's
direction was not followed by the majority of the clergy in
attendance, as they, like most members of the lower clergy, har-
bored strong feelings of Creole resentment against the favorltlst
and exclusive policies of Spain. They endorsed by oatenatlon
the lead of General Paseual Ruiz Huldobro, who had voted In the
affirmative for viceroy Llnlers* displacement. 2
^-Kloardo Leveno, A. History of Argentina , ed. k trans.
William Spenoe Robertson (Chapel HlTlT University of l.'orth
Carolina Press, 1937), p. 156.
*Hegr. Augustln Plagglo, Influenola del olero en la lnde-
pendenola Argentina (3aroeloaa: :.uls Gill ed., 1912), p. 19.
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The resulting dichotomy was an attendant consequenoe of
contradictory views held within the Church, but as the War of
Independence progressed sone of the clerics formerly opposed
to Independence altered their views and resigned themselves to
the Inevitable. 3y 1813, death and exile of all the higher
prelates satisfactorily resolved the antithetical schools of
thought.' Meanwhile the lower clergy had contributed substan-
tial amounts of support to the independence struggle, not only
of a pecuniary nature, but also through their voluntary enlistment
as chaplains and spiritual advisers in the revolutionary army of
General Manuel Belgrano. Honorable mention was granted by Bel -
grano to a number of clerios who had served their eountry beyond
the call of duty. Two of these patriotic priests were the
Reverend Klguel Araoz, rector of the cathedral church at Salta,
and the Reverend Juan Ignaoio ciorrlti, the Chaplain-Vicar of
the Belgrano army.
Clerical duties did not prevent Araoz from recruiting a
volunteer army of 2,000 men to assist In the demise of Spanish
sovereignty. Abandonment of the city of Salta had originally
been considered, but the appearance of the 2,000 volunteers under
the leadership of Araoz and his brother renewed the lagging spirits
of General Balcarces* armed forces, and the united forces decided
to make a stand. The result of this action led to the containment
of ex-viceroy Liniers* troops and was followed by the decisive
battle of Tuouman, where the Spanish armies were fatefully defeated. 4
2:echan, p. 68
4Plagglo, p. 72.
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A seoond patriotic priest, the Beverend Juan Icnaelo
Gorrlti, was one of the fathere of Argentine independence.
Holding the post of spiritual adviser to all of General Belgrano's
armies, Oorriti gave unstinting encouragement to the battle weary
foroea and played an important role in the ultimate outcome.
5
The rising tide of oaudllllsao forced him into Bolivian exile—
a
happy circumstance for posterity, for without being exiled, bis
memorable work entitled Refleclones might not have been written.
This "foremost philosopher of the Revolution" believed that a
free society, based upon Christian Ideals, should be constructed
and that this society would inspire a public morality which would
moke freedom possible. 6 Attainment of these ideals could be
reaohed only through a universal system of popular education,
according to Corrlti.7 His educational ideas were rather advanced
for the time, and he might be regarded as a harbinger of the
foremost advocate of universal education at a later period, Gar-
mlento. auaranteeing the personal freedom of the individual might
beet be assured in a federalized nation, where a division of power
operated. The visions of r.orritl, in spite of their immediate
failure, became the political Ideals of the Argentine nation at a
later date and aooorded him a permanent place among the great
political and reliCiouB thinkers oonneoted with the Independence
struggle.
S
ttLfc»i P. 138.
Kennedy, pp. 50-51.
7lbid., pp. 53-54.
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Tbo Dominican friar, Justo Saata Maria de Dro, another
great Argentine thinker of this early period, ha3 been remembered
for his opposition to a monarchical form of government. In an
lmpasolonod plea before the Congress of Tuoumfin in 1816, the
partisans of Independent monarchy were decisively beaten, and
the way waa paved for a republican form of government—a form of
government which lias oontlnued, with minor interruptions, down
to the present day.
Dean Gregorlo Punes, dean of the cathedral church of c6rdoba
and rootor of the renowned university of the same name, was one
of the most Influential of the patriotic priests. An aotlve
supporter of the independence movement from Its inception, "unes
promoted r. 3uooesslon of uprisings in his native city which impelled
the Spanish ex-vicoroy, Llnlers, to oonvolca the provincial militia.
The tumult oreated by ?unes, ooupled with the news that a revolu-
tionary army under General Manuel Ooampo was approaching from
r.uenos Aires, led Llnlers to flee without giving battle—thus
ending Spanish resistance before It had begun. 9 Many years later,
Dean Punes made eloquent use of his pen for the purpose of molding
public opinion during those first orltioal years of freedom.10
Clorical dissemination of the ideas of independence among the
manses was possible uince "the oonvent was the school
. . . and
8Pdwin Ryan, The Churoh in the South American Republlos
(Westminster, I'd.: The Tewraan Book Shop, 1943), pp. 45-46.
9Piagglo, p. 51.
10Walter ::. Langford, "The hole of Catholic Culture in
Argentina," The Ottocqio Historical ::evlew . XXVI, No. 1 (April,
19AO), p. 59.
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the pulpit wa3 the first Grandstand."11 Notwithstanding the
contributions to the lndependenoe movements made by the afore-
mentioned prelates, the clergy as a whole were "conservative and
reactionary, eager to maintain their ancient prerogatives,
functions, and Influence, and even desiring to Increase their
power at the expense of the civil autborltlee. Profoundly
Influenced by the Ideas of the .'renoh phllosophes, most of the
revolutionary leaders complained of the olergy's attitude as
being too conservative and reactionary. Kany desired to curtail
the functions of the clergy, but were fully aware of the olergy's
Influence upon the masses and handled the Issue with caution. 1'
The two most orltlcal problems confronting the Ohuroh
after Independence were the question of national patronage and
the total lack of communication -.dth the Holy See, both of which
were to defy an easy solution. Did the nascent government In-
herit the patronal authority from the Spanish Crown, as the re-
gallsts claimed, or was this a usurpation of the Holy See's rights?
Did the lack of communication with the Holy See threaten the
continued existence of the Ohuroh as part of the Unlvereal Churoh?
The answer to the first question depended upon which side or posi-
tion had been taken. Prom the regallst point of view, the patronal
rights were Inherent In sovereignty, but from the Church's vlew-
UPlagglo, p. 33.
12J. Fred Rlppy, Percy Alvln "artln, Issao Joslln Cox,
Argentina
.
Brazil and Chile since Independence (Washington, D.C.!
The Geo. Washington University Press, 1935), p. 70.
13Ibld .. pp. 70-71.
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polnt, they had been usurped by the State, unilaterally. The
answer to the second proposition must be given In the affirma-
tive, since the Ohuroh In Argentina was In real danger of becoming
a separate and national church. The effect of these early pro-
blems were to be observed long after their presentation. The
rupture between the Argentine state and the Holy See, on the
advent of Independence had left the Ohurch virtually Incommuni-
cado—a division that would witness the demoralization of a great
part of the olergy In view of the laoJc of hierarchical leadership,
and the flight of the Spanish born olergy and religious orders
during the Ware of Independence. 14 Those few seminaries which
were extant before independence were first sequestered and na-
tionalized by the government and finally Included as part of the
State controlled university system. x5 Disintegration of authority,
with the consequent rise in moral laxity, and the aoute shortage
of olergy practically halted the Churoh's christianizing mission.
After independence, and prior to Rlvadavia's administration,
no conscientious attempt was made by the State to reduce the
Church from Its former high position under the Spanish Crown.
The political leaders of that epooh dared not attack the official
position of the Church for they needed a maximum of support.
Nevertheless, the Constitution of 1819, with its incorporation of
national patronage, laid the basis for future Churoh-State con-
flicts. The Ohuroh was recognized as the official State religion,
14l.evene, p. 363.
^Coleman, p, 15.
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but an important point of departure occurred when liberty of
conscience was guaranteed to all, 16 The Church, as a corollary
of the Constitution of 1819, became partially subjugated to the
State—a subjugation which would reach its apogee during the
long Rosas tyranny.
The Rlvadavlan Ho forms
The prlnoipal minister to Governor :<odrlguez and the power
behind the government, Bernardino Rlvadavia, aspired to purge
the Churoh in iiuenos Aires province from the moral laxity into
which it had fallen because of the dirth of ecclesiastical super-
vision. * Abolition of tithes and eocleslastleal courts, restric-
tion of the number of religious houses, secularization of the
cemeteries by nationalization and abduction of the greater part
of ohurch property were effeotuated when the Argentine Congress,
on Deoember 21, 1022, adopted ilvadavla ' s reforms. Henoeforth,
an annual accounting had to be made to the government by all
remaining religious houses—a procedure designed to reduce the
flagrant laxity and oorruption, if not to eliminate it. 18 The
transgression of the temporal power into the realm of the spiritual
was passively resisted by most of the olergy, the only notable
10Meoham, p. 275.
17Peter :<:. Dunne, S.J., "The Ohurch in Latin Amerioa,"
The Catholic Churoh In .vorld Affairs , ed. Waldenar Gurlan (Notre
Dane, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954), p. 406.
l8Langford, p. 60.
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exoeptlor. bain; Dean Punes, who approved of the long overdue
reforms, believing then to be necessary for the correction of
abuses. The Klvadavian reforme were not an "attack upon the
dogmas of the Church nor in attack against the religion, but
only upon the external oontrol of organization."W
The Constitution of 1826 further restricted the Church's
power while enhancing the regallst oonoept of national patronage
by granting to the Argentine Supreme Court the power to oensure
all papal bulls, letters and communications. The Supreme Court,
thus, was a censuring body as well as an Interpretative organ
of the government, and since It alone could recommend the admission
of papal correspondence which it deemed fit, It became authori-
tative In rellglouB as well as secular matters. 20 Ohuroh subor-
dination to the State had made the Church an unwilling captive
of the civil authority.
Normal relations with the Holy See had yet to be esta-
blished; meanwhile, the neoesslty of refilling the vaoant sees
became Increasingly Insistent If the Church were to survive as
an organization. Having no means to assess the true condition
of the Church In Argentina, the Holy See pursued a policy of pru-
dent expectancy throughout the entire Rlvadavlan period.
At long last the Pontiff named Mariano Medrano y Cabrera
as Bishop of Aulon in partibus to the sede vacnnte of Buenos
Aires. 21 Unfortunately, the cathedral chapter of the diocese
9Keohan, p. 278.
20
Ibl,d .. P. 279.
21Ibld .. p. 282.
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of Buenos Aires refused the right of possession to ?l3hop Ma-
drono, maintaining that his nomination had been canonical rather
than patronal and wae Illegal per se. At the sane time Pedro
Agrelo, the Argentine fiscal or Attorney-deneral, concurred
vlth the opinion of the cathedral chapter by refusing to grant
tne pase of the exequatur to Vedrano's papal oull of Institution. 22
At this Junction a special governmental commission composed of
theologians and Jurists was convoked to further elucidate the
heretofore nebulous principles of patronato naclonal . The com-
mission's decision was rendered In the emorlal a.lustado of 1834--
s determination that was destined to set the pattern for future
Argentine Church-State relations. As trl^ht have been supposed,
the commission's Interpretation was a regallstlc one, especially
In view of the fact that the regallst sohool of thought had been
In the ascendency since independence. Particular attention to
the remorlal a.lustado 's important points are listed as follows:
1. Reaffirmation of the right of national patronage as
being Inherent in sovereignty,
£. National determination of the admlssabillty of papal
documents and communications.
3. Covornnental rlr;ht of presentation to all eoclesiastlcal
offices.
A. Episcopal adherence to patronato naclonal and sworn
allegiance to the government.
5. Curtailment of papal power to appoint to vaoant sees or
to alter the territorial llraltB of dioceses without the consent
22Ibld .. p. 280.
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of the government. 23
Having now reasserted Its right to national patronage
In 1834, the government chose to recognize Manuel Medrano as the
first bishop to occupy the see of Buenos Aires since the demise
of Bishop Lue In 1812. Acoeptanee mm conceded only because
Pedro Agrelo, the Attorney-General, had some years previously
proposed his nomination for the same benefice. This previous
action by the government was sufficient testimony that Hedrano's
appointment by the Pope was not In violation of Argentine law
as embodied In the rights of national patronage. 24
At Rosas Tyranny
Juan Manuel Rosas, despot, tyrant, and autocrat, was to
emerge upon the Argentine political stage soon after the Rivadavlan
reforms. Under the guise of caud^llo of |g r^tauEacite-res tora-
tion signifying a return to the traditional Argentine conoepts
and ways of life-Rosas led the Argentine people down an Infamous
road to tyranny. The pillars upon which Ms dictatorship were
to rest were the Army and the Church. Rosas used the Church to
further his absolutism, on one hand, and protect It from its
political adversaries on the other. The Church was quickly "con-
verted Into a servile instrument of the tyranny, "25 and willingly
submitted to hln personal power—a natural reaction to the
23rbid., p. 283.
Kennedy, p. 20.
^lecham, p. 284.
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Eivadavlan reforms. The great majority or the clergy warmly
endorsed the new regime In the beginning—an endorsement which
would be duplicated a hundred years later and similarly regretted. 2"
Wholeheartedly allying itself with i.oaas from the start, the
Church soon became caught up in a web of entanglement In support
of La santa causa do la federaolfln . from whiob it oould not extri-
cate itself.
The Jesuits and other religious orders, expelled during
the ivadavlan period, were summoned back by Rosas, although
this favor would exaot a costly prloe. Sermons extolling the
regime were demanded, as well ae the display of the tyrant's por-
trait upon all church altars. 2 ' Onoe again, the union of throne
and altar was manifested under 1& re3tauracl6n . for everyone was
28
obligated by law to hear liass and to join into religious services.
.osas himself was not a believer until it suited his political
ambitions, lie had been indifferent previously toward religion,
if not outright atheistic, but now ambition drove hia to adopt
religion or at least the outward forms of It. He "needed a fana-
tical dloguloc—an alliance with men of the colonial spirit,
"
29
and this he found in the Church.
Viewing the anarchical conditions that proceeded his tri-
umph, the people understanding^ enough hungered for law and order,
26Soe Chapter III.
^Hyan, p. 51.
2°Ingenieroa, p. 284.
^Ibld .. p. 102.
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but the price that they were compelled to pay exceeded the
llr.lts of ooraprehenelon. Church-State relations during the
osas dictatorship were lgnomlnous at best, since the Church
In the final analysis was Increasingly beholden to the State.
Some authorities have suggested that the Churoh yielded to a
greater foroe as It had previously been compelled to do after
Independence. A valid conclusion might be drawn from this argu-
ment with respect to the latter years of the tyranny, but this
argument does not go far enough In presenting the entire pic-
ture during the Rosas tyranny, since the Churoh had undeniably
aided and abetted Juan Rosas In the beginning. ;osas, needing
an espionage system, employed the Jesuits as a tool of penetra-
tion—the target being the heart of the cultured classes reached
through Jesuit sponsored eduoatlon.5° Near the end of the
tyranny certain altercations, arising from the Jesuits' refusal
of complete submission, resulted In a new expulsion of the Je-
suits.
Once In power, the absolutist regime trapped Its suppor-
ters and pursued Its own political ends—ends which differed
sharply from those of the Churoh. At this late date the Church
was dragged along by powerful centrifugal forces and was unable
to free Itself from the despotism; 31 thus becoming a silent, If
unwilling, Instrument of the Kosas absolutism.
30Ibld .. p. 1A2.
'^Mecham, p. 284.
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As the right of presentation vas claimed by Rosas—a
claim championed by the noted Argentine attorney, Dalmaclo Velez-
Sarsfleld—the death of ilshop "'edrano again brought the Issue
of national patronage to the fore. Sarsi'leld had but two
choloes:'2 either to recognize Argentine supremaoy over the
Church, as conceived by the regallsts, or to actaiowledge, by
virtue of his universal power over the Church, the supremacy of
the Supreme Pontiff over all Argentine spiritual affairs. Sars-
fleld chose the former, and the Incorporation of national patro-
nage Into the Constitution of 1853 followed as a logical conse-
quence of his Interpretation. 33
The year 1852 witnessed the long sought overthrow of the
hated tyranny by General Justo Jose de Urquiza, thus ending
twenty years of repression, of subjugation, and of dictatorship.
Once again la clvlllzacl6n appeared to have triumphed over the
foroes of la barbarle In the endless seesaw struggle between
the foroes of restraint and the foroes of violence which has
characterized the greater part of Argentine history.
Alberdl and the Constitution of 1853
The Argentine Constitution of 1853, which at present Is
the supreme law of the land, was largely based on the precepts
of Juan 3autlsta Alberdl, the great Argentine jurist. Alberdl,
32Qbras . Vol. XIV, olted by John Joseph ennedy, Catholl -
fiiaa, nationalism , and Denocraoy in Argentina (::otre Dame:
University of :iotre Dame Press, 1958), p. 21.
33ibld., p. 22.
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while not a practicing Catholic, reoognlzed that "religion Is
tha basis of all society. "34 He firmly believed in populating
the vast empty spaoes of the pampa and held that atheism should
not be promoted if moral and religious settlers were to be
attracted to Argentina,
The Argentine nation must protect and maintain
the religion of our fathers as the first necessity
of our social order; but it must be protected
by freedom, by toleranoe and by all the means
which are peoullar and proper of a democratic
regime. 35
According to Alberdi, Catholiolsm should be the religion of the
state, but other Christian cults should be aooorded free practice
and not be limited nor txoluded from the nation if permanent
settlements were to be effected. His most famous dlotum was
"gobernar es poblar"36 gna tnls „!„„, WM t0 be the ba8lg toward
which later generations would aspire.
Prior to the adoption of the Argentine Constitution of
1853, Alberdi published his constitutional precepts, whloh he
felt should be oonsldered by the Constitutional Convention of
1352 then meeting at Santa F«. In order for the reader to obtain
a more aoourate picture of how closely his precepts were followed
and later Incorporated into the Constitution of 1353, a partial
list of his proposed articles—principally those referring to
religious matters are presented below. Saoh proposal Is followed
„,. «
3A
?]«» Guttata Alberdi, gases y. puntos do partlda para la
Crffid?? l"lf| *1of 9& AEEiSSia (feS* Aires: FraSoo
35Ibld.. p. 110.
36Ibld .. p. 58.
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by the present article as It exists In the Constitution, for
the sake of comparison.
Article three of Alberdl'e precepts proposed that "the
confederation adopt and support the Catholic oreed and guarantee
freedom for all the rest. "37 Article two of the Argentine Consti-
tution stated that "the federal government supports the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Creed."?8 In addition Article 14 of the
Argentine Constitution added that "all Inhabitants shall enjoy,
subject to the laws regulating their exercise, the right freely
to profess their religion."'9 Artlole 85, section nine of Alberdl'e
precepts had proposed that "the president must present a list of
three archbishops, bishops, dignitaries or prelates of the
cathedral churches to the Senate"* and was followed by section
10 of the same article, whloh added that "He [the president}
exercises the right of national patronage with respect to the
ohurohes, offices and eocleslastlcs of the State."*1 Artlole 83
of the Argentine Constitution, sections eight and nine, designa-
ting the rights of the president stated:
37Alberdl, p. 285.
38Argentine Constitution of 1853 . cited by Alberdl,
p. 318.
39Arn:entlne Constitution of 1353 . cited by "eeham, p. 288.
As It Is worded, this artlole could be Interpreted to restrict
rell-lous freedon slnee a condition has been attaohed.
^Alberdl, p. 308.
41Ibld., p. 308.
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He exercises the right of national patronage
in the presentation of bishops for the cathedral
churches as proposed In a list of three names
to the Senate and ooncedcs the pase or retention
of decrees of the councils, bulls, briefs and
resorlpts from the Supreme Pontiff of Rome,
with the aooord of the Supreme Court. *2
In addition to the adoption of most of Alberdl's pre-
cepts, the constitutional Convention of Santa Vi added Articles
62 and 73 in order further to olarlfy Church-State relations.
Article 62 of the Argentine Constitution said "the regular
ecclesiastics can not be members of the Congress, nor governors
of a province" ™ and Article 73 of the federal document specified
that
in order to be elected president or vice-
president of the Confederation, he is required
to have been born In the Argentine territory
or be the child of a native citizen and . . .
to belong to the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Communion. 4^
The Constitution of 1853» unlike earlier Argentine constitutions,
mad* a notable departure In providing that the State " support "
rather than "profess " the Cathollo religion.*5 The resulting
ambiguity has been interpreted by many to mean that the Catholic
religion is not the State religion In Argentina, but "slnoe It Is
the duty of the State to support the Catholic cult. It is the
de facto state religion."*6 Pe .jure recognition of the Argentine
^Artrontlnc Constitution of 1B53
. cited by Alberdl, p. 338.
43Ibld .. p. 329.
44Ibld .. p. 335.
Kennedy, p. 288. Italics nine.
^echam, p. 239.
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national patronage has never been accepted by the Holy 3ee, and
although the conolualon of a concordat vrlth tome to nettle this
question has been frequently proposed, none as yet, has been
effectuated, tfany Argentine Catholics, the most notable being
Pray Haiaerto iaqulu, Francisco Dura and Estrada, have orltiolzed
the Argentine Constitution of 1853 as being too regallst in con-
cept and of placing an undue burden upon the Church.
Pray Esquiu, in spite of his reservations conoernlng the
Constitution of 1353, urged its implementation for the sake of
national unity. The friar of Catamaroa, as he was known, sided
against the majority of Catholic opinion of the tine and pleaded
for acoeptonoe of the document, notwithstanding its defects:
Obey, sirs; without submission there is no
law; without laws there in no country and no
true freedom there exists only pasBions,
disorder, anarohy, diaolution, war and evils,
fron which aay :od free the Argentine Republic
forever. ^7
Heeding the eloquent words of "my raraerto Enqulfi, the Argentine
people avoided an armed contest, and their resistance to the
Constitution wae largely overcome, "he Orator of the Constitution,
as he was later called, realizing that stability oould be achieved
only by recognizing the suprese law of the land, exhorted the
people from his pulpit to abide by it.^*8 The cause of national
unity had thus been Berved by one of its greatest spokesmen, and
a fratricidal oonfllct had been avoided.
'Fray :-.amerto jsqulfi, Soraoneg patrl6tlcag . cited by
Caslello, p. 20.
^Kennedy, p. 95.
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A more ardent critic of the Constitution of 1353 was
Tranolsco Dura. Contending that the State had been made the
protector of religion, when in reality tho Church should be the
protector of the State, Dura asserted that a religious defeatltm
oould only obtain. Itellglon does not need political protection
since that proteotlon can lead to a stlffllng of religion, a
view very slnllar to that held by Estrada and tho resultant con-
sequence of stlffllng would be the relegation of religion to a
subservient station in Argentine society. *9
The m03t vociferous critic of the Constitution of 1353
was encountered in Josfi 'anuel Estrada, although his ideas were
not formulated until 1071 with the publication of his noted work,
I& lKl6sla jr el estado . Estrada raalntalned that national patronage
United the religious liberty of the Catholic faith by attacking
Its basis, resulting In its nullification. 50 nullification of
the freedom of worship resulted fron the Constitution of 1853,
since the Catholic Church was enslaved by the State—enslaved
since it must rely on the State for subsidization and tariffs.
Estrada held that the hierarchy was enslaved because the State
could Intervene in the providing of benefices, and lastly, Its
captivity was evidenced by the State's power to withold pontifical
bulls and decrees to the detriment of Catholics. 51 i.'hen the State
*9Pranoloco Dura, Iftlesla y_ entsdo (Buenos Aires! Cultura
cat,6llca, 1927), pp. 50-51.
^Grandee Sscrl tores . Vol. XXVII, p. 33.
51Ibld ., p. 49.
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oxerciaed the ri^ht of patronage over a communion at the sane
time that It granted oomplete freedom to all other oulta It was
"un absurdo y. uno lnlquldad ." 52 /or Estrada the patronized
communion was placed In an unfavorable position, subjected to a
tutelage whloh violated equity and negated religious liberty. 5'
As only the Catholic cult could be harraeaed and oppressed,
there was no liberty for the Church, for "crippled 1 lberty" wae
"the privilege and the denial of Its self." 5* The sentiments of
Estrada were elaborated upon and a remedy offered In his three
reforms, to wit:
1. Abrogation of the right of patronag«»
2. Equality of the Church In religious liberty.
3. A free Ohuroh In a free State, according to the formula
of ;!ontalenbert. 55 Once unshackled from the State, the Church
wan stimulated to enthusiasm, the spirit of brotherhood was
oreated and the Church became a more powerful Influence In de-
veloping the peoples' morals, according to Estrada. 5" Fray Kanerto
Esqulu was in complete accord with the idea of separation of
Church and State, when he replied:
The political relations of the Argentine Re-
public as well as lt3 administrative acts are
neither Catholic nor Inspired by true liberty,
52IJbid., p. 33.
53Ibld.. p. 34.
54Ibid., p. 51.
W Tanolsoo
. Teusi, Vlda 2 obrrt do. Jos6 '>muel
(Buenos Aires: Casa Jacobo Peuser, T92&)
, pTlifr"
^Estrada, p, 61.
-39-
and the desire of the Church for Its emanci-
pation la worthy of all Catholic souls. To
obtain It Is a sacred duty. 57
Generally speaking, Catholics and secularists, have
made a compromise In Churoh-State relatione in whloh a aodus
v
^
T9ndl between the two opposing schools has come Into existence,
with both groups acceding their particular Interests to the
general welfare of the nation. Catholics, for the most part,
have been content with the Catholic orientation of the Constitu-
tion, which recognized Catholicism as the traditional religion
of the majority of the Inhabitants, while the secularists have
been gratified that "the religious question has been kept out of
politics by and large. "58
When the Constitution of 1853 was being ratified, a sig-
nificant event for future Argentine Churoh-State relations
ocourred In the founding of the first openly Catholic newspaper,
iS rej,l r^ .6n by Ksgr. Pederico Anerloe, later Archbishop of
Buenos Aires and Pray Olegarlo Oorrea, aided by PSlix Prlas, who
soon became a collaborator In the enterprise and the leading
journalist for the newspaper. La, re!1^16n was to nake a permanent
contribution to the development of Argentine Catholic lay
opinion. 55 In 1855 a M0ODi , , thollo neVppaper> ^ firden . was
founded by Prfas as a counterpart to the first, but one in whloh
^Tessl, p. 197.
Kennedy, p. 22. Cardinal Cnggiano. the Argentine Prl-
KfclS\2Sr thSt ^ ArGentlnC «*« belrfaltro'ng
fcrtaTfess ax? **mtmi nun. <»
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more stress would be placed upon the soolal aspeot of religion.
Creation of a society In which the Cathollo laity would take
part was one of Prfas' goals—a goal that would reach fruition
only In the 20th century. Distrusting the intellectuals whose
philosophy had resulted In chaos during the pre-Kosas days of
the nation, Prlas urged the Church to take dlreot action In the
political sphere In order to proteot the Institutional Interests
of the Church as he believed the Intellectuals to be biased
against religion. 60 Prlas held strong ideas on education and
Its plaoe In the nation and became a champion of the Church In
Its fight for continued religious Instruction—more about which
will be said later—during the school controversy.
Jose
1
Manuel Estrada, like his contemporary Frlns, was to
found the Argentine periodical La revlsta Argentina , and like
his contemporary was one of the leading Catholic thinkers and
Journalists of this period. He stood for the principles of
Christian liberalism and, unlike Prlas, was more an educator
than a journalist, although he oontlnued to write all of his
llfe.°* He, as well as Prlas, was a champion of the Church,
and both were the products of a new development In Argentine
life. Previously, the spokesmen for the Churoh had been the
clergy, but now Cathollo laymen In an unofficial oapaclty, spoke
out in defense of the Church's rights as they saw them.
60Kennedy, pp. 77-85.
Ro.1as . Vol. XIV, olted by Kennedy, p. 98.
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The Churoh-State School Controversy
The school question precipitated a major crisis In Chureh-
".tate relations, a crisis that still (1963) ha, not been com-
pletely resolved. Traditionally, religious Instruction had
been mandatory In all Argentine schools as part of the regular
school curriculum, for the schools and religious Institutions
had been historically linked from the time of the Spanish domina-
tion. 62
Prior to the school controversy, Domingo F. Sarralento,
later president of the Republic, had been named Director of the
Department of Education In 1859 for the provlnoe of 3uenos Aires.
Although renowned as a great educator, at times Sarmlento showed
little regard for freedom of conscience. In spite of his former
opposition to the ratification of Article two of the Constitution
of 1853. 6' He Issued a circular directed to all public school
teachers requiring them, before beginning classes, to oblige all
children under their tutelage to rise and commence the recita-
tion of prayers to be followed by the benediction. On non-feast
days and every Thursday, the teachers were Instructed to lead
their students personally to the parish mass. During Holy Week
all students without exception were to make the Stations of the
Cross. Sarmlento not only had violated the Argentine Constl-
6gIbld .. p. 188.
653upra. p. 34.
° «T. ?!. Estrada, Obras completes de Jose ranuel Kotrada .
Vol. IV, cited by Caslello, p. 329.
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tutlon by hln directive, but he had prohibited the exercise of
the individual's freedom of choice, nevertheless, he had acted
in the true fashion of a good Argentine republlopji—that is in-
terpreting principles concerning the general public, as he saw
fit, with a complete disregard for any other Interests except
his own.
Kstrada, ten years later, held the same office as Sar-
nlento~the Director of the Department of Education for the
province of Buenos Aires and demonstrated, in spite of his Catholic
bias, some eonoern for the individual's freedom of conscience.
All public school teachers, under his Jurisdiction, were ordered
not to oblige any «tudont to take religious instruction if the
student's parents had expressly prohibited it by reason of
belonging to another communion. 65
Sarralento, as president of the Argentine Republic, con-
tinued his peremptory polioles by ordering the translation from
Prenoh of a catechism entitled The Conscience £f a Child and
commanding Its adoption in all primary schools for the purpose
of imparting a moral and religious education to the child.
Hloolas Avellanoda followed 3armlento into the presidency
and similarly vigorously defended religious instruction in his
writing, Schools without Religion . 66 As a traditionalist,
•vellaneds. was not ready to acknowledge the rising tide of
liberalism whioh was rapidly transforming the Argentine mentali-
ty. Nevertheless, the winds of ohange manifested themselves at
-Tennedy, p. 190.
66
Ca8l«llo, p. 330.
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the meeting of the "atlonal Pedagogical Congress of 1882, held
for the purpose of coordinating ways and moans of standardizing
teaching. The Pedagogical Congress decanded that religious
instruction and the use of the catcchl
-.: be dropped fron the
public school system. These requests night have bMB antici-
pated as the eooleslootloal authorities had not been Invited to
participate* and widely dlvlrgent views were accordod expression
for the first tlae. The lalclot campaign for a secularized
education was to grow Increasingly Intense over the next two
years—with both irlas and Estrada entering Into the debates—
before the Issue was resolved In 1884 by the passage of the
Secularized Teaching Law.
The climax to the school controversy was reaohed In the
middle of 1084, during the prosldentl-M tenure of Julio A. Kooa.
At that tlae the Ueverend Jerdnlno Clara, vicar of c6rdoba,
protested, In a pastoral letter, the heterdox doctrines upheld
by the University of c6rdoba and nore specifically, the govom-
ental proposal of establishing a normal school for girls at
Cdrdoba which was to be directed by Protestant teachers from
the United States. Dr. Clara declared that "no Catholic parent
had the right to send his children there." 6? This attack was
lmaedlately countered by the Minister of Cults, Eduardo .fllde,
who proclaimed the pastoral letter to be subversive In content
Casiello, p. 333. Caslello states that "secularism i«not neutrality, but belligerence when It sSflec th- ?don?lon
T~he\£o^ P°!J,ti?, 4 ia the 80lutlon °f fundamental pwolem™
a$ne?lm" * *
l0h
" m™ ** *« nothlne but a nhalelaoeS
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einoe it was Issued by a government offiolal and In opposition
to the stated policies of the government. Wilde's attaok was
followed by the Attorney-fteneral's deoree suspending the Re-
verend Clara from offlo*.^®
Dr. Clara, not a man to let matters lie, retorted by
issuing another pastoral letter, claiming his dismissal was
null and void because it had emanated from an incompetent au-
thority and secondly, because by the text of the letter, only
the canon of Cdrdoba would be dismissed and not the government
of the bishopric^ The issue was bitterly argued back and forth
in the Argentine Congress as to the legality of the government's
aotlon in removing a prelate from office. 'ortunately, this
part of the controversy was peaoeably resolved when ringr. Tlssera
took oharge of the see of c6rdoba—thus ending the authority of
Clara in the matter.
Although Churoh-; tate tension had relax3d by the summer
of 1884 with the termination of the Clara dispute, the controversy
blazed forth anew in the fall when Bishop Rlsso Patron Issued a
pastoral pertaining to the schools of the Salta diocese. He sus-
tained the opinions so aptly expressed by Clara and added that
°®lieohasi, p. 293.
9Leg6n, pp. 529-530. Dr. Clara's reply is worth noting
for its dear and oonoise language. He stated that "it is not
the Capitular Vloar of Cfirdoba, but the Attorney-General of the
Nation, who had mistaken the times and men by passing an order
whloh oarried the stamp of the period of Charles III, whose
attorney called him 'Our faster?" In concluding Dr. Clara stated
that "in the Argentine Republic, there is not a law which obliges
Catholics to educate their children in Protestant 30hools ...
and this and nothing more is what the pastoral is expressly
prohibiting."
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"all children in his dlooese oould not be sent to schools di-
rected by heretlos and that If a parent disobeyed the letter,
he would be denied the sacraments of the Church. "70 The vicars
of Santiago del Sstero and Jujuy Joined Rlsso Patron In his
stand and, like him, were branded as subversives by the govern-
ment and suspended from offloe. This subsequent aotlon by the
government rallied the Metropolitan of 3uenos Aires and the
natlon*s other bishops behind the Church's protagonists. Argu-
ing that only the Pope had the authority to remove eecleslastlos,
the nation^ bishops unanimously labeled the government's action
as Invalid.
The last phase of the school controversy occurred with
the arrival In Cordoba of the Apostolic Delegate to Argentina,
'
-
;
:r. attera, :or the pulJMM at lStWftMta| o::c of Mm rot <:-
tant school teachers, a "lss Frances Armstrong, director of the
normal school."* Afterward arguing that his conversation had
been solely of a private nature, the Apostolic Delegate stated
that he had advised Kiss Armstrong to publicly announce that the
school had no Intention of pronelytln^ for the Protestant deno-
minations and that no obstaoles would be placed in the way of
teaohlng the Catholic catechism In the sohool.^2 tflldo, learning
of the Apostolic Delegate's vlolt to ."lss Armntrong, accused
:'attera of meddling In 'rgentlne internal affalro and advised
him to leave the nation within twenty-four hours as he was now
.:eohan, p. 294.
71Ibld .. pp. 295-296.
72
IiAl.t PP. 294-295.
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oonsldered persona non ,~rata . Anti-cllmatlcal as the Mattera
lnoldent was, the ousting of ;:attora ruptured dlplouatic re-
lations with the Holy See—a rupture which would not be mended
until a new administration had taken offioe.
The Catholic position during this entire controversy was
eloquently expounded by ?ellx Prlas in his wrltlngB entitled
Secrltos £ dlsoursos . A primary school teacher should be per-
mitted to teach only the religion which he professed, aooording
to Frias. In other words, Catholic instruction could not be
given by Protestant teaohers as this constituted a violation of
freedom of conscience. Holding of a religious conviction was
neoessary for its transmittanee. Frias asserted that "popular
instruction should be religious, and the religion of the majority
ought to be taught."73 Like Estrada, Prlas considered religion
to be the basis of all social order, and a religious majority
should not be subjugated to a religious minority. Attacking the
lalclsts for departing from Argentine tradition in their attempts
to transfer certain functions from ecclesiastical to State Juris-
diction, Frias denied the laloist claim to exolusive Jurisdiction
over areas such as marriage. 74 Secularization was being carried
too far and would only lead to the elimination of all religious
education from the publlo sohool system, aooording to Frias.75
.«_
73?<11* Frias, MojUob y dlscursos. Vol. Ill (Buenos
Aires: Imprenta y llbreria de Mayo, l854J, pp. 182-186.
7\ennedy, p. 87.
75Ibld .. p. 99.
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Hls defense of the rights of the Church '.;as unsuccessful against
the rising tide of laiclsm which reached Its apex before the
turn of the century.
The sahool controversy of 1382-1384 had also involved
Estrada, who was a resolute defender of the rights of the Church.
He defended the bishops' freedom of speech and their right to be
heard even whan disagreeing with the offlolal policies of the
State.' Estrada thought that n£0 asta la llbertad sine donde
ssti el esplrltu ."?7 Tor hln "reason without Christ iralks in
darkness."' 9 A3 to the value of a Christian education, Estrada
stated that
the child whose soul is developed under the
luminous, noble and pure sentiments of reli-
gion, a-iulres the horolo strength of virtue
which leads him to make sacrifices and conse-
quently strengthens the republican character.
™
The final passage of the Education Law of 1384, despite the
protestations and objections of Argentine Catholics, was accom-
plished, and although this Law, 1420, did not prohibit religious
instruction, it made its application impracticable in that all
such Instruction had to be given outside of regular school
hours.ou Its ratification abolished religious instruction, fc
all practical purposes, under the guise of neutrality. 91 The
76Ibld .. p. 100.
^fesBl, p. 193.
7S
Ibld .. p. 168.
79
Ibl.d .. p. 107.
80Kennedy, p. 194.
81Leg6n, p. 527.
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result was the secularization of the school system.
The secularization oampalgn, begun In 1882 by the liberals
and socialists and supported by many primary school teachers, had
not yet run Its full oourse by 1884, The second great secular
victory of liberalism was secured, four years after the ratifica-
tion of Law 1420, with the passage of the Civil Marriage Law of
1888. For the first time civil marriage was made obligatory and
civil ceremony was made a prerequisite to a religious one. In
other words, no religious oeremony oould be performed until after
all of the civil requirements hr?.d been met. Any violation of
this law waB punishable by severe penal sanctions, aoeordlng to
Article 147 of the Argentine enal Code, and any minister, pas-
tor or priest found In violation of the law was subject to from
three months to one year Imprisonment. 3' The State regarded
marriage solely as a social contract between the contracting par-
ties, "solemnized before the government official In charge of
the official register."8*
The proverbial champions of the Church's oause for over
thirty years, Kstrada and ?rfas, attacked the Civil Marriage Law
as being a totalitarian threat to the family as a "social unit
distinct from that of the state
"
85 and as a violation of the
liberty of conscience. Frias In his work, Derecho matrimonial
cat6llca
. stated that
82Patee, pp. 25-26.
83Caslello, pp. 297-298.
3
"*Heoham, p. 303.
85Kennedy, p. 202.
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Cathollo parties should not contract civil
marriages an It would be for them a perpetual
concubine, condemned by their religion and by
the customs of the country. The law which
authorized such marriages In the present state
of our society, would be Ignorant of the pur-
pose of the law. 86
Lstrada felt that marriage was essentially religious and that
the State should recognize the legitimacy of a marriage conse-
crated by the rites of the Church. 8?
Catholic opposition to the Civil Marriage Law of 1880
was unrelenting and assiduous 3lnoe a prior civil marriage, In
the eyes of the Church, resulted In a state of concubinage—
a
mortal sin. The Church thus denied the State's exclusive claim
to foster the oreatlon of the family through marriage. The
Church's position was that the State had no right to legislate
the civil effect of marriage beoause It denied the divine and
natural origins of marriage. The state's disposition placed an
obstacle before Cathollos In the practice of one of their sacra-
ments as It punished any priest who administered marriage previous
to a civil ceremony. Individual freedom of conscience could only
be harmed by the existence of such a statute which recognized the
State's olalm to exclusive Jurisdiction over marriage.
The Church had thus been surmounted by the rising tide of
a liberal doctrlnalrlanism which based Its ooncepts of society
upon the new Ideas of Europe's 19th century Socialists and In-
tellectuals. Antlrellgious sentiment was rising among the leaders
86 ,Prfas, Derecho '.atrlraonlal Cat6lloa . olted by Caslello,
p. 297.
87Estrada, p. 64.
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of Argentine society and was manifested by the emergenoe of anti-
clerical newspapers and the expansion of "asonry. Progress, en-
lightenment and Intellectual freedom were the new shibboleths
of the liberal secularists—obtained from the tracts of Smith,
Kill, and Spenoer. These new liberal Ideas were embraoed by but
a small minority of Argentines—principally those men In public
life who, while not typical of Argentine thought, were to exert
a profound Influence, out of all proportion to their numbers, on
Argentine life. Outside of the f.nall clubs and certain govern-
mental olroleB, the masses remained as before, unohanged In their
pursuit of the traditional and religious way of life. 88
The liberals envisioned the Churoh as a distinct menace
to their new oonoepts, particularly since the Churoh, through the
prlesthood—a priesthood whloh might be tempted to tyrannize
freedom of conscience—had controlled eduoatlon and supervised
the birth, death and matrimony of most Individuals. The State,
In Its new guise, the Buprerie religious as well ao political ar-
biter, was Instrumental In fostering the liberal secularist Ideas
that would emancipate the Argentine consolenoe. 8^ For the Church,
the new liberalism was a total menace to religion, and for the
liberals, the Church, In Its adherence to Roman authority, was
an obstacle to freedom and a threat to national independence, 9°
Argentine society was thus In a state of transition brought
about by a combination of circumstances; namely, the Importation
88Patee, p. 22.
^Kennedy, p. 103.
9 Ibld .. p. 105.
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of foreign Ideologies from i3urop« and the Increased European
Immigration whloh acted as a nucleus around which the Industrial
basis of 20th oentury society would emerge. The rural, paro-
chial, agricultural and traditional Argentine society was be-
sieged by change on all sides—a changing environment -rlth changing
Ideas. Having no other recourse, the Church was forced to accept
the new challenges, and this In turn would radically alter the
Church's perspective. Religious emphaol3 until the Inst decade
of the 19th century had been oentered around political lssues--
an enphaslo heightened by the Church's resistance to the educa-
tional and matrimonial reforms of the period.
Cathollo polltloal thought, reacting to outside forces,
was beginning to orystallze, and toward that end the Catholic
Association of Buenos Aires was established In 1384 under the
leadership of Kstrada. The new association had as Its goal the
combating and halting of the trend toward secularization, and
was political In nature In that It sought to arouse and organize
Catholic opinion.
5
1 That the Catholic "fisociatlon was partially
successful had been attested to In that Catholic lay opinion was
sufficiently aroused to pressure the Congress for a cessation of
the secularization oampalgn. The suspension of secularization
allowed the Church to redirect Its focal point from the political
arena to other spheres, even though a return to traditional con-
cepts would not be countenanced by the lalolsts. ','lth the emer-
gence of organized lay groups, however, the Church would find
Its paladin In times of need.
91Ibld .. p. 183.
OHAPTBF. II
HIVf DIRECTIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE
1892-19*2
Aspects of Jhajifle
The last decade of the 19th century and the beginning of
the 20th century witnessed the gradual evolution of Church enpha-
ola from the political toward the social field of human aotlvlty.
As a dynamlo element of society the Church began a process of
self-reform, made necessary by a ohanglng society. No longer was
the Churoh the spokesman for the majority of Argentines; no longer
did It have oxoluslve control over education; no longer was the
Church the sacrosanct arbiter of faith and morals. The developing
forms of secular oulture which Ignored the traditional, the Span-
ish and the religious origins of the Argentine nation, were Im-
bued with the Ideals of the French posltlvlsts and the north
American progressives whose Argentine counterparts? were to resound
In the forums of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. No longer
an Integrating factor of society, the Church was challenged by
these new forces of liberalism, by the socialist Ideals and later
by the Ideas of the Communist '.anlfesto . Confronted, as It were,
by new political forces on one hand and the growth of an urban
proletariat olaes on the other, the Churoh had to adapt lt.3alf to
new conditions or face the gradual elimination of Christianity
-52-
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from society, Voicing use of the only weapons wliloli It possessed,
indirect Influence and persuasion were exerted where feasible
in order to support the causes in which the Church believed. 1
Liberal dootrlnarlanisa had Its effect on society by
separating the three great spheres of human activity—the poli-
tical, the oconomlo and the spiritual, uepamtlsa was demanded
In order that oaoh sphere, independent of the other, and without
hindrance, could more freely attain its specific goals. The
disintegration of the old order produced a new Argentine social
crisis. 2 Stabilization of the new order has successfully eluded
the human grasp and thus left Argentina in a state of flux.
One of the principal Argentine liberal secularist thinkers
at the turn of the century, Augustln -. Alvaros Suarez, pro-
pounded the liberal secularist ideas of his era. Critical of
the Church and an exponent par excellence of universal education
under State auspices, ho believed that the Church had set limits
upon the hunvrji capabilities and consequently, religious education
must be supplanted by publio sohooling for the purpose of In-
creasing tho individual's reasoning powers. 3 :or him, rationalism
was more altruistic than Christianity and therefore more moral.
'Coleman, pp. 36-37.
Tfegr. r'.lguel de Andrea, El catollolsao social y. su aplj,-
cacl6n (BuonoB Aires: Domingo Vlau ft Ola., 1941), p. £. Here
after cited as EJ. oatollclsmo social .
* MUttl "'. Alvarez unrez, Historic, de las Instltuclpnes
llbres, cited by sttlliam R. Crawford, £ Century of Latin Amerloan
Thought (Cambridge, ?:s.sb,» Harvard University Press, 19C1),
p. 96.
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His Ideas, along with those of other 20th century Argentine
liberals suoh as Alejandro Bunge, Rloardo Rojas, Alejandro Korn
and Alfredo Palaclos, were to exert a profound influence upon
future generations of Argentines.
The changing order of society had witnessed a weakening
of the political power of the Churoh, but conversely, had seen
the Church's prestige Increase In the soolal field. 2* Under the
guise of reform—reform in the political, reform In the ecnomlc
and reform In the religious fields—great changes had been wrought
In a more or less static society within a relatively short Bpan
of time. Slowly at first, led by the younger clergy, the Church
edged into the noclal area of human endeavor while still main-
taining a keen interest in the political field. The passage of
time had Increased the Church's interest in what haB come to be
known as social Catholicism or Christian llberall -.m—a Cathollelsn
interested in the ecnomlc Improvement of the masses, to the
securing of just welfare legislation and to the bettering of
labor's wages and living conditions. Within the vast framework
of the rgentlne Churoh, this aotlve, vocal and belligerent
faction made its presence felt through labor and oharltable
organizations which it had fostered, nlthough relatively few
Catholics adhered to its ideals or prinolpleo. Iadifferentism,
capitalism and the polltioal environment In which it operated
*Edwln Meuwen, Arms and Politics ia Latin America (::ew
Tork: Prneger Ino., I960), p. 58.
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prior to 1942 had resulted In no speotacular achievements.
5
Christian liberalism had recognized for the first tine that the
Church must concern Itself with man's role in this world and
that only through economic well-being and betterment, with the
consequent reduction of poverty, disease, and illiteraoy, could
a vibrant, strong Church oorabat atheistlo materialism. Tradi-
tional Argentine Church emphasis had bean based on the order of
the mystical, Spanish Church and had been primarily concerned
with man's attainment of salvatlon—an attainment in whioh the
transitory nature of this world was largely ignored. Recognizing
that man's physical condition is &c important as his spiritual
welfare and that spiritual attainments are Impeded and in some
cases prevented if man lives in poverty and disease, the Church
attempted to shift its emphasl :. An important step toward social
Catholioism was ultimately achieved in 1931, when a more effec-
tive organization and wider expression of ideals was procured
through the foundation of Argentine Catholic Action, part of the
Church's universal effort to ameliorate the deplorable conditions
in whioh a great part of humanity was found, especially the la-
boring classes. The Argentine Church, in its new role as ohamplon
of the laboring classes, additionally expounded the ideas of
individual freedom and the right to private property.
Ksgr. Miguel de Andrea took up an active role of leader-
ship in areas where Estrada and Frfas had left off. He asserted
5
—————____
Llsandro de la Torre, La, oueBtl6n soolal y un curaUuenos Aires: Colegio llbre de estudlo nuperioroc7~13?fT. P. 52.hereafter referred to simply as La oueotlSn soolal .
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tliat the Church, as well as the State, Mas a defender of free-
dom, for "without freedom there Is no virtue, no holiness, no
merits and no heroism."" Msgr. de Andrea attacked liberalism
as leading to an abuse of freedom by all sections of society,
resulting In anarchy. Playing the leading role as the exponent
of Argentine Christian social liberalism and Individual freedom,
Andrea fought for over thirty years against social Injustice,
Inequality, and maldistribution of wealth—hlo battle culminating
In unflinching opposition to the authoritarian forces of Peronlsm,
Liberalism, to Andrea, was the abolition of God and the violation
of all norms of economic Justice Inasmuch as It sought the un-
restricted and unhampered attainment of money.' Before concen-
trating on these efforts let us first examine two of his pre-
decessors who were Instrumental In launching the new Catholic
social movement In Argentina.
The two guiding lights of the Church from the turn of the
eentury up to World War I were Emlllo Lamarca and Father Federlco
Grote, both of whom played a cogent and complimentary role In the
development of Christian social alms. Laraaroa carried on the
difficult take of fomenting Catholic lay opinion after the death
of Estrada. Although he repeatedly warned the masses that the
new forces of society, particularly the Socialist party, were
revolutionary In Intent and athelstlo In outlook, his supplications
passed unheeded by the majority of Catholics who believed Argentina
De Andrea, El oatollolsrao social , p. 61.
7Ibld .. pp. 64-73.
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Impenetrable to Socialism." Lamarca's warnings could no
longer be ignored after 1890, and accordingly Grote, a German
Redemptorist, arrived to assist in the formulation of a rebuttal
to the Joclallst doctrines and to point out the need for a
positive Catholic social action. ^ Heading the vanguard of the
workers' circles, which he had helped organize in his native
Germany, Grote extended those circles throughout the Republic.
By 1902, he aided in the formation of the Democratic Christian
League whose aims were to prepare workers for future organizational
leadership on a national level and to Increase the social studies
already begun and expounded upon by the noted Argentine sociolo-
gist, Alejandro Eunge. The Seoond Argentine Catholic Assembly of
1907, headed by Lamaroa, was called to foment social works
through the Catholic lay organizations in accordance with the
exhortations of Pope Leo XIII's well known encyclical, Herum
Novarum. The following year, at the meeting of the Third National
Congress of Argentine Catholics, ..amaroa unveiled his project
for the creation of an Argentine oooial League—the purpose of
which was to make known the "advantages of a Christian oriented
organization." 10 At the same time, Grote established the Catholic
Workers' Circle and the Christian Democratic Union, both organiza-
tions composed of Catholic workers and laymen who desired to
defend Christian principles in the social areas of labor and
Q
Patee, p. 27.
9Ibld .. p. £7.
10Caslello, p. 27.
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it according to the principles of the Papal encyclicals.
In 1912, Pope Pius Z suggested that the Argentine Social League
be transformed into the Argentine Popular Catholic Union, whloh
subsequently was to derive its inspiration fron the Italian
model. However, the latter ideal was not realized until 1919,
when the rgentine eplscopp.oy finally consented to its formation
under the leadership of Andrea. 'Jot concerned with immediate
political objectives, it sought to awoken individual Catholics
to the need for action in the Rocial field. 11 The construction
of low cost workers' housing waB the proximal goal of the new
organization. After the Semana tr&Klca of 1919 when riots and
strikes had arisen, caused by the hysteria of i.'orld V.'ar I and the
fear of Boleshevlsm, Andrea attributed the causes of the disorder
to the faot that the workers had no articulate ceans of expressing
themselves to the public authorities as they lacked a voice in
public affairs. He solicited a voluntary collection of funds in
the a ran Colects ' nolonal . the proceeds of whloh were to be spent
on a •ooial welfare program. Two institutes were the corollaries
of his endeavors—the most noted being the Instltuto tgcnloo
femlclno
.
which was devoted to the protection of the interests
of working wooen, and £1 Atepeo £e le. Juventud . established as a
Eocial work center for working class youths. 12 In association
with the former, r. residence hall was built where single working
Kennedy, p. 183.
12
Ibid., p. 141.
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clrls nlf:ht live. 5 Eventually, the lastltuto tScnlco fealnlno .
along with the 'ederrvtlon of Crthollc Associations of somen,
founded ay Andrea, contained more than twenty thousand working
women In Buenon Aires, In addition they had a library, vaca-
tion houses In tho oountry and a hotel for -.forking people with
no fatally,1 Andrea enumerated three causes as being responsible
for the breakdown of the Argentine soolal and moral order: poli-
tical division, iroral bungling and economic dislocations,^ The
Individual's right to private property was staunohly defended by
Andrea for If the right to own property were taken away, such as
had occurred In certain polltioal systems, then man was reduced
to slavery In Andrea's opinion, rcoEomlc solutions were not
found by abolishing private property, but rather In the "Indefi-
nite expansion of private property"1—that Is by a rapidly In-
creasing economy with Its attendant benefits, Aoeordlng to
Andrea, antl-Chrlstlan forees were responsible for the under-
mining of the social order and the weakening of Individual re-
sponsibility. Tie thought that miserable people without a living
wage should not resign thenselves to their present status, but
rather had tho duty to "breal: the bonds that subject them under
a d03potlo yoke."1 ' In ordor to seoure a living wage, Joint
i^Bruce, p. 183. This organization was one of the prin-
ciple charitable Institutions not absorbed by the liva PerSn
Foundation. See Chapter IV.
l4Patee, p. 41.
15Be Andrea, El oatollolamp aoolal
. pp. 44-45.
l6lbl£., pp. 53-54.
17Ibld .. p. 96.
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agreements between the workers' and employers' organizations
3hould be worked out~an agreement currently known as collective
bargaining. As a stalwart defender of labor's right to a living
wage, econonlc Individualism and Communism were both rejected,
for eaoh In Its own way reinstated Individual slavery- "the
slavery of the proletariat"18 which Christianity had abolished
by virtue of Its essence. Outspoken In his defense of the fa-
mily, Andrea sustained the Cathollo contention that the oonjugal
state preoeded the olvll society In time, place and right, and
as suoh the Otate should not Invoke laws whloh are against the
essence of the family and In violation of the natural law.1^
For him, dictatorship of the right or left was to be condemned
as an "exoess, an overstepping of the law, an abuse of force. f20
This abuae of force was seen as a greater crime than the abuse
of the law since the former harmed the Individual, while the
latter harmed only the community. Finally, Andrea was Instrumental
In focusing the Church hierarchy's attention on the need for better
workers' housing, believing that good environmental conditions
were as Important as a farorable spiritual atmosphere for the
total well-being; of the Individual. In 1919, his exertions re-
sulted In the Issuance of a Joint pastoral letter by the Argentine
l8Ibld .. p. 147.
19Ibld .. p. 104.
20Ibid ., p. 105. "sgr. do Andrea later was the principal
religious opponent of the rise of Peronlsm. He, virtually
alone among his oohorts, condemned Peronlsm as an Inherent evil
that would eventually enslave the Individual and extinguish per-
sonal freedom. Hie position was substantiated within a rela-
tively few years. Gee Chapter III.
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hlerarohy which stated amon»- other things that
a sanitary dwelling from the physical and
moral point of view, within reach of thooe
cf modest economic means Is essential In
order to assure a better eduoatlon for fu-
ture generations and to exterminate the
noolal plague of tenements. 21
Shortly thereafter, Andrea, under the ausploes of the Argentine
Popular Catholic Union, headed a group which began the construc-
tion of low oost workers' housing. Unfortunately, only four
ensembles of new housing were completed before the program waa
abruptly halted. On commenting upon the stoppage, Msgr. do Andrea
was careful to avoid Incriminating any particular group and added
that "It was not the fault of the Church, but now In not the
time to Judge It."22 It was tremendously disconcerting: to learn
that suoh a beneficial projeot had been halted by certain unnamed
vested Interests. Had the low ooat housing project been carried
out, today there might be only a relatively few slum dwellings
in BuenoB Aires. The obstructive forces whloh halted this pro-
gram were rather Indicative of the great barriers to progress
that faced Latin Amerloa
—
primarily that of the human element,
namely, a lack of humanltarlanlsm. Occasionally, a solution has
If not through existing devices, then through revolutionary
means. 2* A recent Argentine observer has Identified the partl-
21Ibld .. p. 142.
22Ibld .. p. 143.
2
^Cuba and "exloo are good examples where the vested
Interests were ultimately swept away In a polltlo.-.l and social
revolution, principally because society In general would not
alleviate the dlnnal conditions under which 4C> of a nation
tolled.
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cular vested Interests that stalled tho low ooot workers'
housing program as having been certain wealthy landowners and
elements of tho right wing clergy. 24
Conflicts Under the Alvear Administration
After a long period of quiescence, a major Churoh-Stato
struggle erupted In July, 1923 when Marcelo T. de Alvear, the
Argentine president, proposed the nomination of Andrea to the
vacant archepisoopal see of Buenos Aires. Using his constitutional
prerogatives of national patronage, President Alvear submitted
Andrea's name for the Holy See is accustomed confirmation. A
considerable period of time elasped In which Hone took no action
upon the presentation. Belatedly, the Holy See replied through
the Argentine Papal :!unolo, Hsgr. Bja Oardlnale, that Andrea
was persona non pxata at the Vatieen and, as such, his canonical
Investiture as archbishop of Buenos Aires would be Impossible.
Meanwhile, Andrea withdrew his oandldacy for the vacant see at
the BUggestlon of the Papal Nuncio. 25 Alvear refused to accept
his withdrawal and Insisted upon his appointment. The progres-
siva datarloratton of Ohuroh-Stata relations was not helped by
receipt of r letter froa tho Holy Saa stating that it was not
oompelled to raaka poblla tha raaaona for lta refusal to accept
a pralate'e nomination. At tha tiae, tha pravaiiin- consensus
fi
*YBftbol r, Ronnie, Tha Ag—atlna lianuhllo (New lork:
Tha "aonlllan Co., X945)i p. Sw.
*5rha riaw York r^nna,. Uovaabor 1£, i585.
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of opinion Beemed to be that the Holy nee resonted Andrea's
extreme nationalism as not beflttln" a prospective archbishop.
^
Retaliating by declaring Bade Cardinalo, the Papal Nuncio, por-
aona non grata* the Argentine government withdrew Its envoy to
the Holy See, effectively severing dlplcnrrtlo relatione between
the two. 27 A year and a half elapsed and an annlagous dispute
ran its course before an amicable settlement of the controversy
was reached. 1th feeling running high over the de Andrea affair,
the Holy See announced that "n^r. Juan Boneo, Bishop of Santa Fe,
would assume the administrative duties of the archdiocese of
Buenos Aires, acting in the capacity of Apostolic Administrator
for the sede vaoante , pending the Installation of a regular
bishop. Viewing this latter action by the Vatloan as a personal
affront, particularly In view of the delloaoy of the existing
situation, the State determined to obstruct ^oneo's mission.
When Boneo returned from Rome with a sealed envelop containing
his credentials, the Argentine "lnister of Foreign A.ffalrs wid
Worship, Gallardo, demanded that the papal documents be submitted
to the governnont for lnspeotlon. Bishop Boneo, statins that no
constitutional provision required oomplianoe with this request,
refused to deliver the credentials. The Government then threatened
"Joneo with prosecution under the penal code -.Thioh made execution
of papal bulls, deorees or orders, without prior Governmental
approval a crime. c Adding that continous refusal to present
Kennedy, p. 16,
27
'The Hew York TlqeB . eptember 25 and November 5, 1924.
23
Ibjjd., January 4, 1925.
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his oredentlals would bo construed as a rebellious and disobedient
aot, the Government, determlnod to terminate the conflict favora-
bly, submitted the Issue to the Argentine Supreme Court. The
court, In Its oonsldered opinion, denied Boneo's riyht to act as
Apostolic Administrator for the vacant see on the ground that
his credentials violated the Constitution.^ Yielding to the
weight of superior force, Boneo presented his documents to Foreign
Minister Gallardo, subsequently stating that he had not failed
In his duty as e. bishop nor as an Argentine oltlzen. 30 £e faoto
possession of tlie see by Boneo as administrator was not challenged
further, and he endured In office until a regular suooessor was
determined.
Meanwhile the Socialist Party, mooting "arch 0, 1925,
condemned the weakness and vacllatlon of the Government and
olamored for the separation of Churoh and State since the Govern-
ment had handled the entire Andrea affair most regrettably.'1
The long struggle was finally resolved on September 25, 1926,
when the Senate, after twelve hours of debate, agreed to the
presentation of a now trio of candidates for Alvear's considera-
tion. The nomination of ;!sgr. fray Bottaro was accorded Immediate
papal confirmation, and his investiture toolc place without delay.'2
The foregoing Church-state disputes once again demonstrated that,
29Ib_ld, , February 8, 1925.
3 Ibld .. December 28, 1924.
31Ibld .. ;-aroh 0, 1925.
32ireohan, p. 293.
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in the absence of a concordat, areas of conflict would occasion-
ally arise between Argentina and the Church.
Catholic Aotion
Tranquility was re-established after the passing of the
Alvear administration with the institution of a modus Vivendi
between the Church and the State. Toward the end of the second
decade of the 20th oentury an event of singular significance
transpired—one that would have a profound effect upon the Church
In the oonlng deoades—In the Issuance of a pastoral lsttcr,
dated December 1, 1928, by tho Argentine episcopacy. The pas-
toral sanctioned, In effect, the transformation of the Argentine
Popular Catholic Union Into a new organization of the laity,
/.ool6n og.t611cn.33 or the aohlevement of this goal, four
Argentine prelates, among whom was the Ishop of Uosario, An-
tonio Cardinal Caggiano, embarked for a year's study in Homo.
Their return initiated the organisation of Argentine Catholic
Aotion; formally approved and recognized by the Sovornraent as a
Juridical personality, and officially established under church
ausploes by a collective pastoral issued by the hierarchy, April
5, 1931.
^
Argentine Catholic Aotion, as part of the worldwide move-
ment, supplanted the Argentine Popular Catholic Union—that is,
it was an amalgamation of the principal Catholic lay organizations
33£H£S&» p. 58.
3*Caslello, p. 272.
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fomed to operate under the auspices of the hierarchy as the
"right hand of the olergy." Pope Plus XI defined the organi-
zation as "action of the spiritual order," and lauded the Argen-
tine episcopacy for Its support of the new organization, but
oautloned that political activities would not be countenanced. 35
In reality, It was an apostolate of the laity, whose primary
task was to permeate the environment with Christian principles
of graoe and charity. 36 The need for Catholic Action was obvious
as society had been undergoing a radical transformation, and the
protected, sheltered atmosphere In whloh religion had formerly
operated no longer existed. The rise of a new heterogenous
Argentine society had resulted In a laok of religious and seoular
stability. Tolerance became neoessary for the first time beoause
a unanimity of belief was no longer present. The Churoh believed
that Its paternalistic approach to society should be shifted to a
fraternal1gtic approach—that the soolal and economic errors of
soolety should be evaluated from a fresh perspective with Catholic
Action promoting fulfillment of Individual religious and social
needs. The prlnolpal precepts of Cathollo Action, stated In
Article one of Its by-laws, affirmed Joint participation between
the laity and the hierarchy of the Catholic Churoh—a collabora-
tion between the two whloh was limited and dependent upon the
hierarchy. 37 cathollo Action, as well as the hlerarohy, was
35ibe Hew York Times . ?'.ay 2, 1931.
""Coleman, p. 78.
37c,islello, p. 274.
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aoeorded the privilege of acting as the offiolal spokesman for
the Church because of the organic union existing between the
two. 3« Further, all political activity was expressly prohi-
bited by Article five, Including any form of adherence to an
extant Catholic political party. However, the prohibition was
organizational in approach since a member night belong to a
polltloal party outside of Catholic Motion If that party were
not prohibited by the Church. Ko member was free to Join a po-
litical party which specifically opposed Catholic doctrine or
morality. In 1931 this restriction was amplified and elucidated
upon when the Argentine episcopacy enjoined all members from
supporting any politloal party Which propounded a separation of
Church and State, the recognition of legalized divorce or a
seoularized system of education.-^
Organizationally, Catholic Action was divided Into four
separate, but related branches—Catholic men, Catholic women,
male youth and feminine youth. Local organization was bar.ed
upon diocesan and parish lines 3omewhat similar to the cell
structure of the Communist party. I Central Committee coordi-
nated the parish and diooesan functions, and a Secretary of
Morality campaigned against pornography while editing weekly
reports on the moral value of films. Being organized along
38Ibld .. pp. 275-276.
39Kennedy, p. 183. This last dictum operated as being
prejudicial to certain political parties, namely, the Radical,
^oclalist and Communist parties, for it effectively penalizedthen by forbidding Catholics to vote for them.
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hierarohloal lines, dictates were carried down from the top to
the local level. The Economic Social "eoretary campaigned for
sanitary dwellings for workers and supervised the spread of
Catholic social doctrine via books, magazines and pamphlets. *°
Catholic Aotlon's formation waa aimed at reducing sterile par-
ticularism and coordinating Catholic lay activity along unified
lines. Catholic Action had been accused of being antl-democratlc
and pro-fasolst In the period from 1938 to 1946, but this would
be rather difficult to prove, as axaot documentation would be all
but Impossible to obtain, even If It existed. The Argentine
eplsoopaoy In November, 1938, reiterated the Church's position
of reproof toward the totalitarian state which denied the "In-
alienable rights of persons, of the family or rights previous to
those of the State."41 At the same time, the hierarchy unequlvo-
eably rejected the dootrlne of raolsm. This was followed In
December, 194£, by a pastoral letter addressed to the olergy
stating that the Church "oondemns totalitarianism In all forms,
as It threatens dignity, despoiling man of the essential gift of
liberty." Undoubtedly there were some members of the organiza-
tion who were pro-fascist and raolst, but the organization Itself
was not responsible for the Individual political opinions of Its
ambers outside the organization.
^OPatea, pp. 40-41.
4lCaslello, p. 28.
42
The New York Times . December 16, 1942.
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.Ideological Polealcs
The conflict between differing Ideologies engendered
during the last half of the 19th oontury was heightened by the
advent of World War II.*5 The Ideals of Man, as expounded by
the Communist Internationale, were of Increasing concern for
Individual Argentines after the Semana trfeloa of 1919. Alfredo
Palaolos and Llsandro de la Torre were representative of Argen-
tine secular thought of the period. The former, the founder of
the Argentine Soolalist Party, a distinguished lecturer, a fa-
culty member at the University of La Plata, unmercifully attacked
the destruction of democratic processes under the Per6n regime.
The latter had been an Argentine member of Congress and an un-
successful candidate for the presidency for the Partldo Dew6orat,i
Pror.resl8ta
. At the other end of the political spectrum were
Hagr* Miguel de Andrea, who represented the so-called left wing
of Catholic Churoh opinion, and Megr. Gustavo J. Franoeschl, who
was representative of the Church's right wing element. Prior to
World v/ar II, Andrea found time out from his social work to cham-
pion the cause of democracy In his Causas cue favoroen la dlfunlon
5§1 conmunlsno—a notable work that was an orltlo.il of 19th cen-
tury capitalism In Argentina as It was of communism. In a lengthy
review of the causes for maldistribution of wealth and the emer-
gence of the olass struggle In whloh Argentina was engaged, he
stated that "we.-ilth had ceased being a moans of social welfare
53ugra, p. 52.
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and had passed over to being held as private profit."** Dootrl-
nalre li'oerallsn was responsible for affecting social life,
since the religious and moral forces had absented themselves
from any active participation in the economic life of the people.
The Church could have Intervened to prevent many excesses in
the resulting social disintegration, if it had so decided.
Similarly, political forces became so imbued with the doctrine
of liberty, that they betrayed their mission of guarding the
common welfare of sooiety. ^ Aoousing tiro powerful factors, the
French (evolution and the phenomenon of mechanization, Andrea
condemned them both for having preelpatated the disastrous con-
sequences found today throughout sooiety. Leveling an accusing
finger at the French Hevolutlon, he blamed it for having destroyed
the former association between capital and labor as equals under
the guise of freedom. The superiority of the machine was similarly
responsible for the disintegration of the social order—for It had
absorbed the individual and In so doing, had denied him any Im-
portance or significance. The twofold result was a bifurcation
of the hierarchical order of society—causing a disintegration of
the old order and an inversion of the new, so that the accumulation
of capital became the first, the paramount factor of production.
»:sgr. "iguel de Andrea, Las causas sue favorcen la di-
fuslfin del oonaunlono ( uenos Aires: Lajouane k Cla., 1937),
p. 5. Hereafter referred to simply as Las causas .
45
46
JIbld .. p. 6.
M., pp. 6-7. De Andrea omits reference to the lnequal-that antedated the French Revolution in his hier-
archy of the social order. His premise might therefore be con-
sidered Invalid.
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Convereely, man was transformed Into an Instrument In the hands
of capital, losing hi. identity as an Individual—ultimately
resulting In tho annihilation of his personality. Consequently,
capital, freed from all restraint and lacking Justice and charity,
appropriated the needs of production and created an Inequality In
the distribution of wealth. +7 a, ensuing fight between capital
and labor advanoed tho oause of communism and was aided by a
proliferation of the luxurious and hedonlstio upper olass life.
The twofold effect resulted In the absorption of the energies of
the rich and Increased the indignation and violenoe of the poor. 48
For Kogr. de Andrea, a Christian civilization had oeased
to exist in the Hasten tforld, although it still was called
Christian. The preservation of the remanents of Christian civili-
zation oould not bo carried out by the totalitarian extermination
of one's adversaries as some propounded—for tho Gospel calls for
the life of the sinner, not hia death. Tuning next to social
Catholloism, a subjeot that generated a vituperative rebuttal
from Llsandro de la Torre, Andrea asserted that two dlametrloally
opposing forces-communism and soolal Ccitholiolsm-had confronted
eaoh other. Communism, being materialistic, had. placed all
wealth exclusively Into a few handa-lnto the hands of those who
held power, I.e., the party members—while social Catholicism, as
a spiritual force, paaetntad the social and economic order with
Christian love and soolal Justiee-thereby encouraging prosperity
47IM4., pp. 8-9.
4R
!&&., PP. 12-15.
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through a healthy corporation. *9 further, Andrea added that
"capitalism had been the communism of the bourgeoisie, while
communism had become the capitalism of the proletariat. "50
Ills concepts gained the adherence of large seotors of Argentine
Catholic opinion, and both oommunlom and capitalism were re-
jected.
While Senator de la Torre was campaigning as • presiden-
tial candidate on the Partldo Dem6orata Pronreslsta tlokot, the
clergy waged an intensive campaign against his eleotlon. 51 De
la Torre lashod out against organized religion in general and the
Catholic Church In particular, thereby npawnlng the succeeding
polemical battle. As the head of a political party, he generated
considerable popular appeal, and hie subsequent articles were
among the most widely read in Argentina. Be la Torre asserted
that Social Christianity was not Catholicism, since only a
minority of Catholics were conoerned with the soolal question.
He did, however, acknowledge Its influence through the media of
the newspapers, the workers' organisations and various charitable
enterprises. 52 However, he added that aoelal Catholicism offered
no serious solutlonn for the soolal question and that a more
49Ibld .. pp. 17-23.
50Ibld .. p. 21.
^Rennle, P. 270.
52Llsandro de la Torre, X§ ouo3tl6n soolal £ yji oura
(Buenos Alroo: Coleglo llbre de estudloe sutsorlores, 19A3),
p. 105.
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vital panacea was required in order to carry out needed reforms. 53
ills thought went ae follows*
Religions were ohildren of fear and anxiety
before the mystery which looks up the origins
and end of life, and fear will be eternal
since man la after all naturally superstitious. -™
The Bible and all holy books of mankind were created by para-
noics, deceivers and visionaries, and if one needed faith, since
all religion was superstitious, then it would be better for nan
to be a Hindu than a Christian—for Hinduism was more logical
than Christianity for de la Torre. 31tterly, sarcastically, de-
riding Ksgr. ?rancesohl through his tracts, he bemoaned the fact
that the Argentine Church had disappeared because of the absolute
predominance of foreign Influences which resulted In a national
patronage that was little more than an empty expression. Only
Argentine priests, "trained in the shadow of the Vatican, and
In reality but servants of the Pope, "55 oould attain the highest
religious benefices in Argentina.
Pranoeechl, the recipient of the Invective hurled by de
la Torre, had adumbrated the ideas held by the rightest clergy
in Argentina prior to and Including the Peron regime, and had been
bitterly oritlolzed by many for his fascist ideas. As editor of
53Ibld .. p. 52. His observation was largely substantiated
by the facts, since the Catholic social movement had made but a
dent In the surface in alleviating poor social conditions during
the forty years of its existence. Additionally, it never had
the unanimous support of the hierarchy.
54
Ibid ., p. 105.
55Ibld .. p. 106.
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the Influential Catholic magazine, Crlterlo . his Ideas were
widely disaemminated and garnered a large audience, 5*> In his
book entitled g| el huao del lncendlo . i ranceschi supported
franco's natlonlietio position In Spain. Fearing the de-Chrls-
tlanization of the upper classes, he called on all Spaniards for
a renewed apostolate. Speaking out vigorously In defense of the
Churoh, he denied the protection of the Churoh to the ruling
upper olasses when thOBB classes were unjust. He felt that many
of the upper classes had concealed themselves , either consciously
or unconsciously, behind the 3kirtn of the Churoh in pursuit of
their own particular motives and that, as a consequence , the
Church had been harmed and credited with the injustices of the
ruling olasses. At other times members of the landed Gentry had
demanded aid from the Churoh in protecting the rights of private
property, although they themselves had been guilty of blatant
abuses. 57 Francesohi expressed sympathy for the revolutionary
worker, who in aost cases had been rewarded a nlggerdly daily
wage. Possessing only a rudimentary mentality, the worker had
been Inflamed to hatred and violence against the Injustices per-
petuated against hla. The working olasses were always oonvlnced
that they served a good cause, and -this often resulted in undis-
ciplined and savage actions. 58 whether Francesohi wa- an avowed
Fascist or not, would be open to question—in spite of Tsabel
56Rennle, p. 269.
57
'Msgr. Gustavo J. Francesohi, En el huno del lncendlo(Buenos Aires: Editorial dlfusi6n, 1935)7"p754\ a *
^Ibld .. pp. 124-125.
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Rennie's assertion that as editor of Orlterlo he was "the most
intelligent spokesman for the fascist Catholic clergy. "59 He
denounced Nazism, unequivocably, and stated that Nazism and
communism were "two forms of an Identical materialist doctrine."60
nevertheless, he viewed the Salazar and Franco reigmes sympa-
thetically
—
probably more from fear of communism than out of
unqualified support of Fascism. While perhaps not a Fasolst,
Franceschl was no exponent of democracy.
During World War II, many liberals lauded the communist
cause, but the clergy maintained its traditional position that
communism was anathema to Christianity. Antagonism between the
clergy and the liberals probably resulted in the clergy being
labeled as fascist. The Church dichotomy, epitomized by its
right and left wings—with the former considerably stronger than
the latter—did not augur well for the future as subsequent
events were to prove. However an unmitigated criticism of the
Argentine Church as being fascistlc would be nefarious and un-
justifiable, since a strong vocal minority led by de Andrea
never wavered in support of demooratic principles. Widely diver-
gent opinions were permitted the clergy under the aegis of the
Church and they were given a good deal of latitude. Lamentably,
the so-called right wing, which consisted of a large number of
Spanish refugees who favored a corporate state, was able to swing
the Church behind the Per6n regime for a variety of reasons dis-
missed at length in the next chapter.
59
Rennle, p. 269.
Frances chi, p, 199.
CHAPTER III
TEARS OF REAOTIOHt 1942-1952
Hit ifr8&3* RfttBOPTOBOlffl
world War II had little more than reaohed Its midpoint
the righteet, conservative government of the aging Presi-
dent Ramon S. Castillo was toppled from power on the afternoon
of June 4, 1943. The Compo de Mayo military sarrlaon tradi-
tionally the Guarantor of the presidential offloe~led by
General Arturo Eawson In oonsonance with the Argentine minister
of War, General Pedro P. !Uunire3~iaarohed forward and seized
oontrol of Buenos Aires, thus ending constitutional government
for the eeoond time within a dosen years. Apparently oblivious
to the previously forged entent6between himself and the tfar
lni^ter, General Kawson oooupled the Casa r.osada and proclaimed
himself the new chief executive. The new ohief of state's tenure
was terminated almost before It began, when a forthright reminder
from General Ramirez, relating to the prior accord, Jarred
ieneral RawsoB? 8 falling memory and moved hln to roslgn two days
latOr in favor of General Ramlres. 1
General Pedro Pablo Ramlres, the new ohief of state, was
no democrat; he was a military ssMLLlO. in a nation that has had
a long tradition of wami fflin or ono man personal rule. His
nniverslty^ss.* W51)fpT'l^*^^ ** *** Yoi* ! ColufflWa
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pro-Axls and authoritarian tendenoleB were readily apparent,
although In this he differed but little from hie legally elected
preeedessor. It was In the area of Churoh-State relations that
the Ramirez regime embarked upon a hlstorloal course that ran
counter to the liberal traditions of the preceding sixty years.
Baelng its stated Ideals upon the ooncepts of a Cathollo corporate
state as embodied In the social precepts of the Church, the
Ramirez regime from the outset courted the support and favor of
the Roman Catholic Church. 2 Whether from personal conviction or
In an attempt to win Churoh support, General Ramirez set back
the clock of time when he decreed on Deoember 31, 1943, that
rellgloue Instruction would be relnstltuted In all public schools.
3
Not only was religious Instruction to be re-lmparted, but It was
to be compulsory.'* In view of the radical nature of the new law,
It is Important to note the exact words of part of Decree Number
18411. Article one stated that:
In all public schools of primary, postprimary,
secondary and special, the teaching of the
Catholic religion will be imparted as a daily
course In the respective plans of study.
Those students whose parents manifest express
opposition by belonging to another religion
remain excluded from this teaching, as respectsfreedom of conscience. These students will be
given moral Instruction.
5
2Bruoe, pp. 179-130.
^Alexander, p. 17,
i'.ennie, p. 374. Rennie stated that religious educationwas made compulsory for •'the first time in the history of the
iSSft*£?«
RePub11?' ' i »<>» thorough examination upon her part
See Chapter xT».^S!
stateraent ™**** some qualification.
5Ann$les
,
Vol. IV, 1944, p. 73, cited by Caslello, p. 336.
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Artlcle two added that "the lnatruotors .;ho have the job of
teaching the Catholio religion will be designated by the govern-
ment falling baok upon nominations of persons authorized by the
occleslastlcal authorities. "° Article five created a Director
General of "ellglous Instruotlon, for purposes of organizing
and dlreoting religious teaching in the schools and was de-
pendent upon the "lnlstor of Justice and the liatlonal liduca-
tlonal Council vdth the agreement and consent of the ecclesias-
tical authorities. Article six related to the expenses lnourred
in Implementing the decree, and stated that a speolal budgetary
item would be included in the National General Budget to oover
all the expenses Involved. ? Scorning sixty yearn of liberal
tradition demanded sons form of Justification as the Kamirez
regime encountered much opposition from teachers and others who
resigned their positions rather than conform to the new dcoree.
The Ramirez government made a valid legal argument for its po-
sition by basing Its deoree upon the Constitution of 1353. It
re-examined the Public Teaching Law of 188A and asserted that
the law Itself was valid since it was not antl-Catholle jagr se
—for had it been antl-Oatholie, It would have been null and
void accordlnr to the Argentine Constitution, which supported
and promoted the Catholic religion. Mot being invalid, the Publlo
Teaching Law of 1884, by fixing an Inconvenient hour for reli-
gious Instruction, had literally denied religious teaching in
6
Ibld .. p. 336.
7Ibld .. p. 337.
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the Argentine schools. 8 Denying the validity of subsequent
Interpretations of the 1884 law, the Ramirez regime held that
these previous Interpretations of the law were lnadmlssable--
lnadmlesable because the students were obliged to Ignore the
State-supported religion as a practical result of such Inter-
pretation. Even the Indians had not been denied the benefits
of religious Instruction according to the Constitution, and Its
denial to the nation's students was absurd and a misinterpreta-
tion of the law, according to the Ramirez regime. Further
Justification for the new Interpretation .ras found In the state-
ment that "the child without the knowledge of religion Is not
educated In neutrality, but In atheism, which begins by sys-
tematically repudiating the name of God and ends by denying hie
existence and laws."^ The revolution of June 4, 1943 was made.
In part, to correct suoh mistakes, abuee3 and misinterpretations
of the law—at leaet that Is the Interpretation of the Caelello
school of thought.
The new regime undeniably sought to obtain the active
support of the Church and its clergy, even though the Argentine
clergy in the twentieth century had remained outside politics,
for the most part, as disinterested observers. The dramatic and
complete reversal of Church-State relations in the educational
field did not unite the clergy a3 might have been supposed,
8Casiello, p. 334.
Ibid ., p. 335. This espousal of religious instruction
appeared quite similar to the preoepto held by Frias, Supra ,
p. 46.
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although the hierarchy had continuously favored a revision of
the school laws of 1884. A division of clerical opinion was
the Inevitable result of the new decree—a division which prao-
tloally always appeared when oertaln oruoial principles were
deliberated. Santiago Luis Cardinal Copello, the leader of the
right wing, ultra-conservative clergy congratulated President
Ra»irez on the now decree stating that:
The patriotism shown by Your Sxcellenoy in
fulfilling one of the deepest hopes and
greatest ambitions of the Argentine people
has reouperated for then the morality of
our oountry's great destinies, the path
which was shown by the great thinkers and
heroec who forged its nationality. 10
:'isgr. Alfonso .uteler, bishop of ::cndor,a, expressing the minority
viewpoint of the clergy warned members of Catholic Action to be
careful "not to create by our attitudes certain ties and under-
standings in tho eyes of society, by which the Church never gains
and almost always loses."1! in the course of events, his warning
wa8 completely disregarded by Catholic Aotlon, whose Central
Committee Issued a letter to laalrez whloh stated in behalf of
all Catholics that "Your Ttalnence and your government well de-
serves the praise of the nation for the clear-sightedness and
decision with which the Argentine children have been restored to
their authentic patrimony of returning Christ to the schools. nl2
10Blanksten, p. 190.
US1 Tlenpo (: exlco City), June 30, 1944, olted by Ronnie,
JEto Arflent?ne Ra^b^o, p. 374.
."JjiattaJi 3a A221& CaJfegHoa Ar^cnl^na,. Co. 261, oltod
by Casiello, p. '37.
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In all fairness, It should be mentioned that a minority of the
clergy did not support the Ramirez regime, but the overwhelming
vtight of opinion In favor of Ramirez was clearly manifested
In the letters of Cardinal Copello and of Catholic Action In
whloh the Church actively endorsed the regime. The Churoh did
not sustain the regime out of a sense of altruism; rather It
sought and found the fulfillment of Its long cherished educa-
tional Ideals In the Ramirez regime. For the Churoh, sixty years
of denial had at last been vindicated by the Ramirez victory—
oompulsory religious education In all schools wan again a
reality and the secularist and atheistic trends of the last cen-
tury had been arrested. 3-3 The question might be asked as to why
the Church was so Insistent upon a religious eduoatlon for
youth. Here Is found the crux of the entire problem—the dif-
fering philosophies conoerned with the eduoatlon of the child.
The Catholic educational Ideal was dlsmetrloally opposed
to that of the modern Argentine state. The Church felt that
Inasmuch as the Argentine state had based Its educative philosophy
upon the posltlvlst thinkers of the 19th oentury, the child was
considered as only a blologloal being with no more substance
than that with which he was formed. Although the educational
goal had been to adapt the child to the means, to give him suf-
ficient weapons In order to confront and sueoeed In the fight for
life, these philosophies, In the eyes of the Church, did not re-
solve the problem of man's destiny, his end or purpose of life.
13Kennedy, p. 206.
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They stated what man was, but not what ho ought to bo. 14 On
the other hand. Christian philosophy, according to Casiello,
taught that man was dependent upon a greater force than himself
for his exletence-that force being Cod, the Alpha and the Omega
of all things. As such, man had a spiritual and an Immortal
8oul, subject to cod, but not subjugated by Illm. The Christian
man was neither pure animal nor pure spirit, but held the seed,
of wisdom and vice simultaneously, cither for good or evil, de-
pendent upon the exeroise of his own free will. 15
The conflicts between the eduoational Ideals of the
Church and the State resulted In the formulation of two diverse
postulates of human life—the anthropocentrlc theory, whloh
envisioned man as the center of life, and the theocentrfc theory,
which recognized God as the center of a universe in which MM
subordinated himself to God and was contingent upon Him. The
anthropooentrist acknowledged that the true end of life could
not be perceived and as such, failed in forming the Integrated,
the whole man, as far as the Church was concerned.!6 Paradoxi-
cally, the theooentrtsts believed In aiding, clarifying and
disciplining the human will and spirit in order that man might
attain his legitimate desires and true ends, so long as they were
not in contradiction to Christian morals and ethics. Carrying
out a v/ell-alned selection of man's innately good tendencies
14Caslello, p. 316.
15
Ibld.. p. 318.
X6
mi'. P. 317.
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resulted In the development of an Individual personality which
eould r.uccoscfully resist nallolous external pressures and re-
sulted in the attainment of the desired ideals. Christian educa-
tion deplored tho "Let nature take its course" ideas as expounded
by certain 19th century progressive philosophers. The individual
must be stimulated, transformed and orlentatod toward an ideal in
whioh education plays the role of exciting and awakening the pre-
existing powers and not simply in the transmission or infusion
of ideas. 1
"
7
It was because of this educational philosophy that the
Church in part upported Faoirez in re-lntroduolng compulsory
religious instruction in the public 30hooln—thereby denying to
each individual the right to determine for himself the right or
the wrong of an educational ideal. Should eduoation be religious
or seoular? If religious, does the ohild receive a too narrow,
too conservative, too restricted outlook on life? Conversely,
doea the child in a public sohool receive enough religious train-
ing outside of sohool to give him mora than a superficial know-
ledge of Christian fundamentals? As the Argentine state had denied
the Christian Ideal of education by remaining neutral in the con-
flict between differing educational Ideologies, it had, through
its own inaotlon, f03tored the liberal positlvi3t philosophical
ideas of the 19th century. The Churoh as a whole reaoted favorably
toward the Ramirez regime slnoe it had found a ohaaplon for its
cause—that of a Christian education for youth. Tho Church and
17Ibld .. p. 314.
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lts hlerarohy wert, for the most port, concerned not with the
democratic aspects of the reglne or the laok of then, but only
In the attainment of Its own Immediate objectives—that of ro-
storing universal religious education on a national scale.
Argentina had thus taken a step backward—aa viewed from
the liberal viewpoint—while the Church regarded the State's re-
establlshnent of religious Instruction as a step forward In the
right dlreotlon. Prior to 1943 the solution of the Church-State
oonfllot over religious eduoatlon In the public schools had been
mollified by a nodus vlvendl In which the Church wa3 free to
ereot Its own religious schools ooapliaentary to, but separate
from, those of the 3tat9. In the final analysis tills would seen
to offer the nost satisfactory solution to the recurring educa-
tional conflict. Those students who desired a religious eduoa-
tlon were untramolled In obtaining this type of eduoation In the
church sponsored parochial schools, while those not desiring an
education based upon religious precepts were free to pursue their
aoademio alms in the regular publlo schools.
Another thooretloal question is posed with regard to
religious instruction in the publlo school oystens does this
instruction, if Imparted, deny the Individual's freedom of con-
science? In a nation where the overwhelming majority of the In-
habitants belong to one religious oreed, is a violation of free-
dom of conscience committed when religious Instruction is Imparted
to the majority of students through the public school system? In
a democratic system of government where the majority rules, would
rellglouB Instruction in the public schools deny or discriminate
agalnst a religious minority of that nation' c citizens? These
are moot questions, worth raising, the answers to which the
reader can best determine for himself
.
Ha jftro4?* Aooonfloqcjr
From Its Inception the lamirez regime was no more than
an Interim government—a brief Interlude out of which the most
despotic, absolute and tyrannioal Argentine government of the ^Oth
century would grow.
Juan Domingo Peron's rise to power was no accident--It
was the oulralnatlon of a well-conceived and deliberate plan to
organize the Argentine masses—the deeoanlsados Into an effective
source of political power under the ausploeo of the new General
Confederation of Labor. Under the Hamlrez regime, Juan Peron,
as seoretary of Labor, used his position as a stepping stone to
the attainment of his fondest aspirations—that of the presidency.
Championing the cause of the Argentine worker against the conser-
vative, reactionary forces of the oligarchy which had success-
fully thwarted the will of the masses, Peron solicited and obtained
the workers' support. For the first time the Argentine worker had
found a capable, energetlo and willing advocate in Peron and
rallied around him In search of its long sought goals of better
working conditions, decent housing and the securing of a living
wag*. Once organized into labor unions, which later became oap-
tlves of the all powerful Reneral Confederation of Labor, the
workers wholeheartedly lout their support—a support which was
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instruratntal In fulfilling the ambitions of Peron. Hla resultant
success was not based upon labor alone; It was rather a combina-
tion of military and labor support which togothor assured ?or6n
of election to tho cation's highest offloe. As an army officer,
Colonel Peron was able to dominate an Influential croup of po-
litically minded officers known as el p:rupo oflolal . As a wily
politician, he was able to forge an alliance between the military
rxuvo and labor—an unbeatable alllanoe that would guarantee him
ultimate victory in the presidential elections of 19A6. 18
Cardinal Copello, as the unofficial spokesman for the
right wing of the Church, was, by virtue of his high position,
able to exert a dominant influence over the majority of the olergy
In the final analysis. This faction, led by the cardinal and
supported by ?'sgr. Gustavo J. Prancesehi, Father Wilkinson Dl-
rube' and ?ather Vlrgillo Plllppo, had from the start favored the
amirea regime and the antl-demooratic, authoritarian policies of
the Conservatives and other small nationalistic groups.
^
Ksgr. Miguel de Andrea, as the unofficial leader of the
Churoh*3 left wing, voiced his unrelenting opposition to the Ra-
mirez regime20 and demanded an early return to constitutional
government, asserting that "the indefinite prolongation of an ab-
normal state of instability and uncertalnlty is a clear symptom
18Arthur Preston hltaker, Argentine Upheaval ('Tew York:
Praeger Publishers, 1956), p. 3. —
19Blanksten, pp. 232-233.
^SUSSSl, p. 60.
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of the evil which la a dad characteristic of our epoch."21 Ab
a bishop ia PartlbuB—that 1b a blBhop trithout a territorial see
or diocesan authority—Andrea was In a position to expound his
beliefs without restriction, for In so doing none of the laity
would be penalized by hlo actions as would be the case of a dio-
cesan bishop. The left
-.;ing faotlon found Its support, in addi-
tion to Andrea, In Father de Eeheverrla and Fatfcor Jobo Maria
Dunphy.
In the subsequent course of events, the loft wine repre-
sentatives of the Ohuroh were, for the most part, subordinated
to the asoendant right wing led by Cardinal Oopello, who personally
favored Peron's ascension to power. This hierarchical factionalism
would not be reconciled until nearly a decade later when the heavy
hand of absolutism and persecution would activate a now coales-
cense among the clergy—a unity based upon unanimous opposition
to a personal despotism.
conclusive evidence of the existing dichotomy within the
Ohuroh was manifested on November 25, 1945, In front of the Imma-
culate Conception Church of Buenos Aires when a group of Catholic
women walked out of the ohuroh In protest to "politics in Churoh."
When some parlshonera shouted for liberty and demooraoy, fighting
broke out among the rapidly swelling crowd of 1,500 In front of
the church. Specifically directing their protest against the
regular parish priest, Father Virgillo Fillppo, who had displayed
a completely partisan attitude In his sermon on the Impending
21
'La. Prensa. (Buenos Aires), January 2, 1947.
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eleotions, the Catholic women kneeled in prayer on tho street
and be3eeched the Almighty to "Illuminate this sinister' a mind." 22
This laical protest against ?lllppa's political neddllng was
noteworthy, for it demonstrated that part of the church would
not submissively yield to politloal direction, and secondly, it
magnified the existing split between the right and left wing ele-
ments within the Church. Later, a group of prominent Catholic
laymen expressed their unalterable opposition to Percys candidacy
for the presidency in a published manifesto whloh urged their
co-rellgionlsts to vote against totalitarianism. 23 Subsequently,
in November, 1945, the Argentine Episcopate issued a Joint pas-
toral to all Argentine Catholic reminding then of their duty as
citizens to vote la the forthcoming elections. The pastoral ad-
monished all Catholics to refrain from voting for any candidate
whose party platform called for the legalization of divorce, se-
cularized education or the separation of Church and State. 2* Al-
though nothing new had been added to the hierarchy's previously
stated position 5 the timing of the pastoral has been interpreted
by many observers as having aided Peron's election, since it pre-
judiced the oause or the Communist, Socialist and Radical political
"The new York Tines . "lovember 26, 1945.
"Alexander, p. 14.
-.Ac
^The Hew York Times . December 5, 1945.
25
2ujjra, p. 67.
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parties. One observer -nade the bald assertion that "Peron had
received political support by high Church officials "27—a state-
ment whloh has not been corroborated and one based primarily on
the timing of the pastoral. 3eyond the slightest doubt the
pastoral was leveled at the aforementioned polltloal parties and
as such could be construed as church Intrusion into the polltloal
arena. Equally certain Is the fact that the right wing of the
Church favored Peron's eleotlon and believed In his soolal pre-
cepts, but whether or not they entered Into any behind-the-scenes
polltloal deal with Per6n has yet to be oubstantlated.
On the eve of the elections of February 24, 1946, pre-
vailing opinion anone the Catholic olergy favored Per6n, parti-
cularly since he had aotlvely courted the Catholic vote, but
favoritism was not neoessarlly active support. The few evidences
of aotlve support encountered In important Instances suoh as
Father Flllppo, Cardinal Copello and the editorials of :"sgr.
Franceschl, oertalnly do not offer muoh substance to the charges
when contrasted with the opposition of a few left wing members
of the clergy. We do not have any definite Information p.s to
how the mass of the clergy felt toward Peron's candidacy.
In the most honest elections since the enactment of the
Saenz-Pena Electoral Law of 1916, Juan Domingo Per6n received
?6
ruoe, p. 180. Druoe seemed to feel that the Churoh's
pastoral letter "broke the Conservative front and won Perfa many
a vote" for the "poorer Argentines were Inclined to aocept what
the Church recommended." This opinion by Bruoe may have merit,
but It is not supported by the skimpy evidence available.
27
Alexander, p. 126.
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over two-thirds of the total to to, thereby constitutionally
beooalng the next president. The masses, labor and the working
classes had overwhelmingly supported Per6n, and his victory was
their victory—for thea a new day had dawned.
The Peronlst "jrvana
Onoe In power, General Peron manifestly supported and
endorsed the Church's activities—a far cry from the pre-existing
Churoh-State relations prior to the Ramirez regime. Clergymen
were Invited to attend Peronlsta rallies and party meetings, and
asked to bestow their apeolal blessing on the proceedings. i8 An
ably calculated and conceived polloy designed to win a maxli.ua
of Church support was pursued by the new regime. One of the first
results of this polloy was the presidential Introduction of Decree
Ho. 18411, the Law of Compulsory Religious Instruction, to the
Argentine Congress for Its ratification—neoessary to confer upon
It the aura of legality. Containing an absolute Peronlsta ma-
jority, the Congress approved the measure by more than two to one,
and Peron 's subsequent algnature made it the law of the land on
April 20, 1947.
^
The Idyllic Churoh-State relations were proxlmated fur-
ther when Pope Plus XII awarded the Great Cross of the Order of
Plus IX to Peron in recognition of Argentina's munlfioont contri-
bution toward the relief of war-suffering In June, 1947.30 The
28
Ibld., p. 127.
^The New York Times . April 18, 1947.
It?ld«, June 29, 1947.
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pope's action oane Immediately after the oelebrated pilgrimage
of SeSora de Per6n to the Holy See and In no way expressed papal
approval of the new regime, although If papal disapproval had
been manifested, the award moat likely would not have been made
—In eplte of the Perons' efforts to relieve war suffering.
In October, 1947 the opening of the first Argentine Marian
Congress at the shrine of Our Lady of Luj&n witnessed the presence
of President and.Seflora Peron and the entire cabinet, which had
turned out for the occasion en, masse . This latter action offered
visible evidence of the support and baoklng which the Peron regime
extended to the Ohurch. *M a new union of throne and altar In
the process of fornatlon—a union oomparable to that extant during
the Rosas tyranny? 31 vnv had President Peron sought a close alli-
anoe with the Catholic Churoh? Was It out of a deep sense of
pious devotion to Christian principles or primarily for political
reasons? The framing of a definitive answer to toe above questions
would show that both political and religious reasons seemed to
have entered Into hie considerations. olltloal—for Peron
needed a maximum of support from all sectors of Argentine society
and the Churoh as part of the society was an unknown political fac-
tor to be reckoned with. Religious—for Senora Peron, considered
by many the power behind the throne, was the "devout member of
the family. "32 WnUe allve> 3e&0T& per6n ^ ^ Btrongest &Uy
31Supra , p. 29.
im >^
32
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Vele2
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nrhe Arsentlne Crisis," The Nation . Vol.
H1 ' I ' l'SuXT, 2 ' 1955, p. 3. Mr. Velez categolrtcallussertsthat IT! Peron ;7as instrumental In the enactnent of the relialou*
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the Churoh possessed, according to one observer, and personally
promoted oordlal ::tate relations with the Church.
For Its part, the Churoh went along with the Per6n regime
—especially the right wing clergy—finding In the PeronB* a
ohansplon for their social and religious goals. Father I'ilippo,
the moQt outspoken supporter of the new regime, secured elec-
tion to the Chamber of Deputies on the Justlclallsta or ?er6n
oclal platfora in 1948. Father Arturo i:elo was another active
Peronlsta supporter in Catamaroa, editorializing the virtues of
Poron and lauding the new regime In the daily £a. unl5n .33 never
had Church-State relations appeared more harmonious, but on the
distant horizon were a few minor, seemingly Insignificant events
that if observed might have propheclzed an Impending conflict.
As far back as June, 1946, the Poronlsta controlled Con-
gress passed a law depriving the Cathollo professional and labor
organizations of their Juridical autonomy. '4 At the time, this
aotlon caused but a ripple—a ripple that was ultimately to grow
Into a real problem. Little did the right wing clergy, blinded
In Its devotion to Per6n, recognize this first—this initial act-
as a portend of future events. Host observers regarded this
event as of no major Import, since surfaoe harmony between the
Churoh and State was maintained, but this writer regards it as
the opening salvo in a long struggle by Peron to dominate every
-^Alexander, p. 129.
54Franol3 23. :'.o"ahon, "Per6n and the Church," Commonweal
.
Vol. 61, :To. 26, April 1, 1955, p. 571.
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segment of society. Ouf.rardly, Church-Jtata relatione were
extremely amicable u late as September, 1343, when the Argen-
tine hierarchy ordered speoial prayers of thanksgiving for the
merciful preservation of President and Seflora PerW lives after
an unsuccessful assasiaation attempt had been made against them.
In addition, three To Douao wore offered espsoially for the
Peronlsta groups. 35 ;liVain two noath8 a secoad 8ltjnlfloaat eyent
was to occur, z -.raming signal that the Church would remain as a
favored, privileged sector of society only as long as r-eron willed
it—that is until he had consolidated his power and wag no longer
restrained by Dva Per5n.
On Rovember 17. 1948, the Paron regime decreed that all
members of the clergy, la the future, uere required to carry
special ecclesiastical credentials on their persons. She Pero-
nlsta controlled press previously had lambasted certain "reaction-
ary" elements among the clergy, and Its real significance was
to keep r. close and continual vigilance upon all clerical critics
of the regime. 36 SoEe of tho clergs prevl0UBly ardent -„Hg|Lu
heeded the warning signal and began entertaining reservations
.bout the regime, rather Uodolfo Carbone, In this group, publish-
ed a pamphlet enumerating the faults of Peronlsm, but apparently
not having the courage of his convictions, ended by stating that
Peronlsm was the lesser of tvo evils. 37
35The Hew York Times
. September 27, 1948.
Ibid.. November 17, 1948.
STSfiBBfflUMfii. Vol. 61, :io. 26, p. 672.
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A third significant event, of concern to Ohuroh-State
relations, took place In January, 19*9—an event whloh por-
tended a rising antagonism between Peronlstas and the olerlcal
authorities, father Joel Warla Dunphy, pastor of the suburban
Butnos Aires ohuroh of Corpus Doolne for fourteen years and a
leader of the left wing churoh element, was dismissed from his
parish. A long tine opponent of Perftn, Dunphy had been Initially
attacked some Tionthc previously by the Peronlsta newspaper,
Deaocracla . which had stated that "the priest Dunphy should be
removed from his post. "5^ Hie attacks against the regime had
started In 1945 and had continued Intermittently until the 1949
Impasse. Admitting that he had spoken against the regime, Dun-
phy declared: "I have always spoken as a priest, as a Christian
and as a Catholic. There Is a totalitarianism of the right and
of the left, and from the moral and religious point of view,
they are equally wrong. "'9 In the ensuing course of events,
Dunphy reoelved p. visitor on October 3» 1948, In the person of
Cardinal Copello, who had ourgersted thft the good father "volun-
tarily resign" and that a nei-r monastic post was awaiting him.*
Apparently, the four month Interval between the cardinal's visit
and the removal of Dunphy had been Insufficient to convince the
latter of the errors of his ways and the merits of the cardinal's
suggestion—one that should have been taken literally. Accordingly,
^The Hew York limes . January 5, 1949.
'^Elanksten, p. 213.
^The !<ew York Times . January 7, 1949.
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Dunphy ve.a relieved of hie post, followed by a statement from
Copello's secretary that the dlsmlsal was "a natter of no out-
side Interest."*1 Two days clasped before runphy acted by pe-
titioning the Argentine Tapel "undo for an official ecclesias-
tical hearing of the charges against hla, If any.
Disregarding the aerlts of the oase. It should be noted
that Dunphy had committed two cardinal offenses In the eyes of
the Church. First, he had disobeyed the express wishes of his
superior by not resigning as suggested, and secondly, he had
exceeded his authority by going over the head of his Immediate
superiors in appealing directly for the Papal Xunclo's interces-
sion. Either one or both actions constituted a grave offense
from a disciplinary viewpoint as far as the Churoh was concerned
--particularly
-icce Dunphy had not compiled with the saoerdotal
vow of obedience. Unfortunately, Dunphy' s superiors belonged
to the right wing of the Church and were in a position to silence
hla. Had he been fortunate enough to have had a church superior
with slallrr views, in all probability his actions would have
gone unnoticed.
As the Papal ATmelo was insensible to his plea, Dunphy, who
persisted in his efforts, tried to gain an ecclesiastical trial
by appealing directly to the Vatlesn. Needless to say, Dunphy's
various appeals went unheeded In view of his breach of eccllesias-
tlcal discipline, and subsequently, he assumed his new monastic
post.
41Ibld .. January 8, 1949.
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The foregoing oourse of events conclusively demonstrated
that the right wing of the Churoh was at this time dominant—
that the left wing, with the exception of ^<Bgr. de Andrea, had
been effectively muzzled. Secondly, It served as a olear warning
that Peronlsm would brook no orltlclsn nor Interference from any
quarter, Including the Church. The Church's right wing element,
so misguided In their blind adulatloa of Per6n, either would not
or could not faoe the reality of a growing absolutism at this
time—a despotism that eventually would demand complete subser-
vience to the tate of all sectors of society. By June, 1950
the ascendant right wing clergy had effectuated such a olose
alliance with the Perdn regime that Copello Issued a pastoral
letter addressed to all dioceses In Buenos Aires, ordering the
permanent placement of the Argentine national flag upon all church
altars. 42 This latter aotlon Indicated the close agreement be-
tween the Churoh and State, resulting In a virtual union of
throne and altar by 1950.
Clear evldenoe of Perfin's basic deoaoato . or disrespect
toward the Church, and his Intention to manipulate the Church for
the attainment of bis political ends was manifested In October of
the same year, whan Peron and his wife ostensibly departed for a
brief vacation Just before the arrival of the papal legate, who
had Intended to pay hie official respeots to the Per6na.*5 As
^iiid'f June 21, 1950. It would appear that Cardinal Co-
pello was not a student of history, for the last time that the
national flag had been plaoed upon the churoh altars, during the
Rosas despotism, the results were catastrophic for the Church.
See Chapter I, p. 30.
^Commonweal , vol. 61, No. 26, p. 672.
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an affront and rebuff to the papal legate and similarly to the
Church, this marked the turning point In Church-State relatione.
I gradual shift In clerical oplnlon—the bulk of whloh had fa-
vored Peronlsm to date—wae perceptible. Slowly, Imperceptibly
at first, many clerlos began to hold reservations, as had rather
Carbone the year before, about the wisdom and prudence of main-
taining a eloBe political alliance with the Peron regime. On
the surface, nothing had changed? but Peron, cognizant of the
Blight gravitation of opinion away from his regime, sought to
counteract and arrest It. Using the proposed enfranchisement
of the clergy as a magnet, Per6n baoked a constitutional amend-
ment whloh gave the clergy the right to vote for the first
time,** In the hope of remedying the deteriorating relations
between the Church and the administration. Passage of the Govern-
ment sponsored electoral reform law, by a vote of 79 to 3, by
the Chamber of Deputies, was but a formality. Peron* s friendly
gesture toward the Church had had the dual purpose of halting
the shift of clerical opinion and of paving the way for his
approaching re-eleotlon.
Peron* s electoral vlotory of November, 1951, was a fore-
gone conclusion, since most segments of society supported him
almost as ardently as before—particularly the masses and the
General Confederation of Labor. However, the Church, while not
opposed to i'eron's re-eleotlon, harbored some misgivings, espe-
cially since a realignment of opinion within the Churoh had
begun. The bulk of the clergy became aware that Peronlsm
^The 'lew York Tlmeo . July 7, 1951.
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a tltuted a definite threat to the oountry and the Church,
and, aooordlngly, set about Intensifying the work of Cathollo
Action, 45 the so-called "right arm" of the Churoh In modern
soolety. Catholic Action, though still comparatively weak, had
grown tremendously In Argentina since the first Tucharistlc
Congress In 1934, when only 600 men had attended. At the sixth
convention held at Hendoes. lr. 19A3, over 8,000 men from Catholic
Action had been present, 46 and the subsequent growth had been
continuous. Peron viewed the growing activities of Catholic
Action with alarm and erivlsloned them as a distinct threat to
his despotlo regime. Hie own nationalist youth organization,
based upon the tenets of Justlclfilismo . had made scant headway
among the nation's youth. In order to remedy this defect, the
government founded the Union of Seoondary Students la the early
1950*3 to intensify Peronista activities among the various stu-
dent groups, 'efuslng to stand idly by, the Churoh reacted by
forming a Union of Cathollo Students—a dangerous move since
Per6n would tolerate no opposition to his megalonanlacal desire
for absolute power. Thus the basis for future disoord was laid.
Another cause of Por6n's discontent was the continued
activity of a group of Cathollo laymen who worked toward the
formation of a Cathollo polltloal party. These men represented
a new force In Argentina—a force that labored to break away
from the tradional Cathollo conservative channels and sought to
^commonweal
.
Vol. 61, Mo. 26, p. 674.
4°Dunne, p. 414.
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pursue a middle course between the extremes of right and left*
Upholding the precepts of the i'rench Christian philosophers,
Jacques Marl tain and J. V. Duoatlllon, they envisioned the or-
ganization of a Oathollo political party as the representative
of Christian Democracy. These Chrlstiau democrats, as previously
mentioned, signed a manifesto denouncing the Per6n regime for its
violation of human rights.*7 At that time the Christian Demo-
crats elicited little sympathy from the right wing elements.
This demonstrated onoe again the wide gap in political thinking
between the conservative Spanish-educated olergy and the small
group of laity striving to advenoe Christian Democracy.^ with
the new realignment of ohurch opinion, these laymen were aided
and encouraged in their efforts by a hierarohy looking for a
champion for its cause.
47
Supra , p. 88.
•"Commonweal. Vol. 61, Ko. 26, p. 672.
OHAJPTER IV
the c-mncH's corrLi" TEiautn
1952-1960
The Peronlat Annaaedon
The Church, In 1952, was to lose one of its strongest
allies with the death of Sefiora :<aria Eva nuarte de Per6n,
aocordlng to Claudlo Velez. 1 Regarded by many as a restraining
and temporizing lnfluenoe upon her husband, Se&ora Per6n*s dis-
appearance from the Argentine political scene was to be keenly
felt by the Church. :ven though 3e3ora Per6n had come Into
oonfllot with the Church In the soolal welfare area through her
vast government controlled charitable enterprises, she remained
a loyal adherent to her faith until her death, fkwever, many
socially prominent Catholic women, who had been aotlve In various
church sponsored charitable societies, lntensly disliked SeSora
Per6n, not only due to her lowly baokground, but for her role In
taking control of most ohuroh affiliated oharltle3 and amalga-
mating them in the Eva Per6n Foundation. The socially prominent
Catholic women resented thl3 lnstruslon Into what had traditionally
been their private concern and vented their complaints to the
1Claudlo Velez, "Anti-Catholic Perfin," The nation . Vol.
180, Bo. 5 t January, 1955* p. 100.
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ocoleslastloal authorities, equally chagrined by the virtual
elimination of the Church from the social field of charity.
Senora Per6n's charitable activities often assumed a polltloal
character when gifts and bequests were cade, not with regard to
need, but to the political effect such donations would have.
The Sva Perdn Foundation, thus accentuating the rising Church-
State antagonism, became the fooal point of the feminine oli-
garchical resistance to the Perfin regime.
With the death of Senora Perdn, the Impulsive, egotistical
character of Perdn was no longer held In check. With restraint
once removed, he became the undisputed master of the Argentine
nation In fact as well as In name, except for the one segment of
society whloh had not been subjugated—the Church. The press,
the oourt -., the universities, labor and the army had all been
BUbdued, but the Church alone remained as a center of opposition
to the despotlo regime, although the main body of clergy had
little reason to lead opposition against Perfin until about the
time that he launched several attacks on It!
In November, 1954, Perdn, freed from the restraining In-
fluence of his late wife and Imagining himself challenged by the
clerical Infiltration of the labor unions and the clandestine
activities of the Christian Democrats, launched out Into what was
to become the most direct persecution that the Argentine Church
had ever experienced. Originally piqued by the formation of
the Union of Oathollo Students In dlreot opposition to the state
backed Union of Secondary students, Peron oomplttely miscalculated
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tha strength of Ohurch opposition to his antl-elerloal oampalgn.
The Catholic Church was not as Important a power group In Ar-
gentina as It had been In the last century, since only about
fifteen peroent of Argentine Catholics could be considered as
praotlclng Catholics. Peron's campaign against the Church was
very popular with the many left wing groups and also was generally
favored by labor. This attack, when It came, was a diversionary
tactic, aooordlnr: to one observer, who felt that Per6n hoped to
distract public opinion from certain aspects of his reglne. 2
Instead of distracting public opinion, the antl-Cathollc cam-
paign provided a rallying point for all the enemies of PerSn.
Even the most luke-warra upper olass Cathollos made oommon oause
with the Ohurch. Before his attack on the Churoh, Per6n had the
bulk of army support, but as the anti-Church oampalgn became
more Intense, many army officers, holding deep religious convic-
tions, rallied around the Churoh. 3 The Christian Democratic
movement, which originally did not have the support of the Church
hierarchy and had little popular following, was a potentially
dangerous threat to Peron's regime.* This new party could osten-
sibly attract a considerable following and eventually might
ohallenge the 3upremaoy of Peron's tightly controlled General
Confederation of Labor. 5
2Whltaker, pp. 73-73.
^Ibld .. p. 76.
Herbert h. Matthews, "Juan Per6n's War with the Catholic
Churoh, *&& Reporter
.
Vol. 12, Ho. 12, June 16, 1955, pp. 20-21.
5
"State vs. Church," U.S. ;; ws and ,orld : eport . Vol. 38,
Ho. 15, April 15, 1955, p. 517^
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The first blow In the climatic Churoh-State struggle was
etruok by Peron la early ;.ovember, 1954, when he declared that
certain Roman Catholic bishops were quietly waging a oampalgn
against his administration. Later In his text, Peron Identified
the three bishops as Nloolas Pasollno of Santa Fe, Permln Lafltte
of 06rdoba and Froilan Perrelra r.elnaf« of La Kloja, and labeled
tham as enemies of the State. Catholic Action, as a partner In
crime against the state, was Included In Peron's first scathing
attaok, since Its members had attempted to undermine tho Peronlsta
movement, ."leanvrhllo, the Peronlsta General Confederation of
Labor had attacked tho aotlons of certain priests In the labor
movement and declared that they were "the greatest danger to
President Peron's syndicalist organization."6
On November 13, 1954, the Archbishop of c6rdoba, Msgr.
Terrain Lafltte telegramed Peron that he had always been loyal to
the authorities and especially to the president himself. The
following day the die was Irrevocably oast when the Peron govern-
ment began talcing active measures of repression against the
Ohuroh with the arrest of the first priest, the Rev. Pablo Got-
tardi In Villa Maria, 06rdoba, on the charges of "spreading un-
founded and alarming rumors. "7 in the provincial oapltal, a
celebration, honoring the twenty-seventh anniversary of Lafltte's
6The New York Times . November 11, 1954.
of m*mJl£&'lJF£!Zi 14 ' 195A : /a«"»r sottardi was the firstore than 100 priests arrested during the Peronlsta persecu-tions and confined on various charges ranging all the way from
Ji?£.
Q
??
eC
2f ^f Providential Person to the printing and dis-tribution of anti-government pamphlets.
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lnstallation as head of the diocese wan cancelled by the pro-
vincial police, who locked the church doors of the c6rdoba cathe-
dral and posted guards around the edifice. An exonple of the
strong religious sentiment prevalent In that provlnco, tradi-
tionally the stronghold of Argentine Catholicism, was observed
the following day. The entire cabinet of the provincial governor
and the rsetor and several deans of the University of c6rdoba
resigned In protest against the Peronlsta action. 8
Cardinal Oopello, still not aware of ?er6n*s 3erlous In-
tentions, oalled upon all Catholics to "comply with your civic
duties always without detriment to your religious principles."''
Additionally, the cardinal warned all priest.; not to engage in
political party conflicts under pain of jeopardizing their in-
vestiture.
Urging calm In the existing Church-State oriBii, Peron
addressed the C-eneral Confederation of Labor and declared that
"we have acted in time and have put the brakes on this Infiltra-
tion. "10 He was careful, however, to accuse only certain re-
actionary clerics for fomenting the disorders, rather than the
Churoh as a whole. Leaving no doubt as to his supreme sense of
"Ibid .. November 14.
pid.
,
November 24, 1954. The Cardinal's warning waa
apparently necessary since a large part of the younger priests
actively sought to oppose the Peronlsta repression.
10I|M«i Uovember 26, 1954. The infiltration was an
obvious allusion to the growing clerical influence In the labor
unions which Peron considered a serious challenge to his nower.
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eonfldence In the ultimate outcome of the struggle, Peron de-
clared that he had the power to stop any further moves by the
opposition— c. confidence not entirely Justlflabls by the faots
since Ohuroh persecution would only serve to strengthen and
solidify the left and right wing elements of the Church.
On November 22, the Rev. Rodolfo Carbone was arrested
and sentenced to thirty days In Jail for drawing a parallel In
his sermon between the tfazl persecutions and the existing condi-
tions In Argentina. 11 The detention of ?ather Carbone wa~ fol-
lowed by the first serious anti-government demonstration In front
of Oopello's episcopal palace on the Plaza del Mayo where 5,000
Catholics manifested their unqualified support of the Church.
The crowd shouted "Our lives for Christ" Instead of the traditional
governmental slogan of "Our lives for P«r6n. Hl2 The Primate asked
for oalm and Implored all churchmen to refrain from talcing part
In rellglouB demonstrations not authorized by ecclesiastical
authorities. 1' Perturbed by the demonstration against bis regime,
Peron canceled the annual procession In honor of the Immaculate
Conception of the Virgin 'lary. Disregarding the governmental de-
cree, a orowd estimated at 100,000 packed the Plaza del Mayo and
heard a Marian service broadca-it by loudspeakers from within the
locked Cathedral. 1* Peron replied the succeeding day by reasserting
lx r.upra
. p. 93.
12The Sew York Times . November 30, 1954.
15Ibld .. December 1, 1954.
14Ibld .. Deoember 9, 1954.
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hls claim that the oligarchy and clergy were In league against
the Argentine people. 15
By the middle of December, the government's attacks upon
the Ohurch had lnoreased to an alarming degree when more than
ten priests had been arrested on various charges , In addition,
four priests had been discharged as professors of religion at
the University of C6rdoba, while the Oolegio del Salvador, one
of the oldest parochial high schools in Argentina, had been seized
by the Ministry of Education. 1^ Viewing the confused state of
things as propitious for the introduction of the Peron Divorce
Law, the government legalized divorce for the first time in Ar-
gentine history—over the strenouo protests of the Church~and
declared that social progress was inhibited without divorce.
After Per6n's signature made the divorce bill a law, the Vatloan
newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano , denounced Per6n and charged his
regime with "oppressing Catholicism, liberty of religion, the
morals of the Roman Catholic faithful and the rights of the
Church."1?
The last day of the year witnessed the re-establishment
of legalized prostitution, previously banned since 1937—a mea-
sure designed to promote "social progress," but actually a bill
to satiate the laboring classes desire for "freer" social contacts.
This measure only served to Increase the tense Church-State
15Ibld .. December 10, 1954.
16Ibld .. December 19, 1954.
17lbid., December 24, 1954.
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relations since the hierarchy was unalterably opposed to pro-
stitution. 18
The new year proved no more auspicious for Church-State
relations than had the previous one, for Peron, in his obsession
for total pover, seemed driven by a megalomanlacal desire to
force a fight with the Church—one which the Church earnestly
sought to avoid. As long as Peron did not interfere with its
prerogatives, the church bent over backwards in order to maintain
anicable relations with the State, nevertheless, the continued
arrest of priests, the closing of Catholic schools, and the remo-
val of religious teachers from the universities solidified cleri-
cal opinion against the regime.
Ihe Republican Party for Christian Democracy clandestinely
formed In C6rdoba, was unable to operate on a national scale due
to the government's strict surveillance of all its activities,
nevertheless, the new party attracted the support of the bull:
of the clergy, as the clergy welcomed a champion against the
dictatorship. If all of the clergy did not favor the new party,
at least they viewed it from a neutral viewpoint—a far different
perspective than that formerly hold by the right wing olergy in
proceeding years.
W
On March 16, 1955, over 3,000 telegrams were sent to Peron
imploring him to abrogate the law legalizing divorce and prosti-
tution. They were without effect. 20 As of that date, more than
l8Ibld .. December 31, 1954.
^Herbert L. Katthews, "Peron Facing Plght on Church,"
The Hew York Times . February 23, 1955.
^The Hew York Times . Karoh 16, 1955.
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one hundred ::oman Catholic priests, who had formerly taught
religion In the public schools, were dismissed from their posts,
thus removing the Church as an influence In the public sohools. 21
In addition, twenty-flvo professors from the University of
Cdrdoba, thirty froa the National College of I'onserrat and
eleven from the School of Commerce were discharged—the result
of their being \oo Catholic.
"
22
The fierce struggle between the two opposing forces,
feronlamo and the recalcitrant clorgy, continued unabated with a
heightening tempo, into the spring when eighty-nine religious
schools were charged with fiscally defrauding the Government of
v300,000—a charge which was not elaborated upon. 2' Twenty-three
prelates retorted by signing a letter protesting the action of
the Per6n regime and stated that many church schools would be
forced to olose with the sharp reduction in state aid to the
private schools. Of all Peron's measures against the Church, this
latter action against the sohools "hurt and alarmed the Churoh
leaders the most." 24
By April, 1955, the conflict had degenerated to such a
point that the Poroulsta controlled newspapers began a campaign
advocating the separation of Church and State through an amendment
to the Constitution. The press olalned that a "crafty campaign"
^America
.
Vol. 92, Ho. 22, February 26, 1955, p. 5*9.
22The Haw York Times . February 22, 1955.
23I£M«» "arch 25, 1955.
24Ihe ' osorter . Vol. 12, Ho. 12, June 16, 1955, p. 21.
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by the Church was aimed at creating disturbances and resurrec-
ting the oligarchy, so that the Poronlsta
,
nationalist doctrine
would be undermined.° The "ecclesiastical oligarchy" was held
to be "one of the worst and most Insidious enemies of Per6n,"
and the newspapers charged them with exploitation of the working
classes.^ Retaliating by the Issuance of a pastoral letter,
the Church denounced the government's harrassment and said: "To
those who have lost their tenure, their positions, their reputa-
tions or their resources and to those who endure Imprisonment
without being convicted of any crime, goes our voice of oomfort
and encouragement." 2'''
On Holy Thursday of 1955, the traditional parade from
the congress building to the Cathedral In the Plaza del Mayo had
been redirected in order that the marchers would not go beyond
the Church of MonBerrat, five blocks away. In spite of the
governmental directive, a crowd of some 15,000 Oathollo men and
women, led by a group of younger men, paraded past the Monserrat
Church to the Plaza del Mayo. Upon reaohlng the Plaza, the
crowd, swollen to an estimated 35,000 people, waved white hand-
kerchiefs in front of the Cathedral and sans "Sod Save Argen-
tina, *« Following this great outpouring of Churoh support, the
25The Hew York Tines . April 4, 1955.
26Ibld .. March 29, 1955.
h -, nC:C
2T "
;:t
^
ngmal1 vs
*
churoh ." Tine
.
Vol. 65, No. 14, Anrll
^i 1955, p. 32.
•_« 1f"^ChureV)efles Per6n »" liaa. voi. 65, no. i6,April 18, 1955, p. 46.
-110-
I'linl&ter of Eduoatlon stopped all religious instruction in the
public schools, calling the action a temporary suspension—but
Ohuroh leaders regarded the move as permanent. 29
On April 20, the Roman Catholic school authorities sued
the Kinlstry of Education, darglng defamation by the preceding
monfcfs governmental charge of fraud. Replying to the civil aotion,
the Peronlsta newspaper, Penocracla . stated that the "Yellow
Internationale" of the church was attempting to pass on its
vices and hate to the State. 3°
A large pro-Church demonstration occurred on May 6, in
front of the Cathedral in downtown Buenos Aires, leading to the
arrest of forty prominent Catholic laymen, among whom were re-
tired Brig. Gen. Carlos Garcia Cuevae and the head of Argentine
Catholic Action, Luis P. Arrighl, along with the treasurer and
secretary of that organization.'1 Cardinal Copello, upon learn-
ing of the incident, went directly to police headquarters, where
he was kept waiting for more than an hour and subsequently denied
permission to visit the prisoners. The following day, the car-
dinal called on all Roman Catholicc to go to their local police
stations and demand the release of the leaders of Catholic Ac-
tion. The disorders were not localized in Buenos Aires, for
fifteen important Catholics were arrested in neighboring La Plata
after having led a parade of several thousand to the main plaza
^The Sew York Times . April 15, 1955.
3 UMm April 20, 1955.
31lbld.. May 8, 1955.
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of that olty following the Holy Thursday procession. 32 The next
day, Father Egidlo Esparza was arrested and jailed on charges of
disrespect to the president for stating In a sermon that "the
press points out that in most other nations In the Americas,
church and state are separated. I would add that In none of
these other American nations are priests jailed because they dif-
fer with the government or workers fired because they are Catho-
lic "33
The Argentine Senate on May 11, voted to abolish all re-
ligious education in the Argentine public schools—a reprisal
taken against the Church for its refusal to submit to the State.
This was followed by the introduction of a bill to tax the Roman
Catholic Churoh for the first time in Argentine history. All
religious bodies, including Church schools, traditionally had
been exempt from taxation. A second bill introduced into the
Chamber of Deputies proposed the separation of Churoh and State,
an action which would cost the Church a minimum of $5, 780, 000
annually In governmental subsidies to the Catholic schools. The
Church let It be known that it would approve of the separation
if the State would restore all property previously seized from
the Churoh—property valued at ^142,060,000.3*
Meanwhile a new altercation occurred in Cfirdoba, when
the police chief Issued an order forbidding the holding of Bene-
32Ibld .. May 10, 1955.
33"unexploded Bomb," TJ
34The New York Times . Hay 15, 1955.
ime . Vol. 65, No. 19, May 9, 1955,
p. 42.
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dlotlon within a Carmelite Church. The Carmelite priest re-
fused to acoept the order and stated that a private act of wor-
ship within the church walls did not require a special permit. 35
On May £1, the Peronlata controlled Concress passed a
bill oalllng for the election, within 180 days, of a constitu-
ent assembly to redefine Church-State relations and to disesta-
blish the Oathollo Church as the state religion.'6 Later In
the week, Independence Day was celebrated for the first time In
145 years with the president absent from the traditional Te Deum
service. ** "ollowlng the Independence Day celebration, more
than 125 persons were arrested In six provincial capitals as a
result of disorders. liost of the detained were members of Ar-
gentine Catholic Action, and this fact would seem to Indicate
that opposition against the Peron regime had been actively pro-
meted by members of that organization.
The last day of Hay witnessed the dismissal of 113 Roman
Catholic nuns from the orphanages and homes for the aged, along
with the secularization of the Holgr.r UnzuS Orphanage In '5ar del
Plata. That evening, demonstrations against the Government
broke out at Corrlentes, Tuoum&n and C6rdoba, resulting In the
arrest of twenty-four persons. 39
35Ibld .. Hay 18, 1955.
36Ibld.. May 21, 1955.
37Ibld .. Hay 26, 1955.
^Ibld... May 31, 1955.
39Ibld .. June 2, 1955.
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On June 3, the bill banning all religious Instruction In
the public schools became law, coupled with the government's ter-
mination of all financial assistance to Church schools.*
The traditional Corpus Chrlstl Day procession scheduled
to be held on Thursday was moved up to Saturday by the Church
authorities In order to avoid any disturbances. The Government
replied that the parade would be an Illegal act under any cir-
cumstance, regardless of the day that It was held, since it might
result in serious disorders. Pamphlets appeared asking all
Catholics to make a peaceful and passive demonstration and warning
all participants to assemble early, as public transportation to
central Buenos Aires would be halted by the government. 41 The
fateful day arrived on June 11 and was the climax of the Church-
State struggle. A crowd of more than 100,000 Catholics—the
largest religious demonstration ever held in Argentina
—
gathered
in the Plaza del Mayo for the traditional procession in honor of
the Peast of Corpus Chrlstl. A six hour parade passed through
sixty-five blocks of central Buenos Aires, headed by the leaders
of C'.thollo Action. The parade halted in front of the Congress
building long enough to rnlse the papal flag, beside that of the
national flag, and peaceably returned to the Plasa del Mayo,
carefully avoiding a rival government sponsored demonstration
honoring the return of a renowned Argentine boxer from Japan.
Once again in front of the Cathedral, filling the Plaza del Mayo
^Ibid .. June 3, 1955.
4lIbld .. June 9, 1955.
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for some fourteen blocks, the Catholic demonstrators shouted
"the Army Is Catholic!" and "we have had enough of fear." The
Per6n government, fearful of a headlong clash with the demon-
strators, ordered all police to keep away from the crowd. On-
the-scene foreign observers reported that the army leaders were
very Impressed by the size of the pro-Church crowd whloh demon-
strated Its express opposition to the Government. At midnight,
after the orderly dispersal of most of the crowd, 250 Catholics,
many of then women who earlier had been trapped in the Cathedral,
were arrested. The Government newspapers acoused the Catholics
of bombing the Israeli and Yugoslav embassies and of breaking
the windows of four Peronlnta newspapers during the parade. De-
nocrftcla , the official government mouthpleoe, called the Saturday
events "treasonable," an action which only Increased the visible
state of tension at this time In Buenoe Aires."
June 14 saw the arrest of 430 persons, caught Inside
Cardinal Copello's eplsoopal palaoe, followed by fighting In the
Plaza del Mayo. Peron replied to the Saturday demonstrations
In a broadcast to the nation, asserting that the Churoh "was the
wolf In sheep's clothing" and that a "clerical political aot"
had occurred on Saturday, rather than any homage paid to God.
He ooncluded by deolarlng that the "Government was not against
the Church, but rather
. . . the Church was against the Government.'
42Edward Morrow, "Big Catholic March Defies Per6n Ban,"
The Hew York Times . June 12, 1955.
4?The New York Times . June 13, 1955.
44Ibld .. June 14, 1955.
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The next day Perin retaliated against the Church by dismissing
Bishop Kanuel Sato—auxiliary bishop of Itaenoc Aires and acting
head of the archdiocese during Cardinal Copello'n Ulceus—and
his secretary Ksgr. Ham6n "'ovoa. Both men were charged with
treason and detained at police headquarters prior to deportation
to Italy. Significantly, none of the Oovernment's four secretaries
nor the Defense minister, Gen. Jose Sosa "ollna, signed the de-
cree of expulsion. 5 cardinal Copello, recovering from a ner-
vous breakdown at a nearby monastery, went directly to the Ar-
gentine Foreign Klnlster, Juan Heaorino and demanded an explana-
tion for the dismissal and expulsion of the two prelates.
On June 15, bishop Tato and Msgr. N'ovoa arrived at the
Vatican and reported on the true state of Churoh affairs In Ar-
gentina. That evening the Holy See excommunicated ?er6n, along
with all others who had "trampled on the righto of the Church."*6
The deoree deprived Peron of all the saoramonts and of any
participation In the religious life of the nation. Ills oxconau-
nleatlon helped to consolidate Catholic opinion at the time that
the revolt was in progress.*7 Toohnloally, Per6n oould no longer
be considered the legal president of Argentina—for the Constitu-
tion specified that a president had to be a Catholic, and the
decree of excommunication, In effect, legally barred Per6n from
continuing in offloe. A few hours later, a coincidence of opinion
45Ibld, .. June 15, 1955.
^Ibld .. June 17, 1955.
Kennedy, p. 210.
-116-
between the Church and naval officers appeared when a revolt
broke out at noon on June 16, proceeded by an attack of 'iavy
planes on the Casa Rosada . Per6n, supported by the army and
aided by the fact that the Navy planes could not land and re-
fuel, had the revolt crushed by midnight. 48 However, that night,
a Peronlsta Inspired mob attacked nine churches In Buenos Aires,
setting then on fire after sacking them.*9 The following day,
Peron addressed the nation and deplored the "Communist" exoesses
perpetuated against the Church. His address did not dispel the
shock and outrage felt by the majority of Argentines over the
burning of their churches. The bulk of Argentine public opinion
crystallzed after this wanton attack upon the Church. Many
who formerly ignored religion now rallied around the Church and
determined to end PerSn's power. The damaged churches served as
a focal point for the piety and anger felt by the mass of citi-
zens, and the government, thoroughly frightened by the unanimity
of public condemnation, did nothing to discourage the many pil-
grimages to the ravished churches. 50
The result of the unsuccessful June 16 revolt activated
a large body of heretofore latent Catholic sympathy, which or-
dinarily remained outside the polltloal arena. This dormant body
of opinion was a potential source of power, but could be brought
into action only by grave circumstances. The crisis facing the
^Whi taker, p. 9.
49The New York Times
. June 17, 1955.
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Chureh, coupled with the desecration of holy objeots, rendered
this opinion politically aotive~an active body that would In-
creasingly oppose the Peronlst dictatorship until Its final
overthrow. The succeeding day, Per6n, In a move toward recon-
ciliation with the Church, ordered the release of all Roman
Catholic priests previously detained. He dismissed the ministers
of Interior and Education, both of whom had actively led the
anti-Church oampalgns. Understandably, these new moves by Peron
did not visibly Impress many Catholics, for renewed demonstra-
tions by several thousand Cathollos broke out, and orowds shouted
for the return of Bishop Tato. Ksgr. de Andrea's reply to Per6n*s
conciliatory gestures was viewed In the burned out ohurch of San
Miguel, when that prelate threw off his vestments and Informed
the congregation that henceforth he would wear only blaok as a
sign that his soul was In mourning. 51
The Peronlst Reprieve and Deposition
On June 24, seventy of the 430 Cathollos arrested In the
episcopal palace were released, and the Primate of Argentina,
Copello, opened high level talks with the Government In search
of a solution to the Church-State differences. 52 Pour day8 later>
the cardinal urged all Argentine Cathollos to heed Per6n*s plea
for a political truce and desist from any further anti-government
acts. Peron remained silent for the next two weeks, a silence
p. 30.
51 "Bamaga Control »" Ilia. Vol. 66, Ho. 2, July 11, 1955,
52The New York Times . July 4, 1955.
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lnterpreted by hla opponents as a clear manifestation of his
weakness. His subsequent July fifth speeoh was conciliatory
and encouraged, rather than weakened, opposition to his regime. 5'
Catholic Action leaders disagreed with the Primate's recommenda-
tion for a reconciliation with Perdn and determined to pursue a
course of continued resistance to the regime. 54 Thjg course of
resistance was revealed on the 139th anniversary of Argentine
Independence when a parade, organized by the leaders of Catholic
Action, marched to the Plaza del Mayo, shouting "Let him go" and
"Pear is dead." The demonstrators were in direct disagreement
with the hierarchy's policy of reconciliation, expressed by the
latter' o Cancellation of the traditional Te Deun commemorating
Argentine Independence. The following day, a crowd of 1,000
demonstrated In front of the Cathedral, waving white handkerchiefs
and shouting "Death to the tyrant" and "Peace and freedom." Once
sufficiently aroused, the Catholic laity were in no mood to heed
the bishops' pleas of reconciliation—having viewed Peron's past
actions, they were no longer willing to trust his motives nor
intentions. Police loyalty, wavering at the time, divided between
sympathy for the crowd and fulfillment of duty. Finally, the
police responded by looking up hundreds of demonstrators In the
Cathedral—thus ending the disorders. 55
A few days later, the Perfin regime announced that it would
55Whltaker, pp. 10-11.
5ATh« Hew York Times . July 8, 1955.
55Ibld .. July 11, 1955.
-119-
resume paying salaries to Church prelates—salaries which had
been stopped In April—and, In addition, would grant Catholic
chaplains the right to return to their prison posts."
On August 15, the Church hierarchy instructed all Catho-
lics to observe the traditional holiday of the Assumption of
the Virgin Mary, adding that school children would observe the
occasion by not attending olasses.57 The tacit truce between
Per6n and the Church was broken at the end of August when five
men in a Jeep fired upon some policemen, and milling crowds
battled the police all day.^8 Meanwhile, university students,
protesting the Government's abolition of the feast day, battled
police and firemen for throe hours before being taken into ous-
tody. This act set off a general Roman Catholic student strike
or boycott for a "Crusade for Liberty" whloh was 100^ effective
in the parochlcal schools and 65?' effective in the public schools. 59
The resulting disorders, toward the end of August, har-
dened the Perdn government's stand, and the Minister of Interior
charged that Roman Catholic priests were aotively inciting sub-
version agaln3t the government. He warned that they must desist
or face prooeoution." As a consequence, Per6n sought to bolster
56ibid. , July 14, 1955. Perdn was clearly on the defen-
sive from June 16 on. His position grew steadily weaker with
attempts at reconciliation. Even the Radical Party, led by Arturo
Prondlzl, later president, was allowed free rrdlo time in which
to assail the Per6n regime.
57Ibld .. August 15, 1955.
^"Peron's Big Blow," Kewsweek . Vol. 46, p. 43.
59The Hew York Times . August 16, 1955.
6oTbld .. August 18, 1955.
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hls regime by again employing the harsh, repressive measures
previously used to crush opposition, but public opinion was In
no mood to return to the grim days prior to June 16, The pur-
suit of a carrot and stick policy would not succeed. Still
attempting to pacify public opinion, Per6n, In early September,
postponed the bill which would have separated Church and State
and announced that the Arsentlne ambassador to the Holy See
would shortly return to his post.°2
The last act In the Peronlst tyranny was written on Sep-
tember 16, 1955, in Odrdoba and in Bahia Blanoa, when a full scale
revolt led by the Navy and the Air :'orce broke out against the
despotism, Odrdoba, as the chief centar of rebel resistance, was
once again to triumph over the capital in the long intermittent
struggle between the hinterlands and the portefios . Led by General
Eduardo Lonardl, a practicing Cathollo, a group of Air Foroe
Cadets at the cadet school just outside of Odrdoba held out against
a vastly superior foroo of 7,000 Government troops. Repulsing
the loyalist attacks, the eadets were able to send forth planes
bearing the revolutionary sign of the cross, signifying "Christ
will win,"' on bombing mission- against the government troops.
Within the city of 06rdoba, Brig. General Dalmlro Felix Videla
Balaguer led hundreds of armed civilian cadres, organized in squads
of ten men each with a handful of rebel soliders, in house to house
6llfhitaker, p. 16.
£The Hew York Times . September 10, 1955.
63,
.7hitaker, p. 31.
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flghtlng which lasted for three days before the government build-
ings were finally oaptured. The naval forces from Bahla Blanoa
headed north In an attempt to blockade Buenos Aires and drew up
alongside the capital In the Rio de la Plata estuary, preparatory
to shelling the city. Defeotors among the army units In San Juan
and Mendoza Joined the rebels and out off the Peronlsta forces,
thereby Isolating v.'estern Argentina from the capital. "^ On Sep-
tember 19, threatened with the bombardment of Buenos Aires, Per6n
at last resigned and fled to neighboring Paraguay, thus ending
one of Argentina's longest and most brutal dictatorships.
Immediately after the successful revolt, Seneral Lonardl
was Installed as provisional president of the Republic, attribu-
ting his victory to the part played by the civilian populace of
C6rdoba. 65
The Po3t- Per6n Period
In early October, Lonardl outlined his policy toward the
Church, statins that "all differences" would be settled "through
the conclusion of a concordat.""" Additionally, he ordered religious
Instruction resumed In La Rloja province and restored the Cathollo
nuns to their posts In the welfare Institutions. 6? Before the
64Ibld .. p. 32.
65JThe Hew York Times , neptenber 22, 1955.
66
v;hltaker, p. 36.
67The Hew York Time
3
. Ootober 4, 1955.
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month had ended, the exiled prelates, Tato and iovoa, returned
to Buenos Aires, greeted by a crowd of 30,000 who had turned out
to welcome them back. 63
Lonardl's reign proved to be rather brief—lasting less
than eight weeks before being forced out of office on iiovember
13, 1955, by General Pedro P. Aramburu. Opposition to certain
of his policies had developed among the Army clique, for many
officers regard him as too soft on the Peronlatas and believed
that reactionary Catholics were too influential In his government. 69
The Aramburu government pushed a more vigorous antl-Poronl3ta
campaign and followed a middle of tne road course In Church-State
relations. With regard to religious Instruction In the publlo
schools, Gen. Aramburu decided to allow the Peronl3ta prohibition
to stand, thus placating the mass of his antl-clerloal supporters
on the one hand, but disappointing many of his Catholic adherents
on the other.?
By May, 1956, a minor religious Issue erupted Into promi-
nence. A group of 1,000 students at the University of La Plata,
long nrted for lt3 liberal tendencies, seized the Institution In
protest against the policies of the Minister of Eduoatlon, Dr.
Atlllo dell'Oro Malnl, who had been a holdover from the Lonardl
government. Two days later, student demonstrators at C6rdoba and
68Ibld., October 24, 1955.
69
'Arthur P. Whi taker, "Argentina: Recovery from Peron,"
Current History
.
Vol. 32, No. 188, April, 1957, p. 207.
70Ibld .. p. 207.
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Bueno8 Aires were injured in clashes 'between the supporters and
opponents of Oro Kainl. His opponents, led by the Argentine
University rederatlon, charged that Oro : aini was a "clerical
reactionary." The Argentine University federation was in the
vanguard in demanding the resignation of Oro Kaini and finally
obtained its objective. 71
General :.uls Rodolfo Gonzalez, a former War College pro-
fessor, criticized lightest Roman Catholics in a speech given be-
fore the Military Club in September. Ills speech had a bombshell
effect upon his audience when he stated that "Spanish priests and
clerics foment pernicious prinolples amongst us and use their
great Influence upon the youth. "72 in addition, he attaoked the
Superior War College as "being a breeding ground for totalitarian
offloors. "73
The year 1957 saw the Argentine People chiefly concerned
about problems arising from the forthcoming election of a Consti-
tuent Assembly. Jjia Prensa favored the constitutional reform In
order to strengthen the Argentine federal Bystem and reduoe the
power of the president.
7
4 Speaking out against political parties
whioh advocated divorce, compulsory secular education or a "one
big union" labor policy, the Roman Catholic bishops admonished
71The Hew York Times . Hay 11, 1956.
' 2Ibld .. September 8, 1956. It is interesting to note
that a majority of the Argentine clergy encountered In this thesis
have Italian rather than Spanish names.
73ibld .. September 8, 1956.
7*"Rlver Plate Republics: Argentina," Hispanic American
cport . X, Ho. 1 (January, 1957), p. 37.
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thelr members to refrain from voting for these parties and urged
all Catholics to collaborate In restorlnc normalcy to Argentina. 75
During the following weeks, the pre-election situation was fur-
ther confused when certain political parties, purposely using
vague and imprecise language to describe thoir principles, aimed
at winning some of the Catholic vote. In response, the Argentine
episcopacy appealed to all political parties to clarify their
positions regarding the fundamental problems of life.'"
The election results for the Constituent Assembly were
tabulated at the end of July, and the Moderate :;adloalc led the
reform parties, receiving 2,143,000 votes and capturing 77 seats
In the 205 member Constituent Assembly. The socialist Party,
also In favor of constitutional reform, captured 511»000 votes
and 12 seats, while the new Christian Democratio Party obtained
420,000 votes, placing third with seven seats In the Constituent
Assembly. The Intransigent Radical party, which was against
constitutional reform, obtained 1,329,000 votes with 73 of the
Assembly seats, making it numerically the second party In the
nation. 77 A full 25 percent of the electorate had not voted, as
most of them were supporters of ex-dlctator Per6n, Some observers
stated that not all of the blank ballots were for Peron since from
two to ten percent of the total vote cast in previous eleotions
75The New York Times . June 9, 1957.
76Ibld .. June 23, 1957.
77Ibld., July 31, 1957.
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had been blank. 78
In September, hope dimmed for reform of the Constitution
of 1053 when party factionalism broke out. nevertheless, Presi-
dent Aramburu expressed his desire to reform the Constitution so
that a future president could not make himself a dictator. Be-
fore the close of the first day's session at Santa PS, the In-
transigent Kadioal Party members walked out of the Constituent
Assembly, thus weakening tho supporters of reform.79 in spite
of the hoyoott by the Intransigent Radicals, the remaining de-
legates unanimously approved tho Constitution of 1853 as the law
of the land, theroby abrogating the Per6n Constitution of 1949
favored by the Intransigent Radicals. Although the delegates
present constituted but half, 105 out of the k05 delegates to the
Assembly, their votes won the day. 80
Dr. Lucas Ayarragaray was chosen by the new Christian Demo-
cratic party to run as the party's standard bearer in the forth-
coming elections cf February, 1958. His vice-presidential
running mate was to be Horaclo Sueldo. 81
After the election of Arturo Frondlzl in February, 1958,
the Church-State issue again flared to the forefront of Argentine
problems. President Frondizi presented a bill to Congress re-
questing public support for all private universities—universities
78 h|U River Plate Republics} Argentina," Hispanic Amerlaan
Report. X, Mo. 7 (July, 1957), p. 378.
"
79?he Mew York Times . September 8, 1957.
8oIbld .. September 25, 1957.
8lIbld ». November 5, 1957.
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whlch had been created by private Initiative—to qualify then
to Issue diplomas and professional titles on a par with the state
Institutions, provided that they submit to the conditions esta-
blished by State regulations. 82 Most Argentine university stu-
dents went on strike against the bill In defiance of Prondlzl's
wishes. Student rioting against the bill continued Into Ootober
and led to the wounding of three students In Tuouman. 8' The
federal chief of police In Buenos Aires stated that Communist
agitators and leftist extremists were attempting to convert the
university dl pute Into a religious conflict. 84
On October first, the Frondlzl sponsored bill survived an
all night meeting of the Chamber of Deputies when the required
two-thirds majority necessary to override Senate approval of the
measure failed to pass. The victory was a personal one for the
president, and Jubilant Catholics oommended him on his efforts. 8 5
Approximately a year later, ?rondlzl joined 300,000 per-
sons at the National Duoharlstlc Congress held on October 12, 1958
In Cdrdoba. Frondlzl praised the olvlllzlng role of the Church In
Argentina and wished It well for the future. 86 Later that month,
Antonio Cardinal Cagglano became the eighth arohblshop of Buenos
Aires, when he 3wore an oath of allegiance to uphold the Argentine
S2Ibld .. September 25, 1953.
83lbld .. Ootober 4, 1953.
^bld .. Ootober 1, 1953. There is no evldenoe for or
against this assertion.
85Ibld
. , October 2 , 1958.
86Ibld .. October 14, 1959.
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Constitutlon In a civil ceremony boycotted by the Papal Nuncio
who objeoted to the wording of the oath since It upheld national
patronage. 8 ' Cardinal Cagglano was attended by Frondizi and
other high government officials. Afterwards, Prondlzl had an
Interview with the controversial bishop of La Plata, Antonio Jose
Plaza, known as the workers* bishop for his role In reconciling
the Peronjsta masses still loyal to Peron. 88
Once again Church emphasis was shifting from the political
field to the social arena—especially since the Church was no
longer threatened by secular political foroes. The temporary
Interruption brought about by the Per6n tyranny had forced the
Church to concern itself with political issues, but now, with the
dictator gone, It was free to pursue its mission in the social
and spiritual fields of human aotlvity. Led by Pope Pius XII, the
Argentine Church sought to strengthen its visible presenoe In
Argentina in a now campaign aimed at increasing the number and
quality of the olergy and In strengthening religious devotion among
the people. Accordingly, Bishop Fermln Lafltte, coadjutor arch-
bishop of Buenos Aires, opened a crusade for priestly vocations, 89
by noting that of the 51 parish vacancies in Buenos Aires In 1957,
only seven were filled by new Argentine clerics and only six would
be filled In 1958. The drive to lnorease priestly vocations and
religious devotlonB among the people wa3 spearheaded In i960, by
87Ibld., October 27, 1959.
89c
op
Ibid .. September 14, I960.
'Supra , p. 103.
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Blshop Fulton J. Sheen, the United States director for The
Propagation of the Faith. Sheen visited Argentina at the time
that the largest cruGade ever witnessed in Latin America was
being held. The crusade was begun by the Papal iunclo when he
dlspatohed 2,000 missionaries to open the dialogue between the
Churoh and Argentina. Sheen made twelve television appearanoes,
lectured at the University of Buenos Aires Law L'chool and at the
Institute of the Holy Cross. The weak-long crusade was regarded
as a great success—some three million Argentines had attended
services in the Cathedral of Buenos Aires, and the number re-
ceiving Communion had increased threefold. In addition, a record
number of baptisms and marriages had been performed. 9° Sheen's
return to the United States was followed by a meeting of 800
Cathollo clergy and lay workers in Washington, D. C. The Ameri-
can group agreed to give Latin Amerioa top priority during the
decade of the 1960's and, toward that end, stated that "the U.S.
hierarchy would contribute substantial sums of financial aid to
the Church in Latin Amerioa. "91
The close of I960 witnessed the Roman Cathollo bishops
of Latin Amerioa appealing to national leaders and all Catholics
to support low-ooat housing and 'Just land reform. The bishops,
gathering in ;>uenoB Aires, added that the various governments
and private groups must construct decent housing for all families
90
"Task Force for Catholicism, " Time. Vol. 76, Ho. 18,
October 31, I960, p. 28.
^The New York Timos . September 14, I960.
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and permit the peasants the right to attain their own land. 92
The Church's stance had thus become more stabilized In its new
role.
92Ibld .. November 20, I960.
CHAPTER V
PAST AND PRESENT
The State
We have traoed the development of Churoh-State relations
from the founding of the Argentine nation up to i960 with par-
ticular emphasis on this development slnoe 1392. However,
only brief mention has so far been made of the composition of
the power structure of the Argentine State. These components,
or centers of power, together constituted the dynamics and the
essence of the State. Any enumeration of these power centers
would Include not only the Church, but the oligarchy, the poli-
tical parties, organized labor, the university students and the
armed forces.
Traditionally, Argentina has been controlled or governed
by any number of the^e power oenters Jointly, acting in ooncert.
Any number of combinations have evolved between the various
power centera with first one and then the other allied together
for a certain period of time. As these links or common bonds
have broken with the emergence of new ideas and Issues, a new
combination of power resulted in whioh former allies often found
themselves on opposing sides. Rarely has there been a unanimity
of agreement or action among the power centers for a long period
of time, but prior to the 20th century human sooiety was more
-130-
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slmple, less complex and consequently less fragmentized. In
the society that was, but Is no longer, there were three princi-
pal oenters of power, Instead of the six or more found In con-
temporary Argentina—the Church, the array and the oligarohy.
These three traditional centers of power acted In unison more
often than not, enabling them to dominate the Argentine nation
economically, politically, and religiously. As there existed
rellgiou:: unanimity in the 19th century, a political concordance
frequently governed relations between the Churoh, the army, and
the oligarchy.
The Church, politically, was as important, or nearly as
important, as the other centers of power, for it alone encompassed
most Argentines and transcended the limits of the other centers of
power, principally because the majority of the army and the oli-
garchy not only acceded to their particular group but, additional-
ly? gave loyalty to the Church, resulting in a Juxtaposition of
the various centers of power.
As has been shown, this traditional power structure began
to ohange radically In the 1880' s—largely a result of the growing
divisions within society—the rapid increase and expansion of the
new centers of power, out of and away from the original nuolel.
Immigration, the rise of an urban proletariat, the increase and
spread of education, the organization of political parties—all
acted as catalyzing agents in sparking the transformation of a
small rural traditional society into that of a larger, more com-
plex, modern state—the contemporary Argentina. The gigantic
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cattle barons found new commercial and Industrial giants had
orowded Into the expanding economic power spectrum. Labor, never
effectively united, waited to be organized. The State as a dis-
penser of social welfare benefits would develop and expand Its
operations through Its agents. 1
Ho longer was the Church the behemoth that It onoe had
been when It embraced practically the whole Argentine nation, and
accordingly, It suffered a decline In Its relative Importance—
a
decline In both the religious and polltloal fields. Placed on
the defensive by the new challenges confronting It, the Church,
still a creative force, was constrained to shift Its emphasis from
the polltloal to the soolal field of human activity, although Its
weakened polltloal power would remain a potent force to be reck-
oned with as the Perfin era later proved.
The oligarchy, like the Church, experienced a relative
deollne In Its political and eoonomlc power as the 20th century
progressed—and particularly since 1942. Onoe a dominant power
center in alliance with the Church and the army, the oligarchy,
although controlling much of the national wealth, held an In-
creasingly smaller proportion of the total wealth In an expanding
and changing society. Hever large numerically, the oligarchy
was able to maintain its polltloal hegemony by astute behind-the-
scenes political maneuvers with the army. Determined to hold on
to its privileged economic and social position, the oligarchy
allied Itself with any conservative reactionary force In order to
Lieuwen, p. 69.
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maintaln the status gup : thereby maintaining for Itself a major
role In national affairs. The political power of the Argentine
oligarchy seems to have waned as a decisive Influence upon na-
tional affairs.
Numerous Argentine political parties arose from the dis-
illusionment and discontent experienced by the lower middle
classes and bourgeoisie at the hands of the oligarchy and con-
servative forces. The political parties became spokesmen for
the bourgeoisie—a means of expressing opposition to the conser-
vative and oligarchical ruling Interests, which heretofore had
Ignored the existence of the new and rapidly Increasing commer-
cial class within the national confines.
Originally, the bourgeoisie had been numerically small;
It had no champion for its Interests, no means of protesting
against the abuses of the wealthy oligarchy and conservatives.
The rapid rise of polltloal parties of whatever political hue
supplied the bourgeoisie with a weapon—an Instrument that oould
be employed to defense of Its own Interests. One of Argentina's
greatest dilemmas has been that the political parties have
fragmented to such a degree that no single party could command
more than a minimum of public support—at least not until the
Peronlst party was organized. Where political life Is not clearly
defined nor developed as In Argentina, the resulting confusion
has been bo great that the nation has often bordered on anarchy.
As nations develop politically, the oenters of power distinguish
themselves, usually becoming more public and consequently more
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democratlc* As Argentina has not evolved politically, the
democratic processes have suffered. :;o modern state can main-
tain a stable government where a multitude of mall political
parties exist—amply demonstrated In the example of Prance,
where political factionalism and fragmentation have led to vir-
tual anarchy. Party factionalism In Argentina likewise has so
weakened and divided public opinion that the bourgeolse class has
been effectively disenfranchised. The differences between the
political parties has beooree so basic and bitter that they hrtve
lost contact with the masses and prestige among the people at
large.-5 On the contrary, In most modern democratic states where
the rights of the Individual are respected and upheld, the large
bourgeolse political parties have bolstered the center position
and avoided the extremes between the right and the left, .v'here
a multiplicity of political parties exists, as In Argentina, the
middle classes oannot speak effectively; hence they have been
dominated by a minority of extremists, usually of the political
right.
The Argentine masses, chiefly laborers in urban and rural
areas, were generally disregarded before the rise of Per6n. His
electoral success was their victory^* for onoe organized labor
could make Its voice heard; could be represented In the political
2
"Polltlcs In Latin American Countries," 01? REPORTS . Vol.
I, No. 3, p. 110.
f
3Arthur P. KMtaker, "The Argentine Paradox," The Annals
thg American Academy of Political and Social Science . OCXXXIV
arch, 1961), p. 109.
^Supra . p. 85.
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forum of the nation and eventually could come to dominate the
political life of the nation through the ballot box and the
powerful General Confederation of Labor. Organized labor was
the last of the modern centers of power to arise aB a potent
political force, but certainly not the least. As the most numer-
ous of all the Argentine power groups, It had too long lacked a
spokesman for Its just demands for better housing and living
wages. Consequently when It found an advocate in Perfin, It
supported him wholeheartedly and was Instrumental In his rise to
power. The average Argentine laborer was only superficially edu-
cated, and for hlni, democracy and Individual rights were Utopian
and meaningless since those who had to toll long hours in order
to earn a small pittance were concerned not with Ideas, but with
the realities of the present life. Their antagonists were the
oligarchy, the conservatives, and other Argentines who luxuriated
In a hedonistic life without care, thought or concern for their
fellow man. With the ultimate downfall of Peron, labor's poli-
tical power suffered a temporary and dramatic eclipse. However,
organized labor oannot be again Ignored by the ruling cliques,
for labor's future cooperation will bo necessary to guard the
stability and keep the Internal tranquility of the Argentine na-
tion.
As the weakest power center in Argentina, the university
students are a vocal minority that bring pressure to bear upon
many vital political issues through the media of student strikes
and demonstrations. Usually organized along the lines of the
nation '8 political parties, the university students act as a
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catalyst rather than the determining factor In the formulation
of major political decisions. Their strikes may be ineffective,
but at such times that they affect the population as a whole
they beoome an Influential medium of arousing mass protest.
5
When the university students demonstrate against specific govern-
mental policies, they vivify and activate political opposition to
the State. Vfhether they will ever be on a par with the other
centers of power would seen doubtful slnoe they are limited In
numbers. Nevertheless, at certain periods they will continue to
have a telling effect upon the internal organs of the nation.
The armed foroes are today perhaps the single most power-
ful force In Argentina. Traditionally one of the Important cen-
ters of power, but unlike the oligarchy and the Church which
have declined in relative polltloal Importance, the armed foroes
have not only maintained their former position, but have Increased
it to the point that they virtually dominate Argentine political
life. Since the revolution of 1930 against the then president,
Hlp6llto Irigoyen, the armed forces have played an increasingly
larger role and have beoome a permanent factor In Argentine po-
litical life due to the sharp and deep divisions within the na-
tion—divisions which have led to a loss of direction. 6 Formerly
allied with the oligarchy and the conservative foroes In the 19th
century, they have recently—or rather a part of them—supported
* University Students: A Heal Pressure Group," CIP REPORTS .
p. 124.
6Whl taker, "The Argentine Paradox," p. 107.
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labor's demands for a larger role In Argentine affairs. This
resulted in the alliance of labor and the military under Per6n
—an alliance that became the pllisr upon which the Peron regime
rested.
After the first antl-Per6n revolt, part of the armed forces
withdrew Its support from labor and backed the Church In Its bit-
ter struggle against the tyranny. Mo friend of political parties,
the military had thrown Its support to one or another of the vari-
ous contending faotlons, depending upon which particular group or
groups they favored at the moment. It was said that "the Army
gave Peron power and It was the Array, Jointly with the tlavy, that
destroyed his power.'
The Argentine military Is not and has not been unanimous
In Its polltloal thinking. The military leaders—the officers-
like most sectors of modern society have been the onlookers In
the continual seesaw battle of opinion back and forth like the
pendulum of a clock. For a time one particular faction of mili-
tary thinking becomes dominant and asserts Itself politically.
This faction remains In the ascendency until enough opposition
has been generated from within Its own ranks to permit another
faction to rise to the top to displace the former and assume com-
mand. The new faction then acts as the spokesman for the bulk of
the military. During the Kamlrez and Peron regimes, the conser-
vative, reactionary military faction was ascendant and, as such,
7"Tlmes Getting Hard for Dictators," g.H. News . September
30, 1955, p. 38. This statement was valid In part, but does not
present the entire story, since the other power centers allied
themselves with the army In support of Peron, permitting the
army to support Per6n in the elections of 1946.
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supported the dictatorships. However, as the persecution of
the Church Intensified, many of the military officers with
strong religious convictions could no longer support Per6n, and
this faction became first vocal and then aotlve In determining
the military decisions which led to the final overthrow of
Feronlsao . The military forces have come to regard themselves
as the "legitimate force of gravitation In the nations' Institu-
tional order" and as the guarantor or republican principles."
why. It may be asked, are the armed foroes so strong to-
day, and v;hy are they able to dominate the Argentine political
spectrum? One of the reasons might be that the technological
Improvements In military weapons made within the last half cen-
tury have given the military greater oombat strength and more
rapid mobility, vrith Improved technology has come more rapid
communications and more effective weapons. A revolt In a well-
organized modern state becomes most unlikely without the assent
or cooperation of the armed foroes. This axiom is largely over-
looked by many experts of polltloal affairs who still predicate
revolution on the existent oondltlons of 1789—that Is that man
armed only with uncomplicated weapons can effectively revolt
against tanks and machine guns with any hope of success.
In recent years, the Argentine armed forces absorbed about
eighteen percent of the total national budget." What part of
this large sum was spent on military equipment and what part was
°Whltaker, The Annals .... p. 106.
9CIF REPORTS , p. 110.
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pald out in the form of salaries to the enlisted personnel is
not revealed, but any power center than can rely on approximately
one-fifth of the national budget is necessarily a power to be
considered, particularly where, as in Argentina, there is an ab-
sence of political balance in the national struoture.
The Church
Influence of state on church .—The changing environment
and rising power centers of the State caused the Church to shift
its emphasis from the political to the soolal area as mentioned
before. The relative political and spiritual decline of the Church
since the 1880 's was due in part to the State's exercise of the
national patronage. State control of religious appointments
often saddled the Church with men of inferior ability, who fre-
quently were more concerned about their individual benefices than
they were about the religious needs of the people.
An Indigenous clergy failed to develop In Argentina, and
the nation had to depend upon outside help for what few clerics
it oould obtain. The lack of clergy, while still serious today,
had been even more critical in the nascent years of the young
Republic. As a result, modern missionary principles gained little
acceptance, and the medieval methods of patronage, unable to per-
form the misslonizlng task, led to an underdeveloped Catholicism
and the virtual cessation of the Christian apostolate in Argen-
tina. 10
10Coleman, p. 11.
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Another factor responsible for the Church's weakened role
In Argentine society was the State seizure of most Church proper-
ties in the Rivadavlan period of reform. 11 The majority of
Argentine people still regard the Church as wealthy from the
visible signs of handsome Church structures. The practice of
voluntary contributions to support the Church remained undevelop-
ed, and the Churoh found Itself compelled to rely on the State
for much of Its sustenance. This mentality—that the Church Is
rich—still predominates in Argentina and mo3t of Latin America,
although the opposite would be closer to the truth. Although no
statistics are available for Argentina, they have been compiled
for the Archdiocese of Santiago de Chile, which, with over two
million Catholics, has a paltry annual income of ,165,000. In
Lima, Peru, an American Karyknoll parish with 7,500 regular Sun-
day oommunlcants, collects only £100 a week. 12 The lack of
clergy, coupled with the shortage of financial resources are per-
haps the two most serious results of State intervention into the
religious sphere. These deficits compounded other weaknesses,
which Bet off a ohain reaction which seriously threatened the
effectiveness of the Churoh. The lack of olergy led to the rela-
tive ignorance of most Argentine Catholics, which resulted in a
nominal Catholicism. Future generations of Argentines could
have been trained in the basic precepts of Christianity, without
Church reliance upon religious instruction In the public schools,
l:LSupra
. p. 26.
12Leonard Gross, "The Catholic Churoh in Latin America,"
Look, October 9, 1962, p. 31.
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lf religious schools had not been lacking; the result of lack
of money In part,1}
Recently, the lack of religious devotion among Argentines
was attested to by a religious survey conducted In a typical
parish In 3uenos Aires. Of the 25,000 parishioners, ninety-three
percent had been baptized, ninety percent married by the Church,
but only sixty percent had made their first Communion. Of 125
Argentine children who made their first Communion In this parish,
only one father and six mothers were practicing Catholles. J'.ost
baptized Argentines completely Ignore the fundamentals of their
faith, since only thirteen percent attend Sunday Hass, and less
than five percent perform their Easter duty. 1^ Besides not prac-
ticing their religion, many Argentines deny the dogmas of the
Church regarding papal Infallibility and the lndl solubility of
marriage. !5 These foregoing statistics, while not conclusive,
serve to highlight tho serious questions faolng the Church In Ar-
gentina
—
problems that largely originated out of past Church-
State relations.
13
"Latin America—A Challenge to Catholics," .,'orld Klsslon
H, Ho. 1, Spring, I960, pp. 1-2. The serious shortage of Catho-
lic schools Is shown by comparing Mew York to Buenos Aires. In
M* York City, with a Catholic population of 1,500,000 there were
218,000 children enrolled in the church schools, while in Buenos
Aires with over 3,200,000 Catholics, or more than double the Itv
York Catholic population, there were only 100,000 Catholic children
attending church directed schools in 1958.
^Tercera sernana, p. 61. fioraan Catholic dogma states that
every Catholic has an obligation to make his annual Easter duty
—
that Is he must go to Confession and receive Communion at least
once a year. Failure to make one's annual duty results in ipso
facto excommunication.
15Ibld .. p. 65.
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The religious life of the Argentines had reached such a
low ebb by 1930 that Protestantism was able to successfully in-
crease its mlssionzlng activities to the extent that the Catholic
Church was challenged from another area—that of Protestantism.
The growing strength of Protestantism in Argentina has been con-
demned by many right wing Catholic clerics, but other more liberal
prelates have viewed the Protestant successes as a blessing In
disguise, since the energetic Protestant mission campaigns have
acted as an impetus in arousing the Catholio Church from its leth-
argy. The half million Protestants in Argentina today have pro-
vided a needed challenge to the traditional religion. Their
missionizlng efforts have proved so successful that the Catholic
Church has taken a page from the Protestant book by adopting new
Christianizing techniques similar to those of their oo-rellglonlsts,
principally that of intense evangelizing oampalgns. 1^ A three
weeks mission oampalgn was recently launched by the Catholic
Church; twenty-two laymen and nineteen priests participated in
dally preaching on the streetcorners. The results were eminently
satisfactory among the laboring classes. As one cleric later
commented: "We are not too late; if we all work and pray for It." 1?
In view of the present weakness of the Catholio Church In
Argentina, it might be asked how the Church became such an impor-
tant political factor in the overthrow of the Peronlsta tyranny,
as its main emphasis had of late been directed toward the social
165upra . p. 12T.
^CIP REPORTS , p. 133.
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area. One general conclusion la that the Catholic Churoh,
traditionally involved in Argentine political activities, had
shifted its emphasis to the social phase of human activity, but
had not entirely excluded itself from the political arena. This
shift in emphasis was interrupted during the period of the Perdn
tyranny, when the Church was forced to turn Its attention to the
political arena onoe again in order to defend its traditional
rights. The fight against Peronist aggression necessitated the
suspension of activity in the social area, hut this suspension
proved only temporary In nature. Once Perdn had been ousted, the
Church again was free to turn toward the sooial area tilth a re-
newed vigor and greater conviction than previously demonstrated. 13
The persecutions and restrictions endured under the Per6n govern-
ment caused a new welding of clerical opinion, since most of the
reactionary clerics were forced by events to malce coamon oause
with the left wing clergy at this time. After Per6n, much of
this new spirit of cooperation was maintained, so that sooial
reforms had greater support from the Churoh than formerly. An
additional factor In the greater unanimity of Church opinion was
due to the death of many older prelates and their subsequent re-
placement by younger priests, educated under different circum-
stances in a different era.
i'ost observers of the Argentine political soene have
stated that the Church was no more than a rallying point in the
final overthrow of Peron—In other words, individual members of
l8Supra . p. 128.
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the clergy did not aotlvely take up arms and lead the revolts
of June 16 or September 16, 1955. This Is a valid hypothesis
as presented, but It fallc to mention the role played by Catholic
Action. Catholic Action, as the "right arm" of the Churoh, had
been accorded the role of official spokesman for the Churoh
along with the hierarchy. On the last fateful days before the
final overthrow of Per6n, the leaders of Catholic Action became
divided In opinion, whether to aid and assist actively In the
ousting of the dictatorship or whether to heed the hierarchy's
pleas for non-intervention. Some leaders of Cathollo Action who
favored armed Intervention undoubtedly did take up arms In C6r-
doba and probably became the local blook leaders In defense of
that city, although adequate statistics on their role are not yet
available. It Is highly probable that many of the squad or pla-
toon captains under General Ffillx Balaguer were local leaders of
Catholic Action. 1" If these supposition- could be substantiated,
then the Church was not only a rallying point for the opposition
to Peron, but may have been an aotlve participant In hl3 ultimate
downfall, along with the armed services.
In the overthrow of Per6n, the Churoh was more of a catalyst
than a mere rallying polnt~lt was the agent whloh aided In the
transformation without Itself being changed and without which the
transformation would have been slower or difficult of achievement.
Even If the suggestion that loaders of Catholic Action aotlvely
took up arms laoks proof or validity, It may still be asserted
19
'Sunra
. ?. 120.
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that the Church, however visibly weak In Argentina, exerted a
vital Influence upon the Argentine people—an Influence which,
though they might choose to Ignore It, they would not allow to
be destroyed.
Influence of Church on State .—That the Catholic Church
was able to rally support against the State epitomized by Per6n
was not due to Its support of democracy. The Church was chiefly
concerned with protecting Its Interests, and when those Interests
were threatened, It rose up In Its own defense. >er6n's attack
upon the Church was a calculated risk for the outcome could not
be predicted. The Increasing persecution of the Church rallied
not only Catholic opinion, but cut aero s class lines and gained
the Church muoh sympathy from a vast reservoir of latent good will
even though the Argentine people were but nominal Catholics.
Statistics are not available nor has a comprehensive sur-
vey yet been made of the Argentine military's religious beliefs
and practices, so far as this writer knows, but from other scien-
tific surveys, an assumption might be drawn that the Argentine
military officers were more actively Catholic than the nation as
a whole; a large percentage of whom could be considered practicing
or formal Cathollos, 20 particularly since the military officers
belonged to an above average educational group. A reoent survey
to determine the religious practices of the French, based upon
their educational level of attainment, in Dijon, France, showed
that those Kith a higher or college education were the most active
2°Supra , p. 3.
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rellgiously, while those who had only a minimum of schooling
were the least active religiously. In the former group—those
with the equivalent of a college degree, fifty-five percent were
found to be practicing Catholics, while among the latter, the
laboring classes, only thirteen peroent were practicing Catholics.
In the absence of any similar survey for Argentina, the French
survey may or may not have much significance for Argentina beoause
Its validity In a different environment would be open to question.
However, the Argentine military officers are, by and large, drawn
from the middle class and have enjoyed the beneflto of a better
education, and It Is possible that they are more religious than
the nation as a whole. If this hypothesis is true, then the ?e-
ronlate. attacks upon the Church culminating In the desecration of
the churches may have caused a revulsion In the minds of certain
military officers. This revulsion of feeling, this shock and out-
rage activated by the arsonists may have caused the balance of
military opinion to 3hlft from support of Peron to Initial latent
opposition—opposition which finally matured Into the open revolt
of September, 1955.
Per6n had moved fox some time toward a position which made
him less dependent upon hie brothers In arms. At the same time,
It Is to be expected that certain personal power ambitions of In-
dividual officers militated against the dictator's position in
1955. The position of the Church and its relationship with the
dissident military officers has remained pretty much of an enigma
In spite of some of the general indications. 21
21Lieuwen, p. 69.
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Churoh-3tate Relations in Retrospect
The Ohureh until the 20th oentury had been passive In
the social sphere and had failed to present a favorable Individual
Image that the masses could follow. The masses viewed the Church
as having been present In Argentina for four centuries, and still
It had not been able to Improve their lives nor even keep up with
the changing conditions of society. 22 This lack of vigor In the
social field was costly to the Church, for the masses largely
turned away from religion. The fact that the Argentine Church
has onoe again turned Its faoe toward the soolal and spiritual
needs of Its people does not mean that Its Influence may no longer
be felt In the political realm. An the Churoh gathers strength
among the Argentine people, It must, If Its message Is effective,
generate a strong moral feeling among its adherents. The element
of morality should, In turn, make Its lnpaot on the whole of
society, Including Its political elements. It might be suggested
that a strongly Christian element in Argentina might make a sub-
stantial contribution to the stability and democracy needed In
Argentine political life. Too often In the past the Church had
remained silent to dictatorship, and that silence was Interpreted
as approval by many Argentines. The masses rejected the established
order, for It had not helped them, and seeing the Church as part
of that order, they rejected the Church.
The Peroh tyranny was not entirely harmful to religion for
It did have a beneflolal effeot upon the Churoh In that It moved
22LooJc, Ootober 9, 1942, p. 32.
-148-
the Catholic laity to a keener appreciation of olvll and reli-
gious rights, too often In the past taken for granted. 23 Before
Per6n, the Churoh had been characterized as being preoccupied
with Irresolute routines that led noirtiere. In the post-Perfin
period this Idea has been somewhat dispelled due to the Intense
efforts of Catholic Action and the visible laical response In
the organizing of a Catholic association of doctors and teaohers
with a membership of 7,000 and 34,000 respectively. 24
There still exists much routine Catholicism, but It appears
to be on the wane with the gawnth of an apostolic spirit, espe-
cially noteworthy among the younger generation. Another aspect
of present Church resurgence Id the rapidly increasing role of
American missionaries In Argentina, The number of American
Catholic missionaries In Latin America has lnoreaGod by 335 per-
cent—from 489 In 1940 to 2,580 today. 25 %e American hierarchy
Is purouing an intensified and vigorous campaign In conjunction
with the Holy See's efforts to rectify the critical shortage of
priests and schools. Hew parishes are being created, new reli-
gious schools being built and a more religious atmosphere Is said
to prevail. 26 The Argentine hierarchy has openly pressed the
v-.L. f
3
^
hn
„
J,
J
c
?
nBldlne
' £P Horizons |a Latin America (NewYork: Dodd, Head & Co., 1958)7 P. 96.
2AIbld.. p. 97.
and Bros?
Y
Wishers,
J
^of,^i^^ ^ 1"-" *"»"
26Tercem seraana, p. 66.
-149-
ollgarchy to raise vfages, partition lands and carry out reforms.
Additionally, a network of centers, fostering social and economic
projects, are being built, and ftrang priests (largely foreign)
are entering depressed areas which previously have received only
a perfunctory religious oare. 2''
,
The activities of the Church among the university students
through the Union of Catholic Students Is having an Important ef-
fect, formerly, graduates of Catholic universities, like most
Argentine university Graduates, had little faith In the masses.
This Is no longer as true today.
In conclusion, a word about Argentine democraoy should be
Included. The Church-State study whloh ha.- Just been made pointed
out some glaring defects In Argentine democracy. Real democracy
and Individual freedom can exist only where a diversity of opinion
and Ideas exist—a diversity that the Argentine government has
been unwilling to permit, either in the past or at the present
time. Dissent from the official position has not been allowed to
stand for long. As long aa Argentine prelates, Intellectuals,
and publlo officials are not free to differ from the official
governmental position without fear or danger of removal or dismis-
sal, democracy will be no more than an empty facade in Argentina.
Ignoring or pretending that forces which weaken Argentine demo-
cracy do not exist is no solution for the problem.
In spite of a high level of education and a relatively
sound economic base, democratic ideals have not been achieved.
27Lo£k, October 9, 1942, p. 32.
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Argentina Is a prime example of the fact that true democracy
calls for more than a high level of economic and educational
attainment. These are necessary pre-requlsltes, but political
stability is equally important to the effeotlve functioning of
a democracy.
..'lthout an adequate system of oheoks and balanoes
upon the power of the State, all the cures and panaceas offered
serve to little avail. The State should not be permitted to
intervene in the provinces under the guloe of protecting the pub-
llo interest, because this power has been abused too often and too
long. Neither should lax laws permitting the declaration of a
national emergency under Lhe slightest pretext be allowed to stand,
for this Instead of protecting the nation and Its people, marely
promotes the rise of authoritarianism with the consequent subju-
gation, rather than protection, of the people. Equally Impor-
tant is the fact that the State has abused its power of patronage
over the Church in the appointment of ecclesiastics. This abuse
of federal power has gone so far that university heads and fa-
culty have been diomlssed on the slightest pretense, simply be-
cause they disagreed with prevailing government opinion. Pro-
vincial freedom Is tenuous, Church freedom is restricted and
academic freedom is llluaosy m Argentina. Under these conditions
oan demooraey be attained in Argentina? As this Is being written
the "president" of Argentina, Jos6 Maria Guldo,. has called upon
the Church to aid the State In maintaining a semblance of order
in the forthcoming elections of June, 1963—which in likelihood
will be cancelled because of army pressure. It Is a sad state
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of affairs when the head of a nation feela obliged to call upon
the spiritual powers In order to help maintain national stability.
The present Impasse (1963) does not seen to augur well for the
future of the Argentine people~nor does the confused Church-
State relationship appear to be any nearer a solution.
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ABSTRACT OP THESIS
The primary purpose of undertaking a study of Church-
Hate relations In Argentina was to determine what effect past
historical events had had upon Church-State relations as they
evolved down to the Per6n era and what changes In the spiritual-
temporal spheres of society had occurred since the end of the
19th century.
Host of the source materials for this thesis were not
readily available and some twenty or more books were obtained
by means of the lnterllbrary loan system. Almost all of these
were books published In the Spanish language.
The first part of this thesis— the Introduction—was
purposely long In order that certain aspects of the Church-State
problem, particularly the nature of the Church and of patronage
might be examined, thereby facilitating better comprehension of
later chapters.
The second seotlon of the thesis was a summary of past
historical events, divided Into specific periods which this
writer felt to be chronologically Important, beginning with the
Argentine Independence movement and continuing through the
period of Rlvadavlan reform, the Rosas tyranny, the Constitu-
tional period, down to the rise of the secularist state, which
germinated In the next to the last decade of the 19th oentury.
The third section of the the3is deals with the problems
of a ohanglng society and a ohanglng Church with particular
emphasis being placed upon how the Church had shifted Its empha-
sis from the former political to the social field of human acti-
vity, being intei-rupted only once during the Perdn era, but
only temporarily since it renewed its oonoem with social pro-
blems after the deialse of the Peronista dictatorship.
A chronological recitation of events is related in the
fourth section of the thesi3—events that occurred during the
the Perdn period and show how the Church became the catalyst--
a rallying point of opposition to Peronista absolutism.
The last section of the thesis Is in the form of a con-
clusion that seeks to relate the various elements within one
part of soolety to another and at the same time formulates de-
finitive conclusions. The composition of the State is thus
studied and each component part is examined In its relations
with the Church, which is distinct, but yet a part of tho en-
tire social structure.
In summation, this thesis has proved that not only did
the Church change, but the State changed as well—that both
elements within the social framework were in a state of tran-
sition. Prom time to time areas of friction would arise between
these two elements, especially in the field of education and
patronal rights. These areas of friction were solved for the
most part through the formulation of a modus Vivendi or unwritten
agreement between these two powers.
In the Peron era, compromise no longer became possible
due to the Intransigence of the Perdn dictatorship, and Church-
State relations rapidly reached a climax when the Church, not
ordinarily an active political force became the motivating
factor—the rallying point which culminated In the ultimate
downfall of the Per6n dictatorship. The Church as a polltloal
force In Argentina Is amply demonstrated In this section.
The post-Per6n period witnesses the Church once more
engaged In the soolal field of human activity—a field of activity
In which the State Is also engaged. Whether these two forces
oan work and cooperate together In the future remains to be
seen.
